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Public health interventions are often characterised by costs and outcomes across multiple 
sectors, with benefits that might only be realised far in the future. Further, such 
interventions frequently aim to address health equity concerns. For these reasons, the 
economic evaluation of public health interventions raises methodological and technical 
challenges. The lack of a consistent framework to evaluate their cost-effectiveness has 
been emphasised in the literature. 
This thesis has two main objectives. First, to develop an analytical framework for the 
economic evaluation of public health interventions. The second aim is to show how to 
operationalise the proposed framework, using a brief alcohol intervention to reduce 
alcohol consumption among criminal offenders as a case study. 
The proposed framework extends cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) methods which are 
widely used for the evaluation of health care interventions, and consists of a cross-sectoral 
analysis, with the potential incorporation of health equity concerns and cross-temporal 
impacts. 
The case study intervention impacts Health Care (HC) and Criminal Justice System (CJS). 
Conclusions and recommendations differ according to the perspective adopted for the 
evaluation. Analyses provide different results when conducted from the following 
perspectives: naïve HC (i.e. considering exclusively health-related costs and health effects 
on offenders); CJS; full HC (i.e. including also spill-over effects from criminal justice on 
victims’ health and additional costs falling on the HC budget to treat victims); and joint HC 
and CJS. Alternative value judgments and equity considerations incorporated in the 
economic evaluation also affect the results of the analysis. 
The proposed framework can provide support to decision making for local authorities, and 
could be potentially employed for the economic evaluation of all public health 
interventions. Results of the case study demonstrate the important implications of this 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
1.1. Overview 
Public health interventions aim to promote health, prevent ill health and reduce health inequalities. 
Such interventions are not focused at the individual, but at a group level or above, potentially 
affecting the whole population (NICE, 2015, 2012). Resources available to fund health interventions 
are scarce, and the role of economic evaluation is to assist decision makers in their decisions about 
which intervention(s) to choose (Drummond, M. et al., 2015). The complex nature of public health 
interventions raises methodological and technical challenges in their evaluation (Weatherly et al., 
2009). 
Economic evaluations of health care interventions are typically conducted from the health (and 
social) care perspective and are only focused on health care costs and health consequences. Such 
a narrow perspective potentially underestimates the full impact of a public health intervention. It 
may be necessary to assess a broader range of non-health costs and effects falling on other sectors 
(e.g. education, criminal justice, employment and environment). Further, the impacts may be far in 
the future. Moreover, in this context, additional concerns about health equity might become 
critically important (Weatherly, Cookson & Drummond, 2014, Weatherly et al., 2009, Chalkidou et 
al., 2008, Drummond, M. et al., 2007). 
The omission of relevant cross-sectoral and long-term impacts might cause imprecise and 
misleading results, and lead to inconsistent decision making against decision makers’ aims. The 
inclusion of concerns about the distribution of health (and other outcomes) across the population 
and health inequalities might also impact the preferred intervention. 
1.2. Research questions 
Within this context, the main aim of this thesis is to define appropriate methods for the economic 
evaluation of public health interventions with impacts on multiple sectors. 
More pragmatically, the objective is to develop and implement an analytical framework that 
extends cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) methods which are widely used for the evaluation of 
health care interventions. The proposed framework could consider costs and outcomes across 
sectors, long-term costs and effects, and health inequity concerns in the analysis. Such framework 
can provide support to decision making for local authorities, and could be potentially employed for 
the economic evaluation of all public health interventions. 
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To demonstrate the important implications of this work for future evaluations, the developed 
framework of analysis will be explored using a brief intervention for offenders with alcohol related 
problems as a case study. The case study will be focused on addressing the cross-sectoral and health 
inequity aspects of the analysis. Nonetheless, the proposed framework could theoretically 
accommodate also the inclusion of cross-temporal aspects, and this aspect will be discussed as a 
potential extension of the evaluation. 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of three parts. The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) aims at addressing the research 
questions from a more theoretical point of view and is focused on the development of the 
framework. The second part (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) of the thesis is based on a case study. Lastly, 
in Chapter 8, theoretical approach, findings and limitations of the case study are discussed and 
conclusions are drawn; recommendations for further research are also provided. The next three 
sub-sections describe each part of the thesis in further detail. 
Theoretical part 
After this first introductory chapter, the second chapter explores the theoretical framework of the 
economic evaluation of health care interventions. In the first part of Chapter 2, theoretical 
underpinnings and analytical methods typically employed for the assessment of health care 
interventions are reviewed and categorised. The final output is a taxonomy which aims at clarifying 
the characteristics and differences of the various potential alternative evaluation choices. The 
second part of Chapter 2 describes the nature of public health interventions and illustrates the 
theoretical and practical challenges in their analysis. Limitations of the traditional techniques are 
highlighted, and alternative potential methods of analysis to overcome these issues are briefly 
reviewed. At the end of the chapter, the main characteristics of the proposed approach to the 
analysis are delineated. 
In the third chapter a framework which extends a ‘traditional’ CEA to include an evaluation across 
sectors, an inequity analysis, and an assessment of cross-temporal impacts is proposed. To capture 
cross-sectoral impacts, outcomes falling on different sectors are assessed and trade-offs among 
them are estimated. A compensation scheme across decision makers in different sectors in order 
to address resource allocation problems – generated when costs fall on a sector and benefits on 
another – is proposed. The cross-sectoral analysis is then extended in order to incorporate health 
inequity considerations in the evaluation. The objective is to assess impacts on health inequities 
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across population subgroups, and alternative solutions for aggregating outcomes across individuals 
and dimensions are investigated. To reflect intertemporal issues, extrapolation techniques could 
be employed to estimate long-term costs and consequences of the intervention. Moreover, the 
impact of budgetary policies could be assessed. 
Case study 
From Chapter 4 to Chapter 7, a brief alcohol intervention to reduce alcohol consumption among 
offenders is used as a vehicle to illustrate how to operationalise the proposed framework. Even 
though the scope of the theoretical framework is potentially broader, the focus of the case study is 
on the operationalisation of the cross-sectoral and health equity analyses. 
Each chapter covers one step of the analysis. In Chapter 4, the cost-effectiveness of the intervention 
is investigated from a ‘naïve’ health care system perspective, with decision makers solely focused 
on costs falling on the health and social care budget, and effects on trial participants. A ‘traditional’ 
CEA is thus conducted to evaluate health-related costs and health effects only on the offenders. 
In Chapter 5, a CEA is carried out from the criminal justice system perspective (i.e. with decision 
makers solely focused on criminal justice). Costs falling on the budget of the criminal justice system 
are estimated, and reductions in reconviction frequency are used as a measure of effectiveness. 
Chapter 6 builds on the evaluations conducted in Chapters 4 and 5. In the first part of Chapter 6, 
the CEA conducted from the health care perspective is revised and spill-over effects from criminal 
justice on victims are included in the evaluation. A ‘full’ health care system perspective is therefore 
adopted, with decision makers still solely focused on health. In the second part of the chapter, 
another CEA is conducted from a broader and integrated perspective, where decision makers are 
focused on both health and criminal justice. 
Chapter 7 investigates the effects of incorporating health equity concerns in the cross-sectoral 
analysis. 
Discussion and conclusions 
Chapter 8 briefly summaries objectives and results of the previous chapters, and highlights the 
contributions of this thesis to the literature. Further, it covers the discussion of both the theoretical 
analytical framework and the analysis of the case study. In this chapter, the potential cross-
temporal extension of the evaluation is discussed. Moreover, policy implications and 
recommendations for future research are pointed out, and conclusions of the work are drawn.  
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Chapter 2:  Theoretical background 
2.1. Introduction to the economic evaluation of health care interventions 
Economic evaluation can be defined as the comparative analysis of alternative courses of action in 
terms of both their costs and consequences (Drummond, M. et al., 2015, p. 4). The two main 
features of economic evaluation are thus highlighted: firstly, it deals with both inputs (costs) and 
outputs (consequences) related to an action; secondly, economic evaluation concerns itself with 
choices. 
Because resources are limited, it is not possible to produce all desired outputs and it is necessary 
to undertake decisions regarding which course(s) of action to follow. The purpose of economic 
evaluation is to inform such decisions by providing judgments and comparisons of alternative states 
of the world. As a consequence, it is necessary to define which are the theoretical normative 
principles that support these judgements, on the basis of agreed assumptions about what 
constitutes values (Drummond, M. et al., 2015). 
The ‘underlying normative principles’ are also known as ‘theoretical underpinnings’, ‘normative 
viewpoint’, ‘theoretical approach’ or ‘underlying methodology’. All these terms emphasise the 
value judgments (i.e. the ‘norms’) on which the economic evaluation is grounded. In the health care 
context, different theoretical approaches can be adopted, based on either  the concepts of the 
welfarist approach (Tsuchiya & Williams, 2001, Hurley, 2000), or on alternative value judgments 
(Culyer, 2012, Brouwer et al., 2008, Claxton, Sculpher & Culyer, 2007). 
Another aspect of the economic evaluation regards the analytical technique employed. Alternative 
analytical techniques are available, and the choice of employing one or another is typically related 
to the theoretical approach which underpins the analysis. 
There is no right or wrong decision in the choice of theoretical approach and analytical technique. 
Nevertheless, methodological and theoretical aspects in the analysis should be justified by an 
informed choice. Analysts and decision makers should be aware of the underlying value 
assumptions and potential limitations of the results. This is also necessary because results of 
analyses based on alternative normative principles and analytical techniques might diverge and 
therefore potentially yield different resource allocations and recommendations (Buchanan & 
Wordsworth, 2015, Bala, Zarkin & Mauskopf, 2002). 
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Awareness about the value assumptions behind the economic evaluation and methods of analysis 
should be of paramount importance. Nevertheless, not only are these aspects frequently left 
implicit, but also in the literature there is inconsistency in the definition of the theoretical 
approaches, and in the use of the terminology. A review of the literature was therefore undertaken 
in order to identify and describe the alternative theoretical underpinnings and analytical methods 
currently employed in the UK for the economic evaluation of health care interventions. On the basis 
of these findings, a taxonomy which categorises the normative principles and analytical techniques 
was developed. 
Structure of the chapter 
Section 2.2 classifies and describes characteristics, potentialities and limitations of the different 
theoretical approaches to the evaluation of health care interventions typically employed in the UK. 
Sub-section 2.2.1 illustrates the welfarist approach, sub-sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 explore the extra-
welfarist and social decision making approaches, respectively. At the end of the Section 2.2, a 
taxonomy of the normative principles is provided. 
In Section 2.3, the analytical techniques (i.e. the methods used to practically implement the 
economic analysis) are discussed. The link between normative principles and analytical methods is 
also investigated. A table which classifies and summarises the analytical methods currently 
employed for the economic evaluation of health care interventions is provided at the end of the 
section. 
Lastly, Section 2.4 explores more specifically the evaluation of public health interventions. 
Challenges in the economic evaluation of public health interventions and the appropriateness of 
employing the more traditional analytical techniques are investigated. At the end of Section 2.4, 




2.2. Normative principles 
Welfarist approach to economic evaluation 
Welfare economics is a normative framework used to judge alternative states of the world 
(Drummond, M. et al., 2015). The welfarist approach to welfare economics – or equivalently 
‘welfarist economics’, as defined by Brouwer et al. (2008) – argues that individuals are the best 
judges for themselves and act rationally in order to maximise their welfare, which is based on 
outcomes only, and not on processes. In summary, welfarist economics is based on the following 
four tenets (Hurley, 2000, p. 60): 
1) Utility maximisation. In economics  the  term  has  tended  to  be  synonymous  with  
preference;  the  more  preferable  an  outcome,  the  more  utility  associated  with  it. 
Utility maximisation principle implies that individuals are rational, rank the available 
options and choose with consistency the most preferred among them (i.e. the option 
associated with the highest utility); 
2) Individual sovereignty. Individuals are the best judges of their own preferences; 
3) Consequentialism. What matter are the resulting effects and outcomes of an action or a 
choice. The process is not relevant; 
4) Welfarism. All the non-utility aspects of a situation are not considered in the judgment. The 
‘goodness’ of a state is determined only by the utility levels (i.e. welfare) attained by 
individuals in that state (Drummond, M. et al., 2015, Hurley, 2000). 
‘Welfarism’ and ‘welfarist approach’ are therefore not synonyms and they should not be used 
interchangeably. Welfarism regards only one aspect of welfarist economics and is the tenet which 
excludes all the non-utility aspects from the evaluation (Culyer, 2012, p. 67, Hurley, 2000). 
However, inconsistency in the use of the terminology can be found in the literature. For instance, 
according to the Encyclopedia of Decision Making (2009), ‘welfarism’ (and not ‘welfarist 
economics’) is “often used to describe the dominant ethical framework used in welfare economics 
to judge states of the world with” (Kattan & Cowen, 2009, p. 1189). 
2.2.1.1. Allocation of scarce resources to maximise social welfare 
In reality, the ‘basic economic problem’ is that unlimited ‘wants’ of the society are hindered by the 
limited resources available, and choices need to be made between alternative uses of resources 
(Drummond, M. et al., 2015). Therefore, welfarist economics aims to define their optimal 
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allocation, which is defined as the one that maximizes the welfare of the society (Kattan & Cowen, 
2009). 
In the classical tradition of welfarist economics, utility measures were considered cardinal and 
interpersonally comparable: it was deemed possible to quantify the magnitude of increases or 
decreases in utility for the individuals, and make comparison among them. As a consequence, under 
these assumptions, the overall social welfare can be defined as a function of the levels of utility 
attained by members of the society (Kattan & Cowen, 2009, Brouwer et al., 2008, Hurley, 2000). 
The modern welfarist economics theory is instead characterised by the abandon of the conception 
of cardinal utilities, in favour of ordinal utilities, and the rejection of intra-individual comparability 
of welfare gains and losses (Brouwer et al., 2008). In other words, the only information available is 
that the utility of an individual increases or decreases (Kattan & Cowen, 2009). 
2.2.1.2. Pareto and potential Pareto principles 
In the strictest interpretation of welfarist economics theories, changes in ordinal utilities are judged 
using the Pareto principle. According to the Pareto principle, a state is preferred to an alternative 
one if at least one individual is better off (i.e. has higher utility) and no one is worse off (i.e. 
experiences a decrease in utility) (Brouwer et al., 2008, Tsuchiya & Williams, 2001).  An alternative 
principle to judge alternative states of the world is the potential Pareto criterion, which can be also 
called compensation test, or Kaldor-Hicks criterion (Hurley, 2000, p. 61). Potential Pareto principle 
states that if the gainers are hypothetically able to compensate the losers, and after the 
compensation is paid losers are at least as well off as originally, then there is an improvement for 
society (Tsuchiya & Williams, 2001). 
When judgements are grounded in the potential Pareto principle, ‘potential’ compensations can be 
estimated and comparisons of situations where some individuals gain and other lose are allowed. 
In a perfectly competitive market, compensation can be based on prices, which represent the social 
value of alternative activities. In the presence of distortions (e.g. due to monopoly, taxation or 
externalities), observed prices do not reflect the social value, and ‘shadow prices’ (i.e. prices as if 
there was a competitive and undistorted market) can be estimated. In absence of markets, revealed 
preferences or hypothetical valuations can be exploited to estimate the willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
to reveal individuals’ value (Claxton, Sculpher & Culyer, 2007). As explained previously, these 





2.2.1.3. Welfarist approach to health economic evaluation 
The concepts and the framework of welfarist economics apply also to the health care context. 
Nevertheless, the literature shows a lack of consistency in the terminology used. To avoid 
misunderstandings, in this thesis the term ‘welfarist approach’ will be used to describe the 
approach to health economic evaluation based on the concepts of welfarist economics. 
Following Hurley (2000), the main characteristic of the welfarist approach (as opposed to the extra-
welfarist approach, described in the next section) is that value is assessed using utility. According 
to the welfarist approach to the economic evaluation of health care, the purpose of health care is 
to increase individual utility, and WTP can be used as a proxy for changes in utility. Nevertheless, it 
can be argued that WTP is affected by the initial income distribution, and consequently by the ability 
to pay. This is because the marginal utility of income declines as income increases, affecting 
compensation, offered and required (Drummond, M. et al., 2015, Claxton, Sculpher & Culyer, 2007). 
Moreover, even including adjustments to avoid the problems related to the ability to pay, the use 
of compensation can be considered incoherent in the economic evaluation of health care, in 
particular when dealing with interventions that may cause death (Broome, 1978). According to 
Broome (1978), compensation would be based on an ex-ante valuation (i.e. made before the 
distribution of its costs and benefits is exactly known), as a proxy of the unknown and correct ex-
post valuation. When analysing a project causing death (which would require infinite 
compensation), ex-ante valuation would be different from ex-post valuation. More precisely, the 
former would have finite costs and the latter infinite ones. Therefore, it would be incorrect to take 
social decisions valuing health on the basis of ex-ante individual preferences measured through 
compensation. 
Further, according to the welfarist approach, the ‘evaluative space’ (i.e. the relevant elements and 
components to be included in the evaluation) is confined to individual utilities only and there is no 
need for a decision maker to use their own values (Brouwer et al., 2008). In other words, the 
welfarist approach avoids the specification of an exogenous (i.e. determined by an external 
authority) objective function, because the outcomes are valued by individuals through the 
compensations. Equity concerns can be therefore introduced in the evaluation only if they are 
incorporated into the individuals’ utility measure, and not if they reflect exogenous equity concerns 




Given the previously mentioned limitations of the welfarist approach when applied to the health 
care context, an alternative approach which tries to specify an objective function which is not solely 
based on individual utility has become a popular alternative, the extra-welfarist approach 
(Drummond, M. et al., 2015). According to the extra-welfarist approach, individuals are no more 
the unique source of valuation because what is relevant is something beyond the particular 
outcomes the individuals choose for themselves (Brazier et al., 2007). The determination of the 
content of the evaluative space (i.e. elements and components to be included or excluded) can be 
performed also by authoritative decision makers, experts, representative samples of the public or 
representatives of the affected individuals (Brouwer et al., 2008). 
Sometimes the extra-welfarist approach is referred to as ‘non-welfarist’ approach (Drummond, M. 
et al., 2015, Culyer, 2012). This is to stress that this approach does not expand the evaluative space 
to include more (‘extra’) than only individual utility: it just uses a different evaluation space (‘extra-
ordinary’ rather than ‘extra’). Utility information can be replaced by other characteristics or 
capabilities, or complemented with other information, which can regard for example the quality of 
utility or equity weights (Brouwer et al., 2008). 
In the extra-welfarist approach the outcome of interest becomes no more the welfarist concept of 
welfare based on utility only, but a less defined ‘well-being’ (Brouwer et al., 2008). In fact, ‘welfare’ 
“refers to well-being as assessed specifically in utility terms; in contrast ‘well-being’ is used more 
generally and can be assessed in terms other than utility” (Hurley, 2000, p. 59). 
2.2.2.1. The origins of the extra-welfarist approach 
According to Culyer (2012), Sen’s theories (1993) - combined to previous concepts such as merit 
goods developed by Musgrave (1959) and basic goods by Tobin (1970) and Rawls (1971) - 
contributed crucially to the development of the extra-welfarist approach in the context of the 
economic evaluation, based on the centrality of health. In fact, it can be argued that the extra-
welfarist approach builds on Sen’s “view of living as a combination of various ‘doings and beings’, 
with quality of life to be assessed in terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings”. In 
Sen’s view, ‘functionings’ are defined as “the various things that he or she manages to do or be in 
leading a life” (Sen, 1993, p. 271). 
In contrast with traditional evaluations based on commodities, income, or material resources, 
according to Sen, resources are just instruments to enhance people’s well-being. Health in 
particular is a fundamental characteristic affecting people’s capability to ‘flourish’ as human beings 
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(Culyer, 2012). In other words, well-being should be measured according to what individuals could 
in principle do (i.e. capabilities) and not what they actually do (i.e. functionings), and ill health 
reduces the ability to achieve functionings (Edwards, Charles & Lloyd-Williams, 2013). 
2.2.2.2. Current implementation of the extra-welfarist principles 
The perception of peculiarity and uniqueness of health in the economic literature fostered the 
spread of evaluations where health (and not welfare) is perceived as the main focus (Drummond, 
M. et al., 2015). According to the current interpretation of the extra-welfarist principles, health is 
pursued by policy makers for its own sake and not because it yields utility or merely to the extent 
that it yields utility (Brouwer et al., 2008). As a consequence, maximising health gains is considered 
the main objective of a health care programme, subject to a single exogenous budget constraint, 
which is given by the resources available for the health care system (Coast, Smith & Lorgelly, 2008). 
However, the extra-welfarist approach still requires the definition of a social objective function to 
be maximised. When the main goal of an intervention can be considered to be health, it is however 
reasonable to ignore the other aspects in the social objective function (Sculpher & Claxton, 2012). 
The interpretation of the extra-welfarist approach and its implementation in the economic 
evaluation of health care is still discussed (Coast, Smith & Lorgelly, 2008, Birch & Donaldson, 2003). 
Health is typically measured in terms of length and quality of life, using the Quality-Adjusted Life 
Years (QALYs), which are valued equally across the population (Drummond, M. et al., 2015). It has 
been argued that the recommendations from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) played a fundamental role in establishing the common extra-welfarist practice of using 
QALYs as the standard measure of benefits (Coast, Smith & Lorgelly, 2008). Coast et al. (2008) 
pointed out that originally Sen’s capability approach was actually characterised by a broader 
perspective, with a particular emphasis on equity and distributional concerns. Moreover, the 
implicit assumption of social well-being depending only on health maximisation has been criticised. 
Such a practice retains the idea of maximisation (no more of utility, but of health), which is still 
related to the welfarist approach (Coast, Smith & Lorgelly, 2008). Evidence also suggests that 
maximisation of health gain is not all society and experts are concerned about in relation to health 
care decision making. Policymakers and health care professionals involved in the decision making 
base their preferences also on factors such as severity of the disease, target age, and magnitude of 
the individual health benefit from the interventions (Baji et al., 2016).  
Furthermore, for Birch and Donaldson (2003), the extra-welfarist approach acknowledges and 
accepts the risks of paternalism and dictatorship caused by imposing decision makers’ preferences 
on individuals. The two authors argued that actually in Sen’s theory the source of valuation was still 
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the individual, on the basis of its set of functionings and capabilities. Moreover, they claimed that 
welfarist economics theoretically could be able to incorporate all the concerns raised by proponents 
of extra-welfarist approach, by adapting the concept of utility (Birch & Donaldson, 2003). 
Nevertheless, even if theoretically the welfarist approach might be broadened, the feasibility of 
such adaptations (e.g. integrating equity aspects and evaluation of intangible social goods in a 
welfarist context analysis on individual utilities) is not taken into consideration. Furthermore, 
Broome’s (1978) argument about the compensation of risks rather than of health itself would 
remain still unsolved. 
2.2.2.3. Issues in the specification of a social objective function 
Economic evaluations based on extra-welfarist principles still have the objective of maximising a 
specified social objective (based on well-being) function. The extra-welfarist approach is thus still 
prescriptive, and one of the main issues in its implementation regards the difficulties in defining 
explicitly a socially legitimate objective function to be maximised (Sculpher & Claxton, 2012). 
In reality, any specification of a social objective function would be controversial. Given the many 
conflicting and contradictory claims on what is socially valuable, each stakeholder would have its 
own subjective view with regard to the factors that must be taken into consideration and how to 
value them (Walker et al., 2019). The issues about reaching a general consensus about a social 
objective function were discussed by Arrow (1950) and Sen (1970) in their impossibility theorems. 
Because both welfarist and extra-welfarist approaches aim to define social value using an explicit 
social objective function (based either on welfare or wellbeing), the difficulty in achieving a 
consensus among decision makers about a complete objective function is a common issue for both 
approaches (Walker et al., 2019). 
For this reason, in the UK, the influence of the extra-welfarist theories on the more traditional 
welfarist concept of an individualistic social welfare,  together with the recognition of the practical 
limitations of the extra-welfarist approach, led to the development of the more pragmatic social 
decision making approach (Hurley, 2000). 
Social decision making approach 
The social decision making approach has the purpose of informing social decisions rather than 
making claims about social welfare. Compared to welfarist and extra-welfarist approaches, the 
main difference is that social decision making approach avoids investigating the social values, and 
therefore does not aim at specifying the structure (i.e. the arguments) of a social objective function. 
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According to the social decision making approach, the specification of a complete, explicit and 
legitimate expression of social value is not possible (Drummond, M. et al., 2015, Paulden & Claxton, 
2012, Williams, 1981, Sugden & Williams, 1978). 
According to this approach, decision making bodies (e.g. government departments) can be seen as 
the agent of a socially legitimate higher authority, which cannot express an explicit and complete 
social welfare function, but allocates resources and gives the agent a responsibility to pursue 
explicit objectives (e.g. to improve health). In these circumstances the delegated authority cannot 
be asked to improve social welfare, since it cannot be specified (Claxton et al., 2011, Claxton, 
Sculpher & Culyer, 2007). The role of social decision making is therefore more humble than welfarist 
and extra-welfarist approaches: this approach can be used only to inform decisions rather than 
prescribe them (Drummond, M. et al., 2015, p. 116). 
The authority of the decision making bodies is legitimated by the socio-democratic process, which 
is how society tries to balance conflicting and contradictory claims on resources and social 
objectives (Drummond, M. et al., 2015, Paulden & Claxton, 2012). The allocation of budgets 
available for each decision maker can be viewed as an expression of social preferences (Sculpher & 
Claxton, 2012) and decision makers are informed about the characteristics and consequences (in 
terms of costs and benefits) of alternative courses of action. 
2.2.3.1. Implementation of social decision making approach in the health care context 
Social decision making can help facilitate decisions in the absence of consensus about an explicitly 
defined social objective function. Health may be considered one of the arguments of an unspecified 
underlying social objective function. In the UK, the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) is 
given the responsibility of pursuing health maximisation, following the recommendations of NICE 
(Drummond, M. et al., 2015, Sculpher & Claxton, 2012, Claxton et al., 2011). 
In the absence of consensus on principles, ‘accountability for reasonableness’ becomes 
fundamental in order to agree on what is legitimate and fair (Daniels, 2000). Daniels and Sabin 
(1998) argued that, to assure procedural fairness, a decision process must involve: transparency 
about the grounds for decisions; agreement of stakeholders regarding the relevance of reasons and 
rationales; existence of procedures for revising decisions in light of new evidence and arguments. 
The UK health system is now explicitly applying this framework of accountability in its decision 
making process, and accountability for reasonableness helped shape thinking about how NICE 
should incorporate social value judgments into its recommendations to the National Health Service 
(NHS) in England and Wales (Daniels & Sabin, 2008). 
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2.2.3.2. The crucial role of opportunity costs 
When alternative mutually exclusive courses of action are available, the decision rule to allocate 
resources to a specific intervention is based on the comparison of the resources necessary to fund 
the intervention and their opportunity costs, which are the impacts associated with what could 
have been done with the best alternative use of the same resources (Sculpher, Claxton & Pearson, 
2017). In other words, opportunity costs are represented by what is forgone in order to 
accommodate the resources to provide new services (Sculpher et al., 2014). 
There is often no explicit consideration of which services might need to be displaced to generate 
the funds to pay for the new intervention (i.e. which interventions should be removed, delayed, or 
downscaled to generate the necessary funding). An estimate of the system’s marginal productivity 
(i.e. the relationship between changes in over-all health system expenditure and changes in the 
relevant measure of benefit) can be therefore used to measure of what is given up as financial 
resources are drawn away from other services (Sculpher, Claxton & Pearson, 2017). 
Estimates of health opportunity costs using the estimated relationship between changes in health 
expenditure and changes in health outcomes for health care in UK have been recently generated 
(Claxton, Martin, et al., 2015). This provides an empirical estimate of the marginal productivity of 
the NHS (i.e. the health impacts of small changes in spending across the NHS budget) (Drummond, 
M. et al., 2015). 
Taxonomy of the normative principles 
Table 2.1 summarises the aforementioned approaches, and provides a taxonomy in terms of the 
relevant outcomes taken into considerations, sources of validation, the way of determining the 
social objective function and the criteria to inform judgements. A brief description of the 




 Welfarist approach Extra-welfarist approach Social decision making approach 
Description 
Based on the tenets of welfarist 
economics: 





Grounded on Sen’s theories, extra-welfarist approach 
broadens, or narrows, the evaluative space to include 
outcomes other than individual utility. 
A ‘well-being’ concept (which may include utility 
information as well as other extra measures and indicators) 
replaces the welfare based on utility only. 
More pragmatic approach where the 
principal (socially legitimate higher 
authority) devolves responsibility and 
resources to an agent (decision making 






Centrality of welfare (defined 
as well-being measured in 
utility terms). 
Utility information can be replaced by other outcomes, or 
complemented with other information, which can regard 
for example the quality of utility or equity weights. 
The determination of the specific relevant outcomes 
depends on the source of validation in the specific context. 
Usually health is the main focus. 
Depends on the objective related to the 
decision maker authority. 
Source of 
valuation Affected individuals. 
The determination of the content of the evaluative space 
can be performed by the individuals, but also by 
authoritative decision makers, experts, representative 
samples of the public or representatives of the affected 
individuals. 
The authority of the decision making bodies 
is legitimated by the democratic political 
process. 
The allocation of budgets available to 




The social welfare function is a 
function of individual welfares. 
Social well-being function where outcomes can be weighted 
in order to incorporate equity and other considerations.  
No explicit, complete and legitimate social 









Optimal allocation of resources 
to maximise social welfare. 
Judgments usually based on 
the potential Pareto principle, 
which allows for hypothetical 
compensations. This requires 
the assumption of feasibility of 
benefits monetarisation. 
Maximisation of social well-being. 
Decision makers are informed about the 
characteristics and consequences (in terms 
of costs and benefits) of alternative courses 
of action. 
Adoption or rejection decisions are related 
to opportunity costs (i.e. impacts associated 
with what could have been done with the 
best alternative use of the same resources). 
Implementation 




WTP and compensations 
(offered and required) can be 
affected by the ability to pay 
and income. 
Even including adjustments 
regarding the ability to pay, the 
use of compensation can be 
considered incoherent when 
dealing with health. 
Confining the evaluative space 
to individual utilities only could 
be a limit for the evaluation: 
for example, equity concerns 
imposed by an external 
decision maker cannot be 
included. 
Current interpretation is based on health (measured in 
QALYs) maximisation, subject to a single exogenous budget 
constraint, given by the resources available for the health 
care system. 
Criticisms to this interpretation relate to the narrow 
perspective focusing only on health maximisation (as 
opposed to the broader capability approach by Sen), with no 
emphasis on equity and distributional concerns. 
Risks of paternalism and dictatorship caused by imposing 
others’ preferences on individuals. 
The main issue in the implementation regards the 
difficulties in defining explicitly a socially legitimate 
objective function to be maximised. Impossibility theorems 
demonstrated that a general consensus about such function 
cannot be reached. 
More humble approach: objective function 
is not defined, and the role is to inform 
decisions rather than making prescriptive 
claims about social welfare or well-being. 
In the UK, decision power is assigned to the 
DHSC, which is given the responsibility by 
the whole social democratic process to 
pursue health maximisation (typically 
measured using QALYs). 
Key references 
(Drummond, M. et al., 2015, 
Brouwer et al., 2008, Tsuchiya 
& Williams, 2001, Hurley, 2000, 
Broome, 1978) 
(Drummond, M. et al., 2015, Brouwer et al., 2008, Coast, 
Smith & Lorgelly, 2008, Birch & Donaldson, 2003, Sen, 1993, 
1970, Arrow, 1950) 
(Sculpher, Claxton & Pearson, 2017, 
Drummond, M. et al., 2015, Culyer, 2012, 
Paulden & Claxton, 2012, Sculpher & 
Claxton, 2012, Williams, 1981, Sugden & 
Williams, 1978) 






2.3. Analytical techniques 
Section 2.2 illustrated how judgements regarding alternative states or courses of action can be 
underpinned by different normative principles. In this section, the analytical methods commonly 
employed to perform the analysis are described and classified. Because analytical techniques 
usually depend also on the specific approach chosen for the evaluation, the relationship between 
the techniques employed for the evaluation and the theoretical approach is also investigated. 
All the methods of full economic evaluation involve the assessment of both costs and outcomes of 
the interventions to be compared. While the estimation of costs is common to all of them, the 
feature that distinguishes alternative techniques is how the consequences of health care 
programmes are valued. In the UK, there are three main methods for the economic evaluation of 
health care interventions: Cost-Consequence Analysis (CCA),1 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), and Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). As explained later in Sub-section 2.3.3, in this thesis the CEA category 
includes also CEA that measures consequences using QALYs, even if frequently referred to as Cost-
Utility Analysis (CUA)2 (Drummond, M. et al., 2015). Another potential analytical technique is the 
Cost-Minimisation Analysis (CMA); nevertheless, this is not a full economic evaluation. In fact, the 
use of CMA is sometimes suggested when the consequences of the alternatives under 
consideration are judged broadly equivalent, and the difference between the alternatives boils 
down to a simple comparison of costs (Drummond, M. et al., 2015). Moreover, it has been argued 
that the use of CMA cannot be determined in advance because of the uncertainty around costs and 
consequences (Briggs & O'Brien, 2001). 
Cost-consequence analysis 
CCA is an analytical method based on the scepticism about the possibility of condensing the result 
of an economic evaluation into one number, such as the net benefit or the cost per outcome. CCA 
does not rely on any assumption about what, how and by whom costs and consequences must be 
valued. No outcome aggregation is undertaken and results are shown in the form of a table (Brazier 
et al., 2007, p. 14, Coast, 2004). 
                                                          
 
1 Due to its limitations in informing decision making (explained in Sub-section 2.3.1), some might argue that 
CCA does not meet the full criteria to be classified as a method of economic evaluation for making decisions. 
2 QALYs are here considered a preference based measure of health that do not necessarily reflect utility. 
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CCA might be easier to understand for the decision makers with respect to other types of analysis 
(Coast, 2004). Nevertheless, because of the absence of synthesis of costs and outcomes, policy 
makers’ weights and criteria of decisions are left implicit (Kelly et al., 2005).  The weakness of CCA 
is therefore its potential lack transparency and consistency across decisions (Drummond, M. et al., 
2015). 
As CCA is just a description of costs and consequences and is theoretically not dependent on any 
value assumption,3 it could be used theoretically in all analyses, independently of the underlying 
normative principle of the evaluation. Nonetheless, the main drawback of the CCA regards its limits 
in informing decision makers, because it does not provide any guidance as to how the different 
outcomes should be weighed against each other (Greco, Lorgelly & Yamabhai, 2016). In fact, 
probably the best use of CCA is as a preliminary technique to describe interventions systematically, 
and it is particularly useful when dealing with a broad range of costs and benefits (Weatherly et al., 
2009, Kelly et al., 2005). 
Cost-benefit analysis 
If the normative viewpoint of the analysis is the welfarist approach, CBA is the usual method 
implemented (Brazier et al., 2007, Gafni, 2006, Bala, Zarkin & Mauskopf, 2002). In the CBA, both 
costs and health outcomes are valued in monetary terms and become therefore comparable. Usual 
techniques to value the monetary equivalent of health outcomes are the human capital approach 
and the estimation of the WTP for the non-marketed goods, through the elicitation of stated 
preferences in an hypothetical contingent market (Brazier et al., 2007). 
CBA aims to address questions of allocative efficiency, such as whether a specific goal is worth 
achieving, or what should be the amount of resources to be allocated in order to achieve the goal 
(Donaldson, 1998). Due to its theoretical foundation in welfarist economics and in the use of Kaldor-
Hicks criterion as a hypothetical compensation test, CBA holds significant conceptual appeal for 
economists: it can potentially allow decision makers to assess health and non-health outcomes, and 
perform comparisons between programmes in all sectors of economy (Grosse, Wordsworth & 
Payne, 2008, Gafni, 2006). 
                                                          
 
3 Pragmatic assumptions are however still necessary, for example, regarding the choice of which outcomes 
and costs to include in the analysis. 
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The fact that CBA is underpinned by the principles of welfarist economics enables such prescriptive 
power for CBA and allows converting and describing everything in commensurable terms. However, 
this can also be regarded as the main limitation and challenge of this method (Culyer & Chalkidou, 
2019). 
In practice, the implementation of CBA can be difficult (Culyer & Chalkidou, 2019, Donaldson, 1998). 
CBAs have usually large data requirements, such as estimates of all the relevant costs, and surveys 
to estimate WTP values (NICE, 2012). Moreover, traditionally, there have been measurement issues 
concerning how health and non-health impacts can monetarised (see Sub-section 2.2.1) (Culyer & 
Chalkidou, 2019). Furthermore, the use itself of WTP can be perceived in contrast with NICE’s equity 
objectives: individual WTP is a measure of demand rather than of need, whereas in the NHS, health 
care is allocated according to need (NICE, 2012, Weatherly et al., 2009). Nevertheless, even 
assuming the correctness of the monetarisation of health, there would still be a risk of limiting the 
included costs and benefits to those that are measurable. For example, the value of equity and 
social cohesion may not be easily quantified in a CBA performed with a welfarist approach (NICE, 
2012, Brazier et al., 2007, Kelly et al., 2005). 
Cost-effectiveness analysis 
The limitations of CBA’s welfarist principles in the health care context (Culyer & Chalkidou, 2019) 
contributed to the adoption of alternative methods for the economic evaluation of health care 
programmes. In the UK, and in many other countries, the use of CEA has generally prevailed 
(Drummond, M. et al., 2015). 
CEA avoids the monetarisation of health because effects are measured in ‘natural’ units (e.g. 
number of life-years saved or deaths prevented). Results are typically presented in terms of 
incremental cost per unit of effect. Such estimates are called Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratios 
(ICERs), and can be combined with a Cost-Effectiveness (CE) threshold to inform whether a new 
policy should be undertaken or not (Brazier et al., 2007). By incorporating the threshold value in 
the results of the analysis, results of the CEA can be also expressed using Incremental Net Benefits 
(INBs). INBs can be presented in monetary or natural units: Incremental Net Monetary Benefits 
(INMBs) and Incremental Net Health Benefits (INHBs), respectively (Drummond, M. et al., 2015). 
The nature and the value of the threshold has been widely discussed in the literature (Drummond, 
M. et al., 2015). The perspective that the threshold should reflects health opportunity cost (i.e. the 
health that could have been generated if the money required to fund the intervention had been 
spent on something else) has come to be known as a ‘supply side’ approach. In contrast, according 
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to the ‘demand side’ approach, the threshold should reflect the consumption value of health and 
empirical research aim to represent societal WTP for additional health gains (i.e. what individuals 
are willing to forego in non-healthcare/private consumption for gains in healthcare) (Thokala et al., 
2018). It has been argued that CE thresholds used across the world might be considered 
overestimates and are based on historical estimates, heuristics or judgements. Empirical estimates 
of the supply side threshold – based on the opportunity costs of an investment, measured as the 
health that could have been generated if the money required to fund it had been spent on 
something else – could be considered more appropriate for judging the cost-effectiveness of new 
technologies if the aim is to maximise population health in a budget constrained health care system. 
In the UK, the supply-side threshold has been found to be much lower than the threshold typically 
recommended by NICE (Sculpher, Claxton & Pearson, 2017, Claxton, Martin, et al., 2015). 
2.3.3.1. Utilities, QALYs and cost-utility analysis 
CEA allows evaluating only one outcome for each analysis. CEA is in fact particularly suitable for 
decision making when no trade-off between outcomes is required. This can be a limitation for 
decision making purposes when multiple outcomes must be assessed (Brazier et al., 2007). For this 
reason, in the past it has been recognised that it would have been extremely useful to describe the 
total improvement in health using a single numerical measure of effectiveness, and a variant of the 
CEA has been introduced: the CUA (Torrance & Feeny, 1989). 
In the CUA the multidimensional health change is condensed into a single number called ‘utility’. 
QALYs are usually the generic outcome chosen to describe the health consequences of the 
treatment to be evaluated, by incorporating both quantity and quality of life. Since the 
consequences of the intervention are captured by a generic measure of health gain, CUA provides 
better comparability across both different health outcomes and interventions (Drummond, M. et 
al., 2015, Brazier et al., 2007). 
Some confusion arises in the literature about the definition of economic analysis employing QALYs: 
these are referred to as both CEAs and CUAs. In the usual practice, the terms ‘utilities’ and ‘QALYs’ 
have been frequently used interchangeably, even though originally Torrance and Feeny (1989) were 
already clear in distinguishing conceptually these two ways of addressing the objective of using a 
unique measure of the health consequences. 
In general terms, utilities are preferences that an individual or society may have with respect to any 
particular set of health outcomes. Nevertheless, in the economic literature, the term ‘utility’ has a 
very precise meaning and is associated with the theories on decision making under uncertainty 
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developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM). Since QALYs are based on preferences on 
health states, it has long been debated whether QALYs were a measure of utility or not. It has been 
concluded that QALYs can be utilities only when formed from preferences measured with standard 
gambles. Nevertheless, this is only one possible technique to construct them, and even in this case, 
restrictive and unrealistic assumptions must hold. As a consequence, QALYs are generally 
considered not consistent with the vNM concept of utility (Drummond, M. et al., 2015). 
For this reason, in this thesis I will use the term ‘preferences’ instead of utility, and I will avoid the 
use of the label ‘CUA’. Since QALYs are not an expression of utility, analyses employing QALYs will 
be referred to as CEAs, as suggested by Drummond, M. et al. (2015). The term ‘CEA’ will include 
also CEAs that use QALYs, even if in the literature these are frequently referred to as CUAs. 
2.3.3.2. Use of CEA and its theoretical underpinnings 
Because the welfarist approach requires a measurement of utility, CEA is not justifiable on strictly 
welfarist underpinnings. As previously highlighted, health (and not utility) is the main focus of the 
analysis, and it is assumed that decision makers aim to maximise health subject to resource 
constraints. CEA techniques are usually chosen when the analysis is based on extra-welfarist or 
social decision making principles (Grosse, Wordsworth & Payne, 2008, Brazier et al., 2007, Bala, 
Zarkin & Mauskopf, 2002, Dolan & Edlin, 2002). 
When the analysis is based on extra-welfarist or social decision making approach principles, 
whether the QALYs can or cannot describe utility is not crucial for the purpose of the analysis. QALYs 
are usually judged a good approximation of health gains and that is necessary and sufficient in terms 
of decision making. QALYs are a generic measure of health gain and they offer the potential to 
compare programmes in different areas of health. No alternative method for the measurement of 
health gains showed significant improvement in the quality of the analysis or facilitations in the 
calculation of the effects (Drummond, M. et al., 2015). 
The role of opportunity costs is fundamental. Recommendations of a CEA depend crucially on the 
explicit comparison of its results with a threshold that should represent the alternative use of the 
resources if this policy were not implemented (Sculpher, Claxton & Pearson, 2017, Sculpher & 
Claxton, 2012). Actually, even following a more welfarist approach (e.g. assuming that health is 
measurable in monetary terms), estimation of opportunity costs would be crucial to answer the 
question whether the value of the health gained exceeds the value of the health forgone (Sculpher 
& Claxton, 2012). 
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With regard to the policy implications of the evaluation, economic analysis based on CBA allows 
making statements about social welfare. Nevertheless, that requires the specification of an explicit 
social welfare function based on the aggregation of peoples’ willingness to pay. In contrast, CEA can 
be operationalised even in absence of an explicit social objective function , but can be used only for 
questions of technical or operational efficiency (Claxton et al., 2011). As a consequence, role of CEA 
is more modest, claiming to inform social decisions in health rather than prescribing social choice 
(Culyer, 2012). 
Taxonomy of the analytical techniques 
Table 2.2 summarises the aforementioned analytical techniques, and provides a taxonomy in terms 
of the outcome measurement and the associated normative principles. A brief description of 
advantages and disadvantages of each method is also reported. In Table 2.2 the term ‘CEA’ 









Multiple (including non-health) 
outcomes. 
Monetary units. 
Natural units or a single numerical 
measure of effectiveness (usually 
QALYs for health). 
Normative 
principles 
Theoretically no underlying 
value assumptions. 
Usually welfarist approach. 
Usually extra-welfarist approach or 
decision making approach. 
Advantages 
Might be easier to understand. 
Useful tool for a preliminary 
description of interventions, 
especially when the range of 
costs and benefits is broad. 
Able to address questions of allocative efficiency. 
Can potentially allow decision makers to assess health 
and non-health outcomes, and perform comparisons 
between programmes in all sectors of economy. 
Can be operationalised even in 
absence of an explicit social objective 
function. 
Aims at informing social decisions 
rather than prescribing social choice. 
Disadvantages 
Limits in informing decision 
makers because of the absence 
of synthesis of costs and 
outcomes. 
Potential lack transparency and 
consistency across decisions. 
In practice, the implementation can be difficult due to 
data requirements and issues in the monetarisation of 
health and non-health impacts. 
WTP and compensations can be affected by income 
and ability to pay. 
Value assumptions on which welfarist approach is 
grounded are frequently considered not appropriate 
in the health care context. 
To inform decision making, it requires 
to be combined with an estimate of 
the opportunity costs of investment. 
Cannot solve issues of allocative 
efficiency. 
Only one outcome (even if multi-




(Drummond, M. et al., 2015, 
Brazier et al., 2007, Coast, 2004) 
(Culyer & Chalkidou, 2019, Drummond, M. et al., 
2015, Brazier et al., 2007, Gafni, 2006, Donaldson, 
1998) 
(Sculpher, Claxton & Pearson, 2017, 
Drummond, M. et al., 2015, Sculpher & 
Claxton, 2012, Brazier et al., 2007, 
Torrance & Feeny, 1989) 






2.4. Economic evaluation of public health interventions 
The previous sections explored the main normative principles (Section 2.2) and the analytical 
methods (Section 2.3) for the economic evaluation of health care programmes. In this section, the 
suitability and limitations of these approaches and techniques in assessing public health 
interventions are explored. 
Theoretical approach and practical analytical technique of the analysis are a matter of choice. When 
conducting an economic evaluation of a health care intervention, the choice of the analytical 
technique depends mostly on the underlying normative underpinnings, and there is not an 
approach which is conclusively more correct than any other. Nevertheless, the choice depends also 
on characteristics of the intervention that is being evaluated (Culyer & Chalkidou, 2019, Drummond, 
M. et al., 2015). For example, when health care interventions yield a broad range of non-health 
benefits, such as in the case of evaluation of public health programmes, some methods might 
capture more accurately their full impacts (Buchanan & Wordsworth, 2015). In fact, in the last 
version of the NICE manual for developing guidelines, interventions with health and non-health 
outcomes in public sector and other settings were distinguished from interventions with health 
outcomes in NHS settings, and different recommendations (e.g. use of CBA) were also provided for 
alternative reference cases (NICE, 2015). 
In sub-sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 the context of public health interventions is briefly delineated and 
the main challenges associated with the economic evaluation of such interventions are 
summarised. Sub-section 2.4.3 explores the suitability and limitations of traditional economic 
evaluation methods in assessing public health interventions. In this last section, before moving to 
Chapter 3, the normative principles and analytical techniques of the proposed framework are 
briefly illustrated. 
Public health context 
Acheson (1988) defined public health as “the art and science of preventing disease, prolonging life 
and promoting health through the organized efforts of society”. The target of public health 
interventions is therefore shifted from the individual patient to a group level. In other words, the 
‘public health service’ has the role of identifying and responding to health problems in order to 
protect populations’ health (Holland, 2004). 
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Examples of key public health areas are: conditions and diseases such as cardiovascular disease, 
cancer, obesity, diabetes, vaccine-preventable infections; behaviours such as smoking, drug or 
alcohol misuse, sexual and physical activity; other factors affecting health such as environment, 
working environment, housing and transport; accidents and injuries; child and maternal health; 
mental and oral health. Public health often deals with aspects of health and wellbeing broader than 
specific diseases, and public health policies take into account a wide spectrum of determinants of 
health, which work through four vectors: population, environment, society and organisations (NICE, 
2012). 
Challenges in the economic evaluation of public health interventions 
In the context of public health interventions, economic evaluation should support decision makers 
in allocating the available resources to best meet public health aims (Edwards, Charles & Lloyd-
Williams, 2013). Nevertheless, as highlighted in the Wanless Reports (2004), in the UK “although 
there is often evidence on the scientific justification for action and for some specific interventions, 
there is generally little evidence about the cost-effectiveness of public health and preventative 
policies or their practical implementation” (Wanless, 2004). 
This general lack of cost-effectiveness evidence in public health may be due to the complex nature 
of public health interventions (Weatherly et al., 2009, Chalkidou et al., 2008). Research aiming to 
inform evidence-based decision making in public health can be technically difficult, and present 
methodological and technical issues (Wanless, 2004). Chalkidou et al. (2008) discussed these 
difficulties and pointed out several areas of controversy and uncertainty. Weatherly et al. (2009) 
identified in particular four main challenges in the economic evaluation of public health 
interventions: attribution of effects, measuring and valuing outcomes, identifying inter-sectoral 
costs and consequences, and incorporating equity considerations. 
2.4.2.1. Quality of research evidence and attribution of effects 
Public health interventions are targeted at populations or communities rather than specific 
individuals. Moreover, given the nature of public health interventions (e.g. preventative), any 
differences in outcomes between interventions may occur far into the future. As a consequence, in 
general, the available evidence is weaker with respect to clinical medicine, and sometimes is even 
lacking. For example, traditional randomised control trials (RCTs) are sometimes either impossible 
or excessively costly to perform, because long follow-ups would be required for the outcomes to 
be shown and large numbers of patients needed to demonstrate an effect (Deidda et al., 2019, 
Weatherly et al., 2009, Chalkidou et al., 2008). Further, generalisability issues might be faced when 
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moving from evidence based on a sample (selected into RCTs) to the population, especially if the 
outcomes of individuals or groups of individuals change the behaviour of others (which is common 
in social examples and in public health whenever there is a possibility of contagion) (Deaton & 
Cartwright, 2018). In such a context, it is more common for researchers to use evidence from 
observational studies and find solutions to selection and measurement biases, reverse causality 
and omitted variables (Deidda et al., 2019). 
2.4.2.2. Identifying inter-sectoral costs and consequences 
Public health interventions may generate wider consequences and ripple effects in the economy 
than those relating to health alone. For example, an intervention to reduce alcohol consumption 
may affect both health and criminal behaviour. Similarly, a programme providing free school meals 
to disadvantaged children might have not only health effects, but also consequences for their 
education. Assessing the intervention from a narrow perspective would likely underestimate their 
impact, and potentially lead to unfair decisions about funding (Coast, Smith & Lorgelly, 2008). 
Similarly to public health interventions, interventions in other sectors (e.g. education, criminal 
justice, housing, transport) may have effects not only on important outcomes for those sectors, but 
also on health. For example, an intervention to improve housing may also improve health levels, 
through a reduction of illness and injuries (Weatherly et al., 2009). Responsibility for public health 
in England recently moved away from the NHS to local authorities (LAs), which provided an 
opportunity to integrate public health with other LA functions such as education, housing and crime 
(Frew, 2017, Department of Health, 2012). 
The presence of multiple sectors involved in the analysis might generate issues related to how to 
account for costs of the interventions. Since costs of public health interventions can fall on different 
parts of the public and private sector, budgetary impacts on different stakeholders should be 
identified separately (Sculpher et al., 2014, Claxton, Sculpher & Culyer, 2007). However, there is a 
lack of methods for properly accounting for costs when more than one government department or 
local government is involved in the delivery of an intervention. Moreover, issues might arise during 
the decision making process, especially when multiple decision makers are involved, and one 






2.4.2.3. Measuring and valuing outcomes 
Methods based on standard health gain measurements may be inadequate as they may not capture 
the broader set of (non-health) benefits generated by public health interventions (Squires et al., 
2016, Marsh et al., 2012, Weatherly et al., 2009). 
It can be argued that non-health outcomes should be included in the economic evaluation. If so, it 
would become crucial to measure (i.e. estimate quantities) and value (i.e. choose which outcome 
to measure, and how to use results to inform decisions) them. Even though strongly related, 
measuring and valuing outcomes are distinct issues to be addressed singly, and imply the 
introduction of additional value judgments (i.e. how to value an outcome, and what is relevant and 
what is not worth to be recorded) in the evaluation (Squires et al., 2016, Marsh et al., 2012).  
2.4.2.4. Incorporating equity considerations and concerns about health inequalities 
Health inequalities are differences in health care access, quality of care or health outcomes present 
within a population, and are not necessarily unfair or unjust: they are a matter of fact (NICE, 2012). 
By contrast, as defined in the NICE guidelines (2012), “a health inequity is an unnecessary, 
avoidable, unfair and unjust difference in someone's health or healthcare” and is therefore a 
‘normative’ judgment (whereas an inequality is a ‘positive’ statement). 
Following the introduction of the Equality Act (2010), NICE has the duty to consider the effect of its 
activities in relation to equality in order to avoid unlawful discrimination and to identify 
opportunities for promoting equity (NICE, 2015, 2012, 2008). Moreover, NICE public health 
guidance considers not only the aspects protected by the Equality Act (age, disability, gender 
reassignment, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation), but 
also other characteristics related to socioeconomic differences and particular situations (e.g. 
asylum seekers, homeless, gypsies and travellers) (NICE, 2012). 
In many cases tackling unfair inequalities in health is the primary goal of a public health intervention 
or programme (Chalkidou et al., 2008). Health maximisation cannot be the only rationale for 
decision making, and the inclusion of social concerns related to the distribution of health become 






Analytical techniques for the evaluation of public health interventions 
2.4.3.1. Limitations of the ‘traditional’ CEA 
CEAs are focused on the efficiency goal of health maximisation and struggle to capture non-health 
benefits (Edwards, Charles & Lloyd-Williams, 2013, Weatherly et al., 2009, Kelly et al., 2005). The 
use of CEA appears to be appropriate in performing more clinical-based assessments, whereas 
potentially underestimates the full impact of large-scale public health interventions (Claxton, 
Sculpher & Culyer, 2007). CEA’s narrow perspective might in fact misrepresent the actual impact 
(in terms of costs and effects) of an intervention, and the omission of relevant cross-sectoral 
outcomes from a broader perspective might lead to misleading results that jeopardise the accuracy 
of the final funding decision. 
Another limitation regards the availability and use of opportunity costs estimates. As explained in 
Section  2.2.3, opportunity costs of public health interventions are represented by what is forgone 
in order to accommodate the resources to provide new services, and are crucial for decision making 
(Sculpher et al., 2014). In CEAs of public health interventions, sometimes all costs are accrued and 
results are compared to the usual threshold for health care sector. Such a procedure is suggested 
also in the NICE guidance for public health evaluation (NICE, 2012), and leads to two main issues. 
First of all, it has been argued that the £20,000-30,000 range used by NICE in the evaluation of 
public health interventions might be too high (Chalkidou et al., 2008). It has been demonstrated 
that the threshold does not reflect marginal productivity of the health care system (Claxton, Martin, 
et al., 2015). This criticism seems to be supported also by the empirical evidence. Owen et al. (2012) 
found that almost 90% of public health interventions assessed by NICE between 2006 and 2010 
were cost-effective at a threshold of £30,000 per QALY, and the majority of them were highly cost-
effective. 
Secondly, even if it is assumed that the NICE threshold is acceptable for judging cost effectiveness, 
public health decisions can involve different decision makers’ budgets. As a consequence, the 
resources displaced to accommodate a new investment correspond to a different amount of 
opportunity costs, and having multiple funders in place creates challenges with assigning 
opportunity cost for the intervention (Frew, 2017). If costs falling on other sectors are accrued, it 
would be incorrect to compare them to the health care threshold. Such a threshold would be not 
sufficient anymore to inform decisions in public health with effects falling on multiple sectors, and 
it would become necessary to estimate opportunity costs of each budget involved in the analysis, 
43 
 
valuing from a broader perspective the resources displaced in each sector included (Sculpher et al., 
2014, Claxton, Sculpher & Culyer, 2007). 
2.4.3.2. Cost-consequences analysis 
In the NICE guidelines for the appraisal of public health interventions it is recognised that public 
health involves aspects other than health, and this requires more inclusive methods of analysis and 
a change in the perspective (NICE, 2015, 2012). The NICE guideline for public health builds on and 
adapts the previous guidance for the evaluation of clinical interventions (Edwards, Charles & Lloyd-
Williams, 2013), and the main change is the higher emphasis put on the use of CCA and CBA for 
interventions in this area (NICE, 2015). 
As illustrated in Section 2.3.1, CCA provides a ‘balance sheet’ of cost and consequences of an 
intervention, and allows to capture multiple and also non-health outcomes. Examples of CCA in 
evaluation of public health interventions can be found in the literature (e.g. the analysis of an 
intervention to promote physical activity). Nevertheless, CCA is simply used just as a transparent 
way of reporting impacts of the intervention (Trueman & Anokye, 2013). In fact, the main drawback 
of the CCA regards its limits in informing decision makers, because it does not provide any guidance 
as to how the different outcomes should be weighed against each other (Greco, Lorgelly & 
Yamabhai, 2016). For this reason, Kelly (2005) and Weatherly et al. (2009) suggested that CCA might 
be a suitable pragmatic technique to systematically describe interventions characterised by a broad 
range of costs and benefits. Once completed a CCA, it would be possible to identify some narrower 
questions to be answered through CEAs within the CCA framework, or at the very least, the inter-
sectoral impacts of interventions should be described qualitatively. In case it would be feasible to 
perform the CEAs, such an approach would permit to identify with separate analyses which 
programme is the best to improve health, which performs better in reducing inequalities, and which 
works in changing behaviour or promoting the uptake of the intervention. On the basis of these 
results, the estimation of the trade-offs between different outcomes across the interventions could 
be undertaken (Kelly et al., 2005). 
2.4.3.3. Cost-benefit analysis 
In the most recent version of NICE guidance, it is acknowledged that CBA would be able to take 
account of wider costs and benefits of public health interventions, and avoid the difficulties of 
aggregating data because CBA provides outcome measures and costs that are directly comparable 




By using CBA in the public health framework and valuing everything in monetary and 
commensurable terms, comparisons between alternatives would be potentially straightforward, 
even when they include non-health related benefits. Conceptually, CBA could incorporate also 
impacts in other sectors of the economy (e.g. individuals’ ability to return to work, impacts on 
education and criminal justice system), and would allow to perform inter-sectoral comparisons of 
how resources can be used (Weatherly et al., 2009, Gafni, 2006, Donaldson, 1998). 
However, as already discussed in Section 2.3.2, the typical theoretical underpinnings of CBA might 
be deemed not appropriate when dealing with health, and in practice the implementation of CBA 
might be challenging. In particular, as distributional goals are often an explicit motivation for public 
health programmes, CBA may fall short in incorporating equity concerns in the evaluation (Vining 
& Weimer, 2010) 
2.4.3.4. A brief overview of other potential methods 
In the UK, the most common technique employed for the economic evaluation of health care 
programmes is CEA, where maximising health gains is considered the primary objective of the 
intervention (Drummond, M. et al., 2015, Brouwer et al., 2008, Coast, Smith & Lorgelly, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the widespread use of CEA does not mean that this method is per se superior to CBA, 
or other alternative analytical techniques. In fact, in other fields, such as environmental economics, 
the usual practice is to use CBAs (Gafni, 2006). CEA is usually implemented in the health care sector 
for feasibility reasons and with the aim of meeting decision-makers' requirements (Drummond, M. 
et al., 2015). 
Particularly for the evaluation of public health interventions, traditional CEA showed several 
shortcomings. Alternative methods have been thus proposed for the evaluation of public health 
interventions, and in particular for the assessment of broader effects. A brief summary of the most 
relevant ones is provided here. 
Social return on investment 
Social return on investment (SROI) is a technique that shares many similarities with CBA and has 
been also proposed for the evaluation of public health interventions  (Edwards, Charles & Lloyd-
Williams, 2013). SROI measures social, environmental and economic outcomes using monetary 
values to represent them. Such a procedure enables a ratio of benefits to costs to be calculated 
(Nicholls et al., 2009). Similarly to CBA, SROI has its roots in welfarist economics, so it shares the 





In CEA, the usual practice is to measure outcomes of health care interventions using QALYs. 
Nevertheless, QALYs are a health related outcome measure and do not include all the aspects that 
may matter to decision makers (Brazier & Tsuchiya, 2015), especially when evaluating public health 
interventions (Weatherly, Cookson & Drummond, 2014). In an ideal framework of analysis, local 
authorities should take into account not only health consequences of public health activities, but 
also wider outcomes and externalities (Sculpher et al., 2014). 
Capability approach (Sen, 1993) can be employed as an encompassing measure of both health and 
non-health outcomes and is now considered one of the most relevant alternatives to the 
conventional methods (Greco, Lorgelly & Yamabhai, 2016, Marsh et al., 2012, Lorgelly et al., 2010). 
One of the most widely known suite of measures to value outcomes for use in economic evaluation 
is the ICEpop CAPability (ICECAP) (Coast, Kinghorn & Mitchell, 2015, Coast, Smith & Lorgelly, 2008). 
Capabilities offer a rich set of dimensions for evaluation rather than focusing solely on health status. 
Moreover, their theoretical extra-welfarist underpinnings make capabilities appropriate for use 
with public health interventions due to the emphasis put on equity concerns (Lorgelly et al., 2010). 
Capabilities could in principle be used as a universal outcome measure in a CEA. Nevertheless, 
capability approach is a development paradigm (Greco, Lorgelly & Yamabhai, 2016). The 
implementation of the capability approach for use in economic evaluations is indeed hindered by 
the requirement of defining a legitimate capability space (i.e. identify a legitimate authority that 
can determine the dimensions to be considered) and the difficulties in measuring the relative 
preferences for each capability (Lorgelly et al., 2010). Moreover, pragmatic issues related to the 
lack of opportunity cost estimates and to the need of anchoring the measures at a value of zero for 
death prevent their use for resource allocation problems in health care (Brazier & Tsuchiya, 2015, 
Coast, Kinghorn & Mitchell, 2015). The implementation of the capability approach for decision 
making purposes is in fact still at a relatively early stage of development and there is a lack of 
consistency about how the measurement of capabilities can be used to aid decision-making 
(Mitchell et al., 2017, Coast, Kinghorn & Mitchell, 2015). 
Subjective wellbeing 
The use of capabilities in the analysis is usually backed by an extra-welfarist approach. On the 
contrary, a welfarist approach to the analysis would emphasise individual preferences, and criticise 
capabilities for relying on expert opinion and their inability to generate a monetary estimate of 
benefit (Dolan & White, 2007). For this reason, the use of subjective wellbeing (SWB) has been 
suggested as a potential alternative (Dolan & Metcalfe, 2011, Dolan & White, 2007). 
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The SWB approach measures the differences in people’s self-assessment of their well-being as a 
consequence of the intervention analysed (Marsh et al., 2012). SWB is underpinned by traditional 
welfarist principles, where individuals are regarded as the best judge of their own conditions, and 
public policy has the goal to maximise the sum of everybody’s happiness (or utility) (Greco, Lorgelly 
& Yamabhai, 2016). Consequently, an analysis based on SWB would suffer the usual welfarist 
limitations. For example, it might be not suitable when social concerns and distributional issues 
must be addressed (Coast, Smith & Lorgelly, 2008). 
Even though meta-outcomes of happiness or well-being are already developed – examples are the 
Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale (WEMWBS) and the Wellbeing Adjusted Life Year 
(WELBY) (Coast, Smith & Lorgelly, 2008) - SWB is still in a developing stage, and there are few 
examples of its use to generate evidence to inform policy making (Greco, Lorgelly & Yamabhai, 
2016, Marsh et al., 2012). 
The proposed approach 
In 2004, a HM Treasury’s report recommended the development of a consistent framework to 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of public health interventions, but this framework still does not exist 
(Wanless, 2004). 
The aim of the next chapter is to address this gap in the literature and develop a framework for the 
evaluation of public health interventions that integrates, at different stages, different analytical 
techniques. The proposed framework is underpinned by a social decision making approach, even 
though alternative value judgments can be introduced at different stages of the analysis. 
Combining emerging methods with those traditionally used for health economic evaluation has 
been already suggested in the literature (Briggs, 2016, Wildman et al., 2016). For example, Wildman 
et al. (2016) provided suggestions about how to develop a novel approach to the analysis which 
combines existing methods from economic evaluation beyond health, while maintaining the extra-
welfarist approach to valuing health outcomes. The solution proposed here is based on a 
framework that is flexible (regarding both analytical techniques to be used, and theoretical 
underpinnings), but transparent and explicit. 
With regard to the analytical techniques, the first stage of the framework consists of an initial 
descriptive CCA based on the 2nd Cost-Effectiveness Panel’s ‘impact inventory’ (Sanders et al., 
2016), but with the aim of disentangling budget impacts and direct effects according to decision 
makers’ responsibilities. Afterwards, CEAs from different perspectives are conducted. These CEAs 
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have the role of assessing the impacts of the public health intervention in all the relevant sectors. 
For this reason, an outcome measure commonly accepted for decision making purposes in that 
sector is used, and opportunity costs are made explicit. 
Potentially, the CEAs within the sectors (or dimensions) can be adjusted in order to include equity 
concerns in the aggregation function. This step of the framework would imply the introduction in 
the analysis of principles that might be deemed more extra-welfarist. Furthermore, In order to 
obtain an overall cross-sectoral estimate, an aggregation function across sectors based on 
individual WTP is proposed. It is acknowledged that the use of WTP to aggregate across dimensions 
might be associated with a more welfarist approach to the evaluation. However, the proposed 
framework is still grounded in the social decision making approach, and no explicit social welfare 
function is defined. 
It might be argued that the proposed approach resembles a CBA that acknowledges the existence 
of fixed budgets and opportunity costs, and allows for the incorporation of equity concerns. From 
a pragmatic point of view, results of such a CBA might be in fact similar to those obtained using the 
proposed framework. However, from a rigorous theoretical point of view, the framework proposed 
in this thesis is grounded in the social decision making approach. The underlying normative 
principles are not welfarist and a complete and explicit objective function is not specified. By 
contrast, efforts are made to link the analysis to the real decision making processes. Decision 
makers have their remits, objectives, perspectives and budgets constraints, and these features 
must be acknowledged in the evaluation. For these reasons, the starting point of the proposed 
framework is a CEA conducted from a narrow health care perspective, which reflects health care 
decision maker’s remits. Afterwards, in order to expand the perspective and introduce alternative 
value judgments, the framework uses an amalgamation of approaches rather than focusing on the 
use of one method (Neumann et al., 2018, Sculpher & Claxton, 2012). 
Details about the proposed theoretical framework can be found in Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3:  Analytical framework 
3.1. Introduction to the framework 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, the role of economic evaluation is to assist decision makers 
in their decisions about which intervention to fund from scarce resources (Drummond, M. et al., 
2015). Nevertheless, the complex nature of public health interventions raises methodological and 
technical challenges in their evaluation (Weatherly et al., 2009). For example, a brief intervention 
for alcohol related problems might affect not only alcohol misusers’ health, but also their 
probability of becoming involved in criminal activity and their employability. Moreover, 
expenditures in other sectors may have health effects. For example, investments in the housing 
sector (e.g. spending money on home safety) could reduce medical costs and improve lives (e.g. by 
reducing the risk of falls especially among the elderly) (Butler, 2018). Furthermore, frequently an 
important aim of public health interventions is to reduce health inequalities (NICE, 2012). 
Analyses of public health interventions have typically focused on their impact on health, but such a 
narrow perspective potentially underestimates the full impact of public health interventions. It may 
be necessary to assess a broader range of costs and effects, including those falling on other sectors. 
Further, significant impacts might occur far in the future. Moreover, additional concerns about 
equity might become critically important (Weatherly et al., 2009). Within this context, the aim of 
this thesis is to define appropriate methods for the economic evaluation of public health 
interventions. In particular, this chapter illustrates the proposed theoretical framework for a cross-
sectoral economic evaluation of public health interventions, with the potential incorporation of 
health equity considerations. The framework can theoretically accommodate also a cross-sectoral 
extension of the analysis. Such an extension is briefly introduced in this chapter, and is discussed as 
potential further work in Chapter 8. 
A brief overview of the three main stages of the analytical framework is provided in the next sub-
section, together with the normative underpinnings of the framework. The stages are then 
illustrated in detail in in the following sections. The last section of this chapter describes the case 
study selected to operationalise the analytical framework. In Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, a public health 




Stages of the framework 
The proposed framework consists of a three-stage analysis. In its first stage, it aims at extending a 
‘traditional’ CEA to include the impact of the introduction of an intervention on different sectors 
(and different decision makers). The second stage concerns the incorporation of health equity 
implications in the analysis. In the third stage, the framework is extended to include the impacts of 
long-term costs and effects, and to reflect different budgetary policies. This last stage is discussed 
as a potential extension of the analysis in Chapter 8. 
3.1.1.1. Cross-sectoral analysis 
The cross-sectoral analysis is based on a framework originally formulated by Claxton et al. (2007), 
and then developed by Claxton et al. (2010), Sculpher et al. (2014) and Walker et al. (2019). The 
latest version of the framework, as described by Walker et al. (2019), can be seen as a broader, 
extended version of the ‘impact inventory’ proposed by the 2nd Cost-Effectiveness Panel (Sanders 
et al., 2016). 
The cross-sectoral analysis aims at informing decisions to be taken by legitimate decision makers 
about interventions that have multiple effects which impact on different decision makers, and can 
be used to suggest compensation schemes across decision makers. Such compensation schemes 
could address resource allocation problems (also known as ‘wrong pocket problems’ (Butler, 2018, 
Erickson, Galloway & Cytron, 2012)), generated when costs fall on a sector and benefits on another 
(Walker et al., 2019). 
First of all, the cross-sectoral analysis requires the specification of the perspective employed for the 
analysis. Afterwards, the first step of the cross-sectoral analysis consists of assessing direct effects 
(i.e. what is gained) and opportunity costs (what could have been gained with an alternative use of 
the resources) for each sector (or dimension). The second step is to explore ways to aggregate 
across dimensions (Walker et al., 2019). 
Methods to conduct the cross-sectoral analysis and use its results to inform decision makers are 
described in Section 3.2. 
3.1.1.2. Incorporation of health equity concerns 
The cross-sectoral analysis can be extended in order to include an assessment of the impacts of the 
intervention on health inequalities that might be deemed unfair and unjust (i.e. health inequities). 
Equity impact and equity trade-off analyses can be used to incorporate concerns for the distribution 
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of impacts across population subgroups in the aggregation within dimensions (Cookson et al., 
2017). 
Methods to assess health inequalities and to incorporate equity concerns in the cross-sectoral 
analysis are illustrated in Section 3.3. 
3.1.1.3. Cross-temporal extension 
Extrapolation techniques can be employed to estimate the full impact of the intervention, including 
long-term costs and consequences (Bojke et al., 2017). To reflect intertemporal issues, the impact 
of budgetary policies (i.e. whether annual deficits are allowed or not) can then be assessed. Rigidity 
of budget constraints over time may limit the scope to implement interventions which would be 
cost-effective if decision makers had more control over inter temporal budgets (McKenna et al., 
2010). Moreover, constraints on the time horizon for the analysis affect the relevant costs and 
benefits included in the evaluation (Frew, 2016).  
The cross-temporal extension of the framework is only discussed as a potential extension of the 
analysis in Chapter 8. 
Underlying normative principles of the framework 
In the literature, it has been stressed how any evolution in the analytical techniques for economic 
evaluation should be accompanied by more debate about the theoretical and value propositions 
underlying the various forms of economic evaluation (Marsh et al., 2012, Weatherly et al., 2009). 
In Section 3.1.1, the analytical techniques employed in the framework have been briefly described. 
This sub-section clarifies the value assumptions behind the framework. 
It is generally accepted that the economic evaluation approach should fit with the priorities of the 
decision makers (Frew, 2017). Therefore, with the aim of reflecting the actual decision making 
process and meeting decision maker requirements, the proposed framework is grounded in a social 
decision making approach. 
As illustrated in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.3, the assumption behind the social decision making 
approach is that each decision maker has its own objective(s) and its own constraints (potentially 
related to the available budget and a fixed time period), and is legitimised (by the social-democratic 
process) to take decisions in its area of responsibility. This approach is not based on particular value 
assumptions and avoids the specification of a complete social objective function (e.g. based on 
welfare or wellbeing). Nevertheless, decisions still need to be made. Current budgetary allocations 
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(i.e. budgets available for decision makers) is thus seen as a legitimate expression of some unknown 
underlying social value function, and budgets themselves contribute to determining the 
opportunity costs of investments. The aim of the social decision making approach is therefore to 
inform a series of decision makers, each with a remit for a particular area, by reporting impacts of 
alternative decisions in a transparent way (Walker et al., 2019, Drummond, M. et al., 2015, Paulden 
& Claxton, 2012, Claxton et al., 2011). 
Nonetheless, in subsequent stages of the economic evaluation, additional value assumptions will 
be required in order to perform the evaluation. Normative judgments are necessary in the 
pragmatic choice of sectors and dimensions4 to be considered in the analysis, and for choosing the 
methods of aggregation of the outcomes within and across dimensions. The framework is 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate the inclusion of principles that might reflect a more welfarist 
or extra-welfarist approach to the evaluation. Nevertheless, the framework forces these normative 
judgements to be explicit. 
In summary, the proposed framework is based on CEAs grounded on a social decision making 
approach. The aggregation function5  within dimensions also allows the introduction of health 
inequality considerations. The aggregation function across dimensions allows for the use of social 
valuation based on WTP to aggregate outcomes. The incorporation of equity considerations and 
the use of social valuation based on WTP might be deemed more related to an extra-welfarist and 
a welfarist approach, respectively. However, the analysis avoids the specification of a complete 
social objective function and aims at reflecting decision making processes and context. The 
framework is also flexible and potentially compatible with other methods (and therefore other 
theoretical underpinnings), such as SROI, standard CBA, and capability approach (see Section 2.4.3). 
All these methods can be captured using the proposed framework, exposing the set of value 
judgements which is inherent in each (Walker et al., 2019). 
  
                                                          
 
4 Sectors might not necessarily equal dimensions. 
5 See Sub-section 3.2.2.1 
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3.2. Cross-sectoral analysis 
Public health interventions are challenging to evaluate because of their costs and effects falling on 
different sectors. Typically, health economic evaluations focused on a single-sectoral payer that 
seeks to maximise health, typically through interventions delivered by the health care system. 
Nevertheless, focusing on health only would underestimate the total impact of the intervention on 
society. Moreover, multiple sectors contribute to the production of health, and the health care 
sector might generate benefits besides health (Remme, Martinez-Alvarez & Vassall, 2017). 
The framework aims to extend the ‘traditional’ health economic evaluation across sectors. Before 
exploring how to manage and aggregate cross-sectoral costs and effects, it is firstly necessary to 
have a clear and explicit definition of the perspective employed for the analysis. 
Definition of a broader perspective 
Public health interventions might affect multiple decision makers with different objectives and 
responsibilities. To evaluate these interventions, it is frequently recommended in the literature to 
use a ‘societal perspective’ for the evaluation (Jonsson, 2009, Weinstein, 1990). 
However, the way the term ‘societal perspective’ is interpreted and operationalised within 
economic evaluations is largely subjective. Analyses conducted from a ‘societal perspective’ often 
merely include productivity costs in addition to health effects and costs (Drost et al., 2017). 
Moreover, even if a clear societal perspective was defined, it would still be unclear how to use this 
information to inform choices across different settings and decision makers (Claxton et al. 2010). 
For all these reasons, as suggested by Walker et al. (2019), in this analysis the term ‘societal 
perspective’ is avoided. However, the need of broadening the perspective from that of health is 
acknowledged, and the framework considers an integrated perspective that involves multiple 
decision makers with different objectives and budgets. 
3.2.1.1. The ‘impact inventory’ and its dimensions 
The concept of a broader and integrated perspective can be operationalised using the ‘impact 
inventory’ recommended by the 2nd Cost-Effectiveness Panel, which is a structured table that 
contains consequences both inside and outside the formal health care sector (Sanders et al. 2016). 
Potentially, the impact inventory could include all consequences in their natural units, and without 
any intrinsic value judgments. However, for pragmatic reasons, the impact inventory cannot be 
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exhaustive and the choice of the dimensions to be included is based on a series of value judgements 
(Walker et al., 2019). Moreover, other value judgments will be necessary in the selection, for each 
sector, of an outcome measure deemed appropriate to inform decisions about which interventions 
to fund. Nevertheless, these value judgments simply reflect the existing decision making structure 
and process, and the current resources allocations. 
Using the ‘impact inventory’ tool, an intervention can be described in terms of its impacts on a set 
of dimensions of interest, determined by value judgements and institutional arrangements of the 
decision makers to be informed (Walker et al., 2019). The list proposed by the 2nd Cost-Effectiveness 
Panel assumes correspondence between sectors and dimensions, and includes: Formal and 
Informal Health Care sector; Non−Health Care sectors (Social Services, Criminal Justice, Education, 
Housing, and Environment); and Private sector (Productivity and Consumption). Other dimensions 
can also be specified (Sanders et al., 2016). 
Economic evaluations are usually conducted from the perspective of the decision maker allocating 
public funds, therefore informal care is rarely valued for inclusion in the analysis (Weatherly, Faria 
& Van Den Berg, 2014). The dimension ‘Formal and informal Health Care’ identified by the 2nd Cost-
Effectiveness Panel would already imply an extension of the conventional perspective usually 
employed in the UK for the economic evaluation of health care interventions (NICE, 2013). For this 
reason, the two dimensions are here distinguished. 
When comparing the list of dimensions proposed in the ‘impact inventory’ to the conventional 
approach proposed by NICE guidelines (2013) in the UK, the distinction of formal and informal 
health care is not the only difference. Social care is in fact usually included in the analysis from a 
health care perspective. This separation is maintained here, but this aspect will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter (Sub-section 4.4.4) and in Chapter 8, Sub-section 8.3. 
In order to show the importance of using a broad perspective when assessing public health 




3.2.1.2. Examples of cross-sectoral impacts of hypothetical public health interventions 
The following examples are based on actual public health interventions reviewed in the process of 
identification of a case study for this thesis. 
Programme providing free school meals to disadvantaged children 
The Free School Meals (FSM) pilot was a two-year programme operating in three local authorities 
between the autumn of 2009 and summer of 2011, to extend entitlement to free school meals 
(Kitchen et al., 2013). 
The programme provided free lunches for eligible pupils and therefore affected private 
consumption of these individuals. Moreover, pupils were provided with healthier types of food at 
lunchtime, and impacts of the FSM programme did not fall only on educational attainment (which 
was the main objective of the study), but also on health care. With regard to the costs of the 
intervention, the programme was funded by two local authorities that made free school meals 
available to all primary school children, and a third local authority that made them more available 
to both primary and secondary school children by increasing the number of families entitled to 
them. 
Intervention to tackle substances misuse 
The Randomised Injectable Opiate Treatment Trial (RIOTT) compared supervised injectable heroin 
or injectable methadone with optimised oral methadone for chronic refractory heroin addiction in 
patients not responding to current oral maintenance treatment (Byford et al., 2013).  
The costs of RIOTT fell on NHS and pharmacies providing the treatment. Impacts ranged from health 
(deaths, QALYs, levels of substances attributable diseases, changes in hospitalisations attributable 
to substance misuse), to criminal behaviour and nights in prison, social services and housing 
(residential care, hostels and shelters) (Byford et al., 2013, Hunter & Hasan, 2013). Furthermore, 
even if not assessed in this evaluation, such an intervention might also affect transportation (due 
to road accidents) and private consequences (productivity, work absence and money spent on 
drugs) related to addiction. 










Health Care X X 
Social services  X 
Criminal justice  X 
Education X  
Housing  X 
Environment   
Other (e.g. Transport)  X 





 Informal Health Care  X 
Employers (e.g. Productivity)  X 
Individuals (e.g. Consumption) X X 
Table 3.1 Impacts on health care and non-health care sectors 
The objective of these examples is to show that conducting an analysis from a narrow perspective 
tailored to one decision maker risks omitting important outcomes for other decision makers 
(Walker et al., 2019). 
In the 2nd Cost-Effectiveness Panel’s approach, opportunity costs falling on different sectors are not 
made explicit. On the contrary, the proposed framework aims at extending the ‘impact inventory’ 
and obligates the distinction between direct impacts and opportunity costs (i.e. impacts associated 
with what is forgone) (Walker et al., 2019). In fact, the economic evaluation involves multiple 
decision makers (from multiple sectors) with their own budget, and expenditures must be allocated 
correctly, in order to reflect the different opportunity costs (implied by the resources displaced in 
that sector) appropriately (Sculpher, Claxton & Pearson, 2017, Sculpher et al., 2014, Claxton et al., 
2010, Claxton, Sculpher & Culyer, 2007). 
Direct effects and opportunity costs falling on multiple sectors and decision 
makers 
According to the recommendations of the 2nd Cost-Effectiveness Panel, items listed in the impact 
inventory should be presented in the form of disaggregated consequences across different sectors. 
This is because “there are no widely agreed on methods for quantifying and valuing some of these 
broader effects in cost-effectiveness analyses” (Sanders et al., 2016). 
The aim of the work by Walker et al. (2019) was precisely to go beyond this stage of the evaluation 
and define an appropriate framework, which is built on the cross-sectoral resource allocation 
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scheme developed by Claxton et al. (2007) and Sculpher et al. (2014). The framework captures the 
effects and the opportunity costs in each sector, then considers whether sectors are winners or 
losers and can be used to suggest potential compensations. The framework aims at informing 
decisions to be taken by legitimate decision makers about interventions characterised by multiple 
objectives and resulting in impacts on multiple budget constraints. A resource allocation scheme 
based on compensation schemes across decision makers can be proposed to make decisions, but 
other decision making criteria can also be employed (e.g. dominance criteria). The proposed cross-
sectoral framework reflects the exogenous budget allocations across sectors, which are determined 
by the political debate and the socio democratic process. The amount of resources allocated to 
each sector and its production function determine the marginal productivity of the sector and 
consequently the opportunity costs and the monetary value associated with each outcome. The 
framework reflects therefore, the current resource allocation and fits decision makers’ objectives 
and the approaches already taken to inform decisions (Walker et al., 2019). 
While grounded in the work by Walker et al. (2019), the version of the analytical framework 
proposed here is more focused on the pragmatic operationalisation of a cross-sectoral analysis, and 
is thus less abstract and more prescriptive. While the original framework aims to illustrate all the 
potential alternative options and solutions for conducting the evaluation, here some choices in the 
way of conducting the analysis have been taken (e.g. with regard to the outcomes to be evaluated 
and the method to aggregate them – see Sub-section 3.2.2.1). Nevertheless, these choices are 
explicitly stated, and the analytical framework proposed retains the aim of being generic, flexible, 
adaptable and implementable in various public health contexts. 
To operationalise the resource allocation scheme, for each sector (dimension) it is necessary to 
define an outcome measure that is deemed appropriate for decision making purposes. Moreover, 
an estimate of the marginal productivity (k) of the sector for the selected outcome measure is 
necessary. The marginal productivity of the sectors represents the opportunity costs of the 
investment (i.e. what could be alternatively done with those resources). 
3.2.2.1. Criteria for aggregation within and across dimensions 
Walker et al. (2019) suggested two potential alternative general aggregation approaches: a within-
individual approach and a within-dimension approach. The first approach consists of aggregating 
first within-individuals across all dimensions, and then to aggregate across individuals. The latter 




In order to develop this analytical framework, it was necessary to choose between these 
aggregation approaches. Because the objective of this work is to start from an evaluation from the 
health care perspective, then add dimensions to the analysis, the framework proposed here follows 
the within-dimension approach. Moreover, the within-dimension approach might be considered 
more appropriate given decision makers’ remit to focus on a particular sector. 
The first aggregation is therefore within dimensions. As a result, the proposed framework is slightly 
more prescriptive when compared to the work by Walker et al. (2019). However, methodological 
choices are made explicit and they pave the way to further extensions of the analysis (i.e. the 
incorporation of health equity considerations and cross-temporal extension). Considerations (in 
particular in terms of impacts on equity) about using the alternative within-individual aggregation 
approach are further discussed in Chapter 7, Sub-section 7.4.1. 
Aggregation within dimensions 
When aggregating impacts on each dimension across individuals, many functional forms (at 
dimension level) are possible, each representing alternative normative judgements (Walker et al., 
2019). In this first cross-sectoral stage of the framework, the aggregation is based on the sum of 
the unweighted changes in dimensions across individuals. In the next stage of the framework 
(described in Section 3.3), concerns about health inequality will be introduced and the changes 
across individuals will be weighted, for instance by their current allocations or other equity 
judgments. 
3.2.3.1. The health care sector 
With regard to the health sector, it is assumed that the objective of the decision maker is to 
maximise health (H), and that health is measured in QALYs. Therefore, for a new intervention to be 
funded, the health benefits associated with the new intervention must be higher than the 
opportunity costs (OCs) of the investment. This can be assessed using the INHB. The INHB of an 
intervention that costs ∆CH to the health system is given by the difference between the direct 
effects (DEs) on health (H) and the health OCs. Consequently, if the DEs on health are higher than 
the health OCs, then the intervention is cost-effective and is associated with positive INHB. To 
estimate the OCs of an intervention, an estimate of the marginal productivity of the health care 
sector (kH) is required. In fact, by knowing that at the margin one QALY will be lost as a result of 
every kH pounds not spent, direct health care costs (∆CH) can be converted into health OCs 
(Drummond, M. et al., 2015). 
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The formula to calculate the INHB is described in Equation 3.1. If NHB is positive, the decision maker 
would want to recommend the intervention. 
INHB = Direct effects on health – Health opportunity costs 
𝐼𝑁𝐻𝐵 = ∆𝐻 −
∆𝐶𝐻
𝑘𝐻
   (3.1) 
The health OCs of changes in spending across the NHS budget have been recently estimated, and it 
was found that for approximately every £ 13,000 increase or decrease in spending, one QALY is 
gained or lost elsewhere (Claxton, Martin, et al., 2015). In other words, £ 13,000 is the (central)6 
estimate of kH, the marginal productivity of the health sector (Sculpher, Claxton & Pearson, 2017, 
Woods et al., 2016). 
Details about the methods to conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis from the narrow health care 
perspective are illustrated in Chapter 4. 
3.2.3.2. Private consumption 
The impact on private consumption (CC, measured in £) can be assessed by measuring the 
differential costs falling on individuals in terms of individuals consumption, employers productivity 
and informal health care. 
From the narrow perspective of the individual’s out of pocket expenditures, the Incremental Net 
Consumption Benefit (INCB) can be computed and valued in monetary terms as shown in Equation 
3.2. 
𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐵 = ∆𝐶𝑐    (3.2) 
3.2.3.3. Any other potential non-health care sector 
The same approach used to assess Incremental Net Benefits (INB) from the health care perspective 
can be extended to other sectors. For illustrative purposes, a generic non-health sector is defined 
here. The same structure can be then applied to specific sectors (e.g. education, criminal justice…) 
and expanded to multiple dimensions (i.e. more than one non-health sector). 
Let us assume that the same intervention to be assessed has not only direct effects (∆H) and costs 
(∆CH) on health, but also a direct non-health effect (∆N) and direct non-health costs (∆CN). From the 
                                                          
 
6 The estimation was subject to parameter and structural uncertainty. 
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narrow perspective of the non-health sector decision maker, the same adoption criterion can be 
used, and an Incremental Net Non-health Benefit (INNB) can be computed as illustrated in Equation 
3.3. 
𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐵 = 𝑁 −
𝐶𝑁
 𝑘𝑁
    (3.3) 
If the INNB is positive, the recommended decision for the non-health decision maker will be to 
implement the intervention. 
As previously stressed, the method is therefore based on a social decision making approach, and to 
perform a CEA outside the health care sector, it is necessary to define a non-health outcome which 
is appropriate to inform decision in the relevant sector. Variations in the outcome in each sector 
must be compared to a comparable estimate of opportunity costs based on what is displaced to 
accommodate the additional costs. 
The lack of opportunity costs estimates (i.e. what benefits are displaced elsewhere by diverting 
resources to a certain intervention, or what benefits could be generated if the resources were used 
for another purpose) outside the health care sector, is well known (Hill et al., 2017). There is a gap 
in the literature regarding the estimation of the marginal productivity (kN) for public sectors other 
than health (Sculpher et al., 2014)7. Nevertheless, in this thesis pragmatic solutions are proposed, 
and details about the specific methods to conduct a cost-effectiveness analysis from the criminal 
justice system perspective are illustrated in Chapter 5. 
3.2.3.4. Spill-over effects 
With regard to what is forgone to implement the intervention, costs generated in the health care 
sector have OCs within the health sector that can be computed using kH. However, OCs can also fall 
outside the health care sector (i.e. interventions displaced in the health sector may have impacts 
on the non-health sector and on private consumption). To be calculated, these cross-sectoral OCs 
require an estimate of the marginal productivity of the health sector for non-health outcomes and 
for consumption, called kHN and kHC, respectively. 
The same reasoning applies to the non-health sector. Costs generated in the non-health sector have 
OCs within the same sector, due to potential alternative use of the same resources for other non-
health policies. These OCs can be calculated using the marginal productivity of the non-health 
                                                          
 
7 Even in health there are actually limited estimates for countries based on their own data. Nevertheless, 
estimates exist based on cross-country methods (Woods et al., 2016) 
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sector (kN). Nevertheless, non-health OCs can also fall outside the non-health sector. The health 
that is forgone as a result of non-health resources not being used for other non-health policies can 
be calculated using the marginal productivity of the non-health sector for health (kNH). Additionally, 
the consumption that is forgone as a result of the non-health care costs is given by the marginal 
productivity of the non-health sector for consumption (kNC). It is assumed here that changes in 
private consumption are one of the potential direct effects of the intervention. There are no 
opportunity costs (in health and non-health) generated by consumption. 
Figure 3.1 describes the structure of the cross-sectoral DEs and OCs. DEs fall on health and non-
health sectors, and on consumption. Costs falling on the health sector (highlighted in red in Figure 
3.1) generate OCs not only within the health sector, but also in non-health sector and consumption. 
Similarly, costs falling in the non-health sector (highlighted in blue in Figure 3.1) generate OCs in 
the non-health and health sector, and in consumption. Marginal productivities (k’s) can be used to 
express costs in appropriate units of measurement for each sector. 
 
Figure 3.1 Scheme of Cross-Sectoral Effects and Opportunity Cost  
Equation 3.1 for INHB can therefore be extended in order to include all the actual opportunity costs. 






)   (3.4) 
The same extension can be applied to the INNB and INCB formulae to give: 






)   (3.5) 






)   (3.6) 
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INHBs, INNBs and INCBs can be computed as illustrated in Equations 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, and are 
expressed in different units. INHBs are measured in health units (usually QALYs), INNBs in the 
specific non-health outcome considered in the analysis (e.g. educational outcome or criminal justice 
outcome) and INCBs in monetary terms. To inform cross-sectoral decision making, these benefits 
must be somehow aggregated into a single comprehensive INB measure. 
Aggregation across dimensions 
In order to perform the aggregation across dimensions, a common metric is needed. For this reason 
monetary values in consumption terms are used as a common numeraire across the valuation of 
dimensions. In this way each attribute can be valued, allowing the identification of trade-offs and 
heterogeneity in valuation (Wildman et al., 2016). For each dimension, the willingness to give up 
consumption Vi for the outcome produced by sector i can be estimated (Woods et al., 2016). This 
estimate corresponds to the consumption value for the outcome of the selected sector. The 
monetary value of a unit of health output in terms of consumption (VH) (i.e. the amount of 
consumption an individual would trade for one unit of health), and the monetary value of a unit of 
non-health output in terms of consumption (VN) (i.e. the amount of consumption an individual 
would trade for one unit of the non-health outcome) can therefore be used to aggregate outcomes 
across dimensions. 
The introduction of the individual WTP Vi in the analysis might be seen as a move away from the 
social decision making approach. It might be argued that an analysis that uses monetary valuation 
of the benefits based on individuals’ consumption reflects a more welfarist approach. Nevertheless, 
the framework is still grounded in the assumptions of the social decision making approach. The 
valuation of the OCs is determined by the current allocation of resources among sectors and their 
production functions. Because of the social democratic process, this allocation is accepted as it is, 
without arguing it is optimal or correct. It is recognised and accepted that the individual valuations 
Vi of the outcomes might differ from the marginal productivity of the sector ki (which is determined 
by the budget allocations) (Claxton, Sculpher & Culyer, 2007). 
In the formulation of the framework proposed here, once impacts in each dimension are measured 
in terms of individual consumption, the aggregation approach is additive across dimensions. 
Nevertheless, the framework is flexible and allows for the use of other aggregation functions that 
might be deemed more appropriate according to the value judgements of the decision makers 
involved (Walker et al., 2019). It is actually not even guaranteed that a consensus between the 
different decision makers on the method for aggregation and the values used could be reached. 
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The framework can however provide evidence on the cross-sectoral impacts of the intervention 
and present results based on different value judgments, and therefore help to inform decisions 
(Walker et al., 2019, Remme, Martinez-Alvarez & Vassall, 2017, Claxton et al., 2010). 
As illustrated in Equation 3.7, the cross-sectoral Incremental Net Monetary Benefit (INMB) can be 
obtained by adding INHB and INNB when expressed in monetary consumption units. For example, 
the net monetary benefit of the health element of an intervention can be derived by multiplying 
the INHB with the monetary value of a QALY to give health benefits measured in monetary 
consumption units. When INHB and INNB are converted into monetary terms using individual WTP, 
it becomes straightforward to also include impacts on individual consumption (INCB). 
𝐼𝑁𝑀𝐵 = 𝑉𝐻 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐻𝐵 + 𝑉𝑁 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐵 + 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐵  (3.7) 
The resulting cross-sectoral INMB can be computed as shown in Equation 3.8. 


















))  (3.8) 
The practical operationalisation of the cross-sectoral framework is hindered by data availability 
issues. Estimates of marginal productivity within the health sector and across health and 
consumption are already available (Claxton, Martin, et al., 2015, Claxton, Sculpher, et al., 2015). 
Claxton et al. (2015) found that for approximately every additional £13,000 spent, a QALY is 
displaced elsewhere within the health care system (Claxton, Martin, et al., 2015). Moreover, it was 
found that for every additional £1.11 spent in health care, £1 of consumption is lost8 (Claxton, 
Sculpher, et al., 2015, Roberts, G., 2015). These findings provide the estimates for kH and kHC in 
Equation 3.8. In contrast, marginal productivities (k’s) of other public health expenditures have not 
been estimated. The lack of estimates of k’s outside the health care sector requires the introduction 
of pragmatic assumptions. Details about implementation of the cross-sectoral analysis for the 
health and criminal justice sectors are described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
Informing cost-effectiveness from an integrated perspective 
Theoretically, from an integrated perspective, if the INMB resulting from Equation 3.8 is positive, 
then the new intervention should be introduced. In practice, all the decision makers involved may 
                                                          
 
8  This is assumed to be equivalent to patient’s net production (i.e. their contribution or production of 
resources, net of their consumption or utilisation of resources) 
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only agree about the introduction of the new programme if all the components of the overall INMB 
(i.e. the INBs for each sector) are positive. 
It might well happen that INHB and INNB have opposite signs. In such a situation one sector would 
be bearing the costs of the intervention, and another benefitting from it (de Salazar et al., 2007). In 
other words, one sector wins and one loses. Such a situation leads to a conflict between the decision 
makers and has been referred to as the ‘wrong pocket problem’ (Butler, 2018, Erickson, Galloway 
& Cytron, 2012)’. 
A wrong pocket problem undercuts the incentives for collaboration, but the proposed framework 
would help decision makers in address such resource allocation decisions. Nevertheless, in order to 
ensure the implementation of programmes that are cost-effective from an integrated perspective, 
but not cost-effective from a narrower perspective, it may be necessary to enforce adequate 
compensations among sectors. If the sector that benefits from the intervention is able to 
compensate the loss in the other sector, then the intervention can be implemented and can 
generate an overall positive benefit (Claxton, Sculpher & Culyer, 2007). However, as discussed in 
Chapter 8, Sub-section 8.6, if actual compensation were to be paid, issues about misreporting and 




3.3. Incorporation of health equity concerns in the analysis 
As illustrated in Section 3.2.3, in the cross-sectoral stage of the framework, the aggregation at 
dimension level was simply based on the sum of the unweighted changes in dimensions across 
individuals. Nevertheless, the aggregation within dimensions could potentially take into account 
distributions of impacts across population subgroups (Walker et al., 2019). 
Including distributional concerns in the cross-sectoral analysis is particularly important when 
dealing with health outcomes, because one of the aims of public health interventions is specifically 
to reduce unfair inequalities (i.e. inequities) in health (NICE, 2012, 2008). Therefore, the aim of this 
section is to illustrate how to incorporate health equity considerations into the analysis. 
Rationale for the inclusion of health equity considerations into the evaluation 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2, whereas health inequalities are differences in health or 
health care and are not necessarily unfair or unjust, “a health inequity is an unnecessary, avoidable, 
unfair and unjust difference in someone's health or healthcare” (NICE, 2012). Health inequities are 
therefore related to social justice and value judgements, and NICE has the duty to address health 
inequity issues (NICE, 2015, 2012, Marmot et al., 2010, NICE, 2008). 
In the light of this, the distribution of health impacts between population sub-groups assumes 
particular relevance. Cost-effectiveness might not be the only rationale for decision making, and 
the inclusion of social concerns related to the distribution of health might become relevant 
(Weatherly et al., 2009). 
Health inequities and value judgments 
The policy objective underpinning a conventional CEA is to maximise total health in the general 
population, subject to a budget constraint. CEAs are typically grounded on the value judgement 
that “a QALY is a QALY”, irrespective of who is the beneficiary. Population-level health gain thus 
corresponds to the unweighted sum total of all individual health gains (Cookson et al., 2017, 
Drummond, M. et al., 2015). However, even though the “QALY is a QALY” principle is widely 
assumed in the practice of economic evaluation, it is not universally accepted. It has been suggested 
that there are occasions when differential consideration should be given to health gains based on 
the characteristics of those receiving care (Round & Paulden, 2018). 
Alternative value judgements could therefore be endorsed in the evaluation. For instance, 
diminishing returns of health benefits (Dolan, Shaw, et al., 2005) could be incorporated into the 
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analysis (Walker et al., 2019). This is because it has been argued that social value does not increase 
linearly in marginal increments of quality and length of life (and consequently a QALY maximisation 
approach would actually be based on wrong assumptions). Moreover, other attributes affecting the 
social value attached to health gains could be introduced in the evaluation, such as the desire to 
reduce health inequities, the dispersion of benefits as widely as possible and the compensation of 
certain groups for their disadvantaged lifetime health prospects (Dolan, Shaw, et al., 2005). 
The rationale for introducing adjustments (based on alternative value judgments) in the assessment 
of health variations is related to the concept of vertical equity. According to the concept of vertical 
equity, different needs of individuals should correspond to different levels of health care. In other 
words, morally relevant factors can justify unequal health care treatments. Nevertheless, the focus 
on vertical equity should not however divert attention from ensuring horizontal equity as well. 
According to the principle of horizontal equity, people with the same health care needs should 
receive equal treatment (Culyer, 2015, Wonderling, 2011). 
3.3.2.1. Normative principles and potential value judgements 
As explained in Chapter 2, Sub-sections 2.2.1 and 2.4.3.3, according to the welfarist approach, the 
individual should be the one and only source of valuation. For this reason, the analysis could be 
grounded in a welfarist approach only if value judgments and distributional considerations can be 
included in individuals’ utility function. Such an approach to the evaluation would not allow for the 
inclusion of exogenous equity concerns in the evaluation. 
In the proposed framework it is recognised that tackling unfair and unjust health inequalities is one 
explicit target of public health decision makers. Health equity implications must be taken into 
account in the analysis. For this reason, this stage of the evaluation allows external authorities to 
impose weights to particular populations or outcomes. 
The aim of including the health inequity assessment in a formal analytical framework is to make 
social value judgements explicit and allow decision makers to explore the impacts of alternative 
value judgments and investigate potential trade-offs. Such an analysis can be used to determine 
the strategy that best addresses the dual objectives of maximising population health and 
minimising variations in health which are considered unfair on the basis of agreed value judgments 
(Asaria et al., 2015). 
If impacts on individuals’ health level or other alternative equity considerations are incorporated 
into the evaluation, it becomes fundamental to assess where, in the general population, the health 
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impacts fall. A potential grouping of the population can be based on socioeconomic status (SES) 
(Cookson et al., 2017). 
The unequal (and potentially inequitable) distribution of health  
Using a categorisation based on the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD)9, Love-Koh et al. (2015) 
investigated the quality-adjusted life expectancy (QALE) at birth for each wealth quintile group of 
the population in England. As reported in Table 3.2, the authors found a positive correlation 
between SES and QALE: individuals in the lower IMD quantiles groups have lower QALE at birth. 
IMD quantile Quality-adjusted life expectancy (QALE) 




Q5 - richest 75.63 
Table 3.2 Population QALE according to IMD quantiles, adapted from Love-Koh et al. (2015) 
The current unequal distribution of health might raise equity issues. The association between SES 
(here measured through the IMD) and QALE might be deemed unnecessary, avoidable, and unjust. 
Therefore, health inequalities across IMD subgroups might be judged inequitable (Marmot et al., 
2010). 
In order to reduce health inequity, decision makers might want to prioritise interventions that 
benefit disadvantaged (and therefore less healthy) groups. If concerns about deprivation and the 
distribution of health are included in the economic evaluation, it becomes necessary to assess 
whether the intervention affects health inequalities (in terms of differential QALEs) as well as 
assessing cost-effectiveness (Asaria, Griffin & Cookson, 2016). 
Other potential value judgments 
SES can be used as the equity-relevant characteristic in determining population subgroups. 
Nevertheless, the perceived fairness of health inequalities might also be based on a broad range of 
other factors, such as: burden, rarity or severity of disease or condition; age; responsibility or 
culpability, or other personal characteristics (also in relation with other people or societal positions) 
(Bobinac et al., 2012). 
                                                          
 
9 IMD is the official measure of relative deprivation for small areas in England, and ranks every small area in 




In the UK, factors beyond cost-effectiveness already influence the decision-making process (Briggs, 
2016). For example, NICE introduced ‘end-of-life criteria’, which are based on the assumption that 
the general public would put extra value on health outcomes achieved at the end of life. Appraisal 
Committee are asked to consider the impact of giving greater weight to the treatment gains 
achieved in the later stages of disease if: the treatment is indicated for patients with short life 
expectancy; the treatment offers an extension to life compared to current NHS treatment; the 
treatment is licensed for small patient populations (Shah, Tsuchiya & Wailoo, 2015, NICE, 2013). As 
a result, higher priority can be given to life-extending treatments than to other types of treatments. 
Analytical techniques to incorporate value judgements in the CEA 
Sub-section 3.3.2 described potential value judgments that could be included in economic 
evaluations. The objective of this sub-section is to explore the available analytical techniques to 
integrate social value judgments into economic evaluations. In other words, alternative functional 
forms to aggregate health impacts are investigated. 
Various methods are available, and can be classified as ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ approaches. Indirect 
approaches report fairness considerations alongside the economic analysis, allowing for discrete 
comparisons within the final fairness informed economic evaluation. Examples of indirect 
approaches are various types of Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA)10, based on quantitative, 
qualitative or mixed comparison. By contrast, direct approaches incorporate fairness 
considerations into the primary economic analysis (Dukhanin et al., 2018). 
The ultimate objective of the proposed framework is to incorporate equity concerns into the cross-
sectoral cost-effectiveness analysis. For this reason, the focus will be on direct approaches. Among 
the direct approaches, the two methodologies most commonly implemented according to the 
review by Dukhanin et al. (2018) are equity weighting and distributional cost-effectiveness analysis 
(DCEA). 
                                                          
 
10 MCDA is based on the definition and measurement of the ‘criteria’ (what is being taken into account) and 
the ‘weights’ to be put on each element. By combining the criteria scores using the weighting scheme, MCDA 
can produce an overall assessment of each intervention and has the ability to capture, in a systematic manner, 
a broader range of policy outcomes (Marsh et al., 2012). MCDA can thus make the impacts of criteria and 
weights on the decision explicit, but it cannot avoid the need for value judgements (Devlin & Sussex, 2011). 
68 
 
Equity weighting is an instrument that can be used to perform an equity trade-off analysis, where 
the aim is to quantify trade-offs between improving total health and other equity objectives 
(Cookson et al., 2017). Alternatively, DCEA can be employed to conduct an equity impact analysis. 
Such an assessment aims at quantifying the distribution of costs and effects by equity-relevant 
variables (Cookson et al., 2017). 
Equity trade-off and equity impact analysis are illustrated in sub-sub-sections 3.3.3.1 and 3.3.3.2, 
respectively. 
3.3.3.1. Equity trade-off analysis 
One way of introducing vertical equity into the evaluation is to use ‘equity weights’ to value health 
benefits that apply to people with characteristics that reflect considerations of fairness (Cookson 
et al., 2017). Attaching greater weights to some populations over others implies ensuring greater 
access to scarce resources. A more equitable distribution of health can therefore be achieved 
relative to the dominant health maximisation approach implied in the acceptance of the 
assumption that “a QALY is a QALY” (Round & Paulden, 2018). 
If equity weights are introduced, it becomes necessary to also identify who bears the opportunity 
cost of the additional weight given to the beneficiaries’ health. In fact, if equity weights are applied 
only to the (identifiable) beneficiaries of a treatment, and not to the (similar but unidentifiable) 
bearers of the opportunity cost, the principle of horizontal equity would be violated (Paulden et al., 
2014). 
Equity weighting 
On the basis of vertical equity considerations, the general public might assign a different value to 
health impacts falling on a specific subgroup of the population. For this reason, different weights 
could be associated with specific health variations. However, if vertical equity concerns are 
introduced in economic evaluations, horizontal equity issues should not be neglected. 
The method proposed by Round and Paulden (2018) can be used to conduct an analysis that 
incorporates equity weights, but also complies with both horizontal and vertical equity principles. 
Their formulation allows analysts to incorporate differential weights associated with specific health 
impacts, and also reflects the weights in the opportunity costs. Required variables are defined as 




Qgs QALYs gained by individuals with special characteristics 
Qgo QALYs gained by other individuals 
Qg Total weighted QALYs gained 
Qds QALYs displaced in individuals with special characteristics 
Qdo QALYs displaced in other individuals 
Qd Total weighted QALYs displaced 
ω Weight applied to QALYs of individuals with special characteristics 
Table 3.3 Variables and definitions 
As illustrated in Section 3.2.3.1, from the perspective of the health care system, the INHB of an 
intervention can be calculated as the difference between the direct impact on health and the health 
opportunity costs (i.e. what health could be generated if those resources were used elsewhere). 
Opportunity costs depend on the amount of direct costs falling on the HC budget, and the marginal 
productivity of the HC sector. In other words, opportunity costs are the QALYs that would be lost 
as a result of the resources displaced in order to accommodate the additional intervention’s costs 
(Drummond, M. et al., 2015). 
The formula to calculate the INHB was reported in Equation 3.1. Based on this equation, total QALYs 
gained and displaced described in Table 3.3 can be computed as shown in Equation 3.9. 
𝑄𝑔 = ∆𝐻  𝑄𝑑 =
∆𝐶𝐻
𝑘𝐻
   (3.9) 
If equity weights are introduced, because the group from whom QALYs are disinvested also includes 
individuals with special characteristics, the total weighted QALYs gained and displaced can be 
computed as illustrated in Equation 3.10. 
𝑄𝑔 = (ω ∗ 𝑄𝑔𝑠) + 𝑄𝑔𝑜  𝑄𝑑 = (ω ∗ 𝑄𝑑𝑠) + 𝑄𝑑𝑜  (3.10) 
To implement Equation 3.10, the components of QALYs gained and displaced by individuals with 
special characteristics and other individuals must be distinguished. 
If total QALYs gained are greater than those displaced, then the corresponding Incremental Net 
weighted Health Benefit (INwHB) is positive, and the intervention is cost-effective. This can be 
expressed as shown in Equation 3.11. 
𝐼𝑁𝑤𝐻𝐵 = ω ∗ (𝑄𝑔𝑠 −  𝑄𝑑𝑠) + (𝑄𝑔𝑜 −  𝑄𝑑𝑜) > 0  (3.11) 
It must be stressed that the traditional INHB formula illustrated in Equation 3.1 and consequently 
the INwHB formula of Equation 3.11 do not actually reflect the full impact of the intervention on 
health care. These formulae do not include the spill-over effects on health (described in Section 
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3.2.3.4). The operationalisation of this method with the inclusion of the full impacts on health and 
its practical issues will be illustrated in detail in Chapter 7, using the case study. 
3.3.3.2. Equity impact analysis: Extended and Distributional CEA 
A potential alternative to the equity trade-off analysis is the equity impact analysis, which quantifies 
the distribution of costs and effects by equity-relevant variables. The aim of such an analysis is to 
use CEA to examine the distribution of DE and OC, broken down by one or more variables of concern 
to policy makers from an equity perspective. The two main analytical techniques available in the 
literature are Extended CEA (ECEA) and Distributional CEA (DCEA) (Cookson et al., 2017). 
The ECEA approach permits production of breakdowns of costs, health benefits and financial risk 
protection benefits (i.e. prevention of illness-related impoverishment) by socioeconomic quintile 
group. Because of its focus on risk protection benefits, ECEA has mostly been implemented in low- 
and middle-income countries.  (Verguet, Kim & Jamison, 2016). On the other hand, the focus of the 
proposed framework is on (potentially unfair) health inequality impacts and quantification of trade-
offs between increasing total health and reducing health inequity, in a context of high-income 
countries with universal health systems and fixed health budgets (Cookson, 2016). Therefore, the 
instrument chosen to perform the equity impact analysis is DCEA, which is a framework for 
incorporating health equity concerns into the economic evaluation of health sector interventions 
(Asaria, Griffin & Cookson, 2016, Asaria et al., 2015). 
DCEA methods 
DCEA provides supplementary information about the health inequality impacts of the interventions 
evaluated. Moreover, it can provide decision makers with evidence on the nature and size of any 
trade-offs between improving total population health and reducing unfair health inequality (Asaria, 
Griffin & Cookson, 2016). 
The analysis requires the estimation of the baseline health distribution (usually in terms of QALYs), 
and the modelling of changes to this baseline distribution due to DEs and OCs of the interventions 
being compared. Resulting modelled health distributions can then be adjusted for alternative social 
value judgments about fair and unfair sources of health variation (Asaria, Griffin & Cookson, 2016). 
As illustrated in the illustrative example proposed in Figure 3.2, in a DCEA the baseline health 
distribution and the new distribution after the intervention are compared. This allows a ‘starting 
point’ to be established, given by the baseline health distribution, and assess the impact on health 




Figure 3.2 DCEA from the health care perspective 
Figure 3.2 is an adaptation of the cross-sectoral scheme presented in Figure 3.1. Here the focus is 
only on the health care sector, and the impacts in terms of DEs and OCs are disaggregated according 
to the IMD quantiles. As a result, the distributions of health across the population before and after 
the intervention can be compared. In this illustrative example, greater health benefits are 
experienced by more disadvantaged individuals (green dashed arrow) compared to a smaller 
impact falling on richer individuals (grey dashed arrow) and negative health benefits experienced 
by the individuals in the highest IMD quantile (red dashed arrow). 
The methodological advantage of the DCEA is that it does not prescribe in advance any particular 
set of social value judgments about health inequality. As a consequence, it is suitable for an analysis 
based on a social decision making approach. Of course, in the implementation phase it is necessary 
to make some social value judgments (e.g. the definition of unfair dimensions of inequality, and the 
nature and strength of inequality aversion). Nevertheless, these social value judgments are explicit 
and transparent in the analysis, and the sensitivity of conclusions based on alternative plausible 
social value judgments can be investigated (Asaria, Griffin & Cookson, 2016). 
Presenting the results of the DCEA 
In order to make trade-offs between cost-effectiveness and the alternative health equity objective 
(i.e. reducing inequality in lifetime health) explicit, results of the DCEA can be illustrated using the 
Health Equity Impact Plane (Figure 3.3). The vertical axis of the plane shows the net health impact 
(i.e. the cost-effectiveness) of the intervention, whereas the horizontal axis summarises its net 




Figure 3.3 Health Equity Impact Plane, from Cookson et al. (2017) 
The net equity impact can be assessed using a formal health equity metric that combines 
disaggregated information in a summary index: the Atkinson index of inequality A(ε) (Atkinson, A. 
B., 1970). When applied to health, Atkinson’s measure of inequality measures the fraction of 
population health that society would be willing to sacrifice to achieve full equality in health, given 
the current health distribution and the degree of inequality aversion in the society (Norheim, 2012). 
The Atkinson index of inequality depends on the value of the inequality aversion parameter , and 
is scaled from 0 to 1 (where 0 represents no inequality and 1 represents full inequality). 
To calculate A(ε), it is necessary first to compute the Equally Distributed Equivalent Health (EDEH), 
which combines the chosen measure of inequality with average health in the distribution. The EDEH 
summarises the health distribution as one number, representing the amount of health that each 
person in a hypothetically perfectly equal health distribution would need to have for the decision 
maker to be indifferent between the actual health distribution analysed and the perfectly equal 
health distribution (Asaria, Griffin & Cookson, 2016). 
EDEH and A(ε) can be calculated as shown in Equation 3.12. 
𝐴(𝜀) = 1 −
𝐸𝐷𝐸𝐻
ℎ̅







  (3.12) 
Where: ℎ̅  is the mean health in the general population; N is the total population size; hi the 
individual health in QALE; and  is the Atkinson inequality aversion parameter. 
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A decrease in A(ε) represents an improvement in equality. In order to resemble the cost-
effectiveness plane, the sign of net equity impact is typically reversed. In the health equity plane, 
increases in -A(ε) represent an improvement in health equality (Love-Koh et al., 2018). 
Incorporating health equity concern in the cross-sectoral analysis 
Analytical techniques illustrated in Section 3.3.3 focus on health benefits and costs falling on the 
health sector budget, and can be used to aggregate outcomes within one dimension (i.e. the health 
care sector), with the incorporation of equity concerns. Basically, these methods would allow for 
revising the CEA from the health care sector perspective (Section 3.2.3.1), by incorporating 
alternative value judgments and relaxing the assumption that “a QALY is a QALY”. 
The aggregation within the health dimension, with the potential incorporation of considerations 
about health inequalities, is therefore achievable. Nevertheless, the objective of the proposed 
framework is to incorporate health equity concerns into the cross-sectoral analyses, in order to 
inform decision making from an integrated and broader perspective. This requires also, an 
aggregation across dimensions. 
To aggregate across dimensions, the same cross-sectoral methods (illustrated in Section 3.2.3) can 
be used if either equity weighting or DCEA are conducted in the analysis from the health care 
perspective. The same formula shown in Equation 3.8 can be used, but it will be based on different 
criteria for aggregation within the health care sector. 
If equity weighting is used, the adaptation of the cross-sectoral formula is straightforward. As 
shown in Equation 3.13 (which is an adaptation of Equation 3.7), Total Incremental Net weighted 
Monetary Benefit (INwMB) will be the result of the aggregation of INwHB, INNB and INCB. 
𝐼𝑁𝑤𝑀𝐵 = 𝑉𝐻 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑤𝐻𝐵 + 𝑉𝑁 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐵 + 𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐵  (3.13) 
If a DCEA from the health care perspective is conducted, it would be necessary to use the EDEH to 
adjust the results of the analysis from the health care sector perspective. Practical implementation 




3.4. Implementation of the framework: comments and case study 
The previous sections of this chapter illustrated the main stages of the theoretical analytical 
framework proposed for the evaluation of public health interventions. From the fourth chapter 
onwards, a case study will be used as a vehicle to illustrate the practical implementation of the 
framework. 
This last section summarises the proposed framework and introduces the case study that will be 
used as a vehicle to illustrate the proposed methods. 
A pragmatic approach to the cross-sectoral analysis 
As mentioned in Sub-section 3.2.2, the proposed approach is adapted from Walker et al. (2019)11. 
However, the main objective of the present work was to develop a pragmatic framework, following 
and applying the principles and guideline by Walker et al. (2019) in the context of a real decision 
making process. Consequently, the framework proposed in this thesis is more prescriptive, less 
abstract, and less compatible with the use of alternative analytical techniques. 
Table 3.4 summarises the analytical techniques that make up the proposed framework and can be 
employed to address the cross-sectoral, health equity and cross-temporal stages of the economic 
evaluation. The case study will be then used to illustrate how to operationalise the cross-sectoral 
and health equity analyses. The operationalisation of the cross-temporal extension of the analysis 
is discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
 
                                                          
 
11  As pointed out previously, the framework was originally formulated by Claxton et al. (2007), and 
subsequently developed by Claxton et al. (2010), Sculpher et al. (2014) and Walker et al. (2019). 
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Quantification of DEs and OCs for each dimension 
Cost-effectiveness analyses 
Independent CEAs for each sector, including spill-over effects 
Aggregation 
Within-dimension approach. WTP used to aggregate across dimension 
Resources allocation scheme 





DCEA or equity weighting 





Setting a more appropriate horizon (probably beyond the available clinical 
evidence) for the estimation of costs and consequences of the intervention 
Impact of budgetary policies 
Assessing the impacts of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ budgets (i.e. you can or cannot run 
deficits) 
Table 3.4 Summary of the analytical techniques included in the framework 
Identification of the case study 
In order to show the full potential of the proposed framework, the objective of the selection process 
was to identify a public health intervention with a range of cross-sectoral costs and outcomes, with 
potential long-term impacts, and preferably affecting a disadvantaged subgroup of the population. 
The York trials Unit register12 was checked in order to identify suitable trials which were already 
completed. Moreover, other potential studies were assessed through collaboration with a Public 
Health Research Consortium (PHRC) project (2011-2019), which aimed to develop a context for 
economic evaluations of public health programmes with costs and effects falling outside the NHS 
and local authority public health budgets. 
Once the selection process was concluded, the Screening and Intervention Programme for Sensible 
drinking (SIPS) (Drummond, C. et al., 2014, Newbury-Birch et al., 2014, Kaner et al., 2013) appeared 
to be the most suitable study for the planned analysis and was therefore selected as the case study. 
  
                                                          
 
12 Available at: https://www.york.ac.uk/healthsciences/research/trials. 
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3.4.2.1. Screening and Intervention Programme for Sensible drinking 
SIPS had the objective of tackling the problem of alcohol misuse, which is a major public health 
issue in Britain, a country with one of the highest binge drinking rates in the world (WHO, 2014). 
The impact of alcohol misuse may also extend beyond health consequences. First of all, problematic 
alcohol consumption is associated with criminal activity and reoffending; for example it was found 
that prisoners who had drunk alcohol every day shortly prior to custody were more likely to be 
reconvicted within a year following release than those who had not (Ministry of Justice, 2013). 
Moreover, interventions aimed at reducing alcohol misuse might be associated with a wide range 
of other non-health consequences, such as workplace and productivity losses, road traffic 
accidents, with the impacts often far in the future (Bhattacharya, 2017, Barbosa, Godfrey & Parrott, 
2010). 
Furthermore, alcohol programmes might have a significant role in addressing health inequalities. 
Such interventions target groups on the edges of society, which are deemed to be ‘marginalised’ 
through addiction and alcohol misuse (Bramley et al., 2015), and it has been found that the greatest 
effects are experienced by groups with lower SES (Burton et al., 2017). 
3.4.2.2. SIPS trials 
The SIPS programme comprised of three cluster randomised controlled trials (RCTs) across three 
settings: Emergency Departments (ED), Primary Care (PC) and Probation Services (or Criminal 
Justice Setting, CJS). The three trials had a similar design and aimed at evaluating a brief alcohol 
intervention. 
All SIPS trials could have been eligible as case study for this analysis. Nevertheless, the first two 
trials were primarily based within the NHS, while the latter was based in the criminal justice system 
and provides an example of an evaluation of interventions with costs and consequences in different 
sectors. Alcohol misuse among offenders on probation has been found to be an important issue, 
and such an intervention is likely to have a significant impact on criminality. Among offenders with 
a community or suspended sentence order, just over one-third (35%) were identified as having an 
alcohol misuse need. Among offenders under post-release supervision, 16% were assessed as 
having an alcohol misuse need (Ministry of Justice, 2013). 
Given the specific focus of this thesis on cross-sectoral and long-term impacts and health 
inequalities, the alcohol intervention implemented in the criminal justice setting appeared to be 
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the most suitable to be used as a case study. Details of the SIPS trial conducted in the CJS are 
provided in the next sub-section. 
SIPS trial in Probation Setting 
3.4.3.1. Study design 
The SIPS trial in CJS is a prospective factorial pragmatic cluster RCT with randomization at the level 
of offender manager (OM) (Newbury-Birch et al., 2014). 




Prospective The trial follows the individuals over time 
Outcomes measured at 
baseline, 6 and 12 months 
Factorial 
The study allows investigators to assess more than 
one intervention in a single experiment 
(Montgomery, Peters & Little, 2003) 
3 interventions are assessed: 
CIL, BA, and BLC 
Pragmatic 
Trials is designed to evaluate the effectiveness of 
interventions in real-life routine practice conditions 
(Patsopoulos, 2011) 
Follow-up counselling and 
return visits were voluntary 
Cluster 
Trials where research subjects are not allocated to 
treatments independently, but as a group (Bland, 
2004) 
The target population was 
composed of offenders 
recruited by OMs 
Table 3.5 SIPS trial characteristics 
3.4.3.2. Intervention arms 
OMs were randomised to three intervention arms. Each intervention arm was an intensified version 
of the previous one. 
1. Client Information Leaflet (CIL), also called Minimal intervention, used as a benchmark. 
In the CIL control condition, an information booklet was given to the participant. The leaflet 
contained information about alcohol and included the Drinkline telephone number and 
contact details of local alcohol treatment agencies. 
2. Brief advice (BA) and CIL. 
OMs randomised to deliver BA received training and gave up to five minutes of simple 
structured advice to the eligible offender. Offenders in this condition also received a CIL 
from the OM at the end of the advice. 
3. Brief Lifestyle Counselling (BLC), BA and CIL. 
OMs randomised to deliver BLC, in addition to providing the BA and CIL, were trained to 
refer offenders to an Alcohol Health Worker (AHW). The AHW delivered a 20 minute brief 
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lifestyle counselling intervention to offenders who attend the appointment at the 
probation office. 
3.4.3.3. Population and clusters 
The target population were 525 offenders recruited by 131 OMs from three English regions (North 
East, London and South East). Characteristics of the population were presented in the clinical paper, 
and are reproduced in Appendix A. 
Table 3.6 summarises the number of OMs (i.e. level 2 clusters) and individuals (i.e. level 1 units) in 
each intervention allocation according to both the Intention to Treat (ITT) and the per-protocol 
criteria. The ITT criterion identifies the number of offenders in each group according to their 
allocation to each intervention; the per-protocol criterion is based on the actual compliance of the 
offender, which is if he or she actually received the intervention. 
Unit CIL BA BLC Total 
OM 47 35 49 131 
Offender (ITT) 184 178 163 525 
Offender (per-protocol) 184 173 67 424 
Table 3.6 SIPS population: level 1 and level 2 units 
The number of OMs randomised to CIL, BA and BLC were 47, 35 and 49, respectively. The number 
of offenders allocated to CIL, BA and BLC were 184, 178 and 163, respectively. Nevertheless, 
checking the actual compliance, in the BA group, 173 of 178 received the BA; in the BLC group, 162 
received BA but only 67 subsequently received BLC. 
3.4.3.4. Outcomes 
The primary clinical outcome collected was the self-reported hazardous or harmful drinking status, 
using the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT) at 6 months. Secondary outcomes were 
AUDIT at 12 months, alcohol problems questionnaire, readiness to change, EQ-5D-3L, visits to NHS 




3.4.3.5. Main results from the previously published trial analysis 
Newbury-Birch et al. (2014) did not report any significant differences in the collected primary and 
secondary outcomes13. The authors however highlighted the relevant role of re-offending and 
planned a subsidiary CEA using CJS data, in order to assess whether the choice of principal outcome 
measure altered the recommended decisions. However, no evidence was found that this analysis 
had been conducted or published (Newbury-Birch et al., 2014). 
With regard to the CJS data, the authors found that over the next 12 months, offenders treated 
with BA and BLC were significantly less likely to be reconvicted. Odds of receiving a conviction were 
significantly lower for BA (36%) and BLC (38%), compared to CIL (50%). Nevertheless, according to 
the authors, the main limitation of this result was that reduction in criminal recidivism was found 
in the absence of significant differences in drinking consumption between the groups, which was 
the primary outcome of the study (OR of AUDIT negative status in BA group compared to CIL was 
0.80; 95% CI: 0.39, 1.62. OR of AUDIT negative status in BLC group compared CIL was 0.73; 95% CI: 
0.34, 1.53) (Newbury-Birch et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, the authors pointed out that even in the absence of differences in alcohol 
consumption across interventions, increased awareness might have resulted in a change in 
offending behaviour rather than consumption per se, or offending might be linked to particular 
patterns of drinking rather than overall consumption. 
Rationale for conducting an economic evaluation of SIPS 
Clinical trials are generally assessed on the basis of statistical significance, whereas economic 
evaluations assess both costs and effects and estimate when an intervention is cost-effective and 
how uncertain that estimate is. Statistical methods employed therefore differ between the two 
types of analysis (Raftery et al., 2015). 
A CEA from the health care perspective should still be performed even if clinical studies fail to 
demonstrate a statistically significant difference in clinical end points, and demonstrable clinical 
benefit is not a prerequisite for economic evaluation (Ramsey et al., 2015, Whitehurst & Bryan, 
2013). An economic evaluation can provide useful information regarding the budget impact 
                                                          
 
13 Similar results were found in other settings. The effectiveness of the intervention was assessed also in ED 
and PC settings, and CIL turned out to be the better option (Drummond, C. et al., 2014, Newbury-Birch et al., 
2014, Kaner et al., 2013). 
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implications of the trial. It may happen that large clinical benefits turn out to be too expensive, and 
on the contrary small clinical benefits may be cost-effective (Whitehurst & Bryan, 2013). 
For these reasons, in the next chapter, a ‘traditional’ CEA of SIPS based on health-related costs and 
outcomes will be conducted. Clinical results of the trial previously reported will be revisited, and 




Chapter 4:  CEA of SIPS from the health care perspective 
4.1. Introduction to the case study 
The second chapter of this dissertation explored the theoretical foundations and analytical 
techniques for the economic evaluation of public health interventions. The third chapter covered 
the description of the proposed comprehensive and theoretical framework of analysis. Moreover, 
the case study was presented. The aim of this and subsequent chapters is to operationalise the 
theoretical framework using the case study as a vehicle to illustrate the proposed methods. 
In this chapter, the cost-effectiveness of SIPS is investigated from the health care perspective. The 
objective of a CEA is to inform decisions by assessing and comparing incremental costs and 
incremental effects of an intervention. Because the analysis is conducted from the health care 
perspective, only health care costs and effects of the intervention are assessed. In this analysis, only 
data observed within the trial period are used. 
It is well recognised this ‘traditional’ CEA shows several limitations in informing decisions, especially 
when dealing with public health interventions (Sculpher et al., 2014). For this reason, in Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6, the perspective of the economic evaluation will be extended beyond the narrow 
health care viewpoint. In the fifth chapter, another CEA from the CJS perspective will be conducted, 
using reductions in reconviction frequency as a measure of effectiveness. Afterwards, in Chapter 6, 
the CEA from the health care perspective will be adjusted to also include the spill-over effects from 
criminal justice on victims’ health. In the same chapter, a CEA will be conducted from a broader and 
integrated perspective, including both impacts on HC and CJS. In Chapter 7, the effects of 
incorporating health equity concerns in the cross-sectoral analysis will be investigated. Lastly, the 
potential cross-temporal extension of the evaluation will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
Structure of the chapter 
Section 4.2 describes the methods employed for the analysis. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 cover the analysis 
of health and health care costs, respectively. A CEA under the complete case approach is conducted 
in Section 4.5. The impacts of missing data and outliers are assessed in Sections 4.6 and 4.7, 
respectively. A summary of results of the economic evaluation and policy implications are reported 




4.2. Methods for the CEA from the health care perspective 
Effectiveness assessment 
The impact of the intervention on health was measured using QALYs. QALYs combine quantity and 
health-related quality of life (HRQoL) and are calculated by weighting each year of life lived using a 
quality adjustment weight. The quality weights represent the HRQoL of the health states under 
consideration and are based on individuals’ preferences for the health states. On the conventional 
scale for QALY weights, zero corresponds to death and one to perfect health. The bottom of the 
scale is not well defined and states worse than death are allowed (Karimi & Brazier, 2016, 
Drummond, M. et al., 2015). 
In the UK, the preferred generic measure of HRQoL impacts of health interventions is the EQ-5D 
(NICE, 2013). EQ-5D is a pre-scored multi-attribute health status classification system, with a 
questionnaire that categorizes individuals’ health on 5 dimensions: mobility, self-care, usual 
activities, pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression. In the SIPS trial, the EQ-5D-3L questionnaire 
was used, where each dimension has three levels of severity, yielding up to 245 mutually exclusive 
health states (35 plus dead and unconsciousness). The questionnaire is presented in Appendix B. A 
more recent five-level version was developed in 2011 (when the trial was already concluded), but 
the three-level questionnaire is still the most commonly used (Oemar & Oppe, 2013). 
HRQoL scores collected during the trial were converted into single-dimensional weights by applying 
a scoring function that reflects the general population preferences for the health states assessed 
by the EQ-5D instrument. In the UK, the preferences for the scoring function were measured in 
1994 with the time trade-off (TTO) valuation technique on 3395 members of the UK public (Dolan, 
1997, MVH Group, 1995). The resulting EQ-5D tariff is a set of numbers ranging from -0.594 to 1, 
where 1 is full health, 0 is death, and negative values are valued as worse than death. 
The single-dimensional generic HRQoL weights obtained were used to calculate QALYs. QALYs can 
be obtained by drawing a graph with time on the x axis and HRQoL weights on the y axis, and 
calculating the area under the curve (AUC). Equation 4.1 describes the general expression for 
calculating QALYs from individual patient data, using individuals’ scores at different time points 
(Hunter et al., 2015, Manca, Hawkins & Sculpher, 2005). 






]𝑛𝑡=0    (4.1) 
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In Equation 4.1, n is the number of measurements over the study period; Qt is the individual EQ-5D 
score value obtained in the tth measurement; T is the total duration of the study period expressed 
as the total number of time units in a year; Tt is the time period in which the tth measurement takes 
place, again expressed as number of time units in a year (Manca, Hawkins & Sculpher, 2005). 
Equation 4.2 illustrates the application of the generic formula to this specific case. 












  (4.2) 
QALYs were discounted according to appropriate measures of time preferences (Drummond, M. et 
al., 2015), and regression methods were used to adjust differences in QALYs for potential 
differences in baseline health states between individuals or groups (Manca, Hawkins & Sculpher, 
2005). Because of the clustered design of the study, the Huber–White sandwich estimation 
approach was employed when assessing the differences in QALYs in order to derive robust standard 
errors (SEs). Clustered SEs account for heteroscedasticity across clusters of observations (Cameron 
& Miller, 2015). 
Costs assessment 
Resource use data were collected alongside clinical data during the SIPS trial. Questionnaires were 
administered at baseline, and six and twelve month follow-ups. Unit costs were then associated 
with resource use data. On the basis of surveys’ date of completion, 2010 was used as reference 
year for unit costs and all costs are presented in 2010 pounds. 
Intervention costs were also calculated. These included staff costs and cost of leaflets. Appropriate 
intervention costs were linked to each individual, according to the actual delivery of the 
programme. 
Assessment of cost-effectiveness 
A complete case analysis was performed. ICERs, which represent the ratio of the difference in costs 
and the difference in outcomes between the trial arms, were presented and compared to 
alternative threshold estimates. Threshold estimates were based on values of £13,000 (Claxton, 
Martin, et al., 2015), £20,000 and £30,000 per QALY (NICE, 2012). INBs were presented as well. 
Uncertainty around the cost-effectiveness estimate was assessed using cost-effectiveness (CE) 
planes and cost-effectiveness acceptability curves (CEACs). CEACs were constructed to present the 
probability that each of the interventions (BA, BLC and CIL) is cost-effective according to different 
monetary values being attached to QALYs. 
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Lastly, even though the following analyses were not the main focus of the thesis, the impact of 
missing data and the appropriateness of building a multilevel model were also assessed. To 
overcome the missing data issue, Multiple Imputation (MI) was undertaken. Data after MI were 
bootstrapped to account for the expected skewness evident in economic cost data, and another 
CEA was conducted using the new dataset with imputed values. Analysis was performed using 
STATA 14 (StataCorp, 2015) and Microsoft Excel 2010 (Microsoft, 2010).  
4.3. Effectiveness of SIPS: impacts on health 
Analysis of EQ-5D scores 
Participants were asked to complete the EQ-5D questionnaires before starting the trial, and twice 
over the duration of the trial, at 6 and 12 months. First, EQ-5D scores were calculated. A graphical 
description using box plots14 is reported in Figure 4.1. Table 4.1 summarises the EQ-5D scores at 
baseline, 6 and 12 months for the three intervention allocations. 
 
Figure 4.1 EQ-5D scores at baseline, 6 and 12 months 
                                                          
 
14 Boxes capture the lower (first) and upper (third) quartiles, and the line subdividing the box represents the 
median; whiskers describe the distribution of all data within 1.5 interquartile ranges (i.e. the difference 
between the third and first quartile); dots capture outliers. 
85 
 
Intervention  Baseline Month 6 Month 12 
Minimal 
Mean 0.836 0.873 0.881 
SD 0.243 0.208 0.199 
Count 178 116 101 
Brief Advice 
Mean 0.824 0.823 0.836 
SD 0.222 0.250 0.234 
Count 171 127 112 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling 
Mean 0.880 0.868 0.855 
SD 0.205 0.206 0.220 
Count 157 105 97 
Table 4.1 EQ-5D scores at baseline, 6 and 12 months 
Overall, it seems that the Minimal intervention performs slightly better compared to more intense 
interventions. The BA group is characterised by a slightly higher variability in the scores compared 
to other treatment allocations. Box plots suggest that EQ-5D scores in the Minimal and BA groups 
tend to remain stable over time, whereas a slight decrease in the scores can be observed in the BLC 
group.  
Baseline EQ-5D scores appear to be different in the three treatment allocations. Such differences 
in initial health levels must be taken into consideration when calculating the differences in health 
scores. In order to estimate the differences in EQ-5D scores adjusted for the baseline scores, two 
regressions were performed. Month 6 and 12 EQ-5D scores were regressed on treatment allocation 
(using Minimal intervention as the benchmark) and EQ-5D baseline scores. Offenders were 
recruited by OMs and similarities between individuals recruited and treated by the same OM could 
be observed. For this reason, SEs of the regressions are robust to clustering. Results are reported 
in Table 4.2. 
 EQ-5D scores at 6 months EQ-5D scores at 12 months 
 Coefficient 95% CI * Coefficient 95% CI ** 
Intervention allocation:             
Brief Advice -0.0396 -0.0889 0.0098 -0.0351 -0.0863 0.0160 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling -0.0315 -0.0755 0.0124 -0.0440 -0.0976 0.0096 
Baseline EQ-5D 0.5507 0.4260 0.6755 0.5380 0.3894 0.6866 
Constant 0.4108 0.2858 0.5359 0.4257 0.2815 0.5699 
* Note: SE adjusted for 114 clusters      
** Note: SE adjusted for 109 clusters      
Table 4.2 Regression coefficients for EQ-5D at 6 and 12 months 
Even though differences among treatment allocations are not statistically significant at 5% level, 
results show a negative correlation between levels of health and more intense interventions (BA 




Analysis of QALYs 
Total QALYs resulting from the programme were computed using the AUC method (illustrated in 
Sub-section 4.2.1). QALYs were plotted using box plots for each intervention group, and differences 
in QALYs were assessed. Box plots are presented in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of QALYs at month 12 
From the box plots it appears that QALYs distributions in Minimal and BA groups are very similar, 
with BA having a slightly lower median value. BLC group shows less variation in QALYs and slightly 
higher QALYs. Nevertheless, differences in QALYs might be biased by differences in health at 
baseline. The recommended method to investigate differences in QALYs between interventions and 
the role of baseline EQ-5D scores is to regress total QALYs on intervention allocation and baseline 
EQ-5D scores (Hunter et al., 2015). 
Equation 4.3 illustrates the regression equation used, where total QALYs are the dependent 
variable, b1 is the coefficient for the treatment effect and b2 is the coefficient for baseline EQ-5D 
scores (Manca, Hawkins & Sculpher, 2005). 
QALYs =  b0 + b1 Intervention +  b2 EQ5D𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒   (4.3) 
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However, randomisation is not a perfect process and differences in QALYs might be biased also by 
differences in baseline characteristics between groups. For this reason the role of other baseline 
variables was investigated by including them in the regression as well15. 
4.3.2.1. Two potential regression models for QALYs 
Two regression models were tested16. In regression Model 1, QALYs were regressed on intervention 
allocation (BA and BLC compared to Minimal) and adjusted for baseline EQ-5D scores differences. 
In regression Model 2 it was tested whether other baseline characteristics had an impact on QALYs. 
Age, gender and ethnicity were thus included in the regression, as well as the baseline measure of 
the drinking status (AUDIT score) and the baseline readiness to change. Regressions coefficients 
and their 95% confidence intervals are reported in Table 4.3. 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:             
Brief Advice -0.0230 -0.0600 0.0141 -0.0237 -0.0608 0.0133 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling -0.0277 -0.0564 0.0011 -0.0291 -0.0589 0.0008 
Baseline EQ-5D 0.6752 0.5942 0.7561 0.6536 0.5619 0.7453 
Age     -0.0009 -0.0022 0.0005 
Sex (1=male)     -0.0197 -0.0597 0.0204 
Ethnicity:         
Black     -0.0011 -0.0510 0.0488 
Asian     0.0413 -0.0127 0.0952 
Mixed     -0.1364 -0.2816 0.0089 
Other     0.0380 -0.0312 0.1071 
Baseline AUDIT score     -0.0005 -0.0029 0.0019 
Baseline RCR*:         
Sometimes think about drinking less     -0.0281 -0.0663 0.0101 
I have decided to drink less     -0.0144 -0.0628 0.0340 
Already trying to cut down     -0.0247 -0.0584 0.0090 
Constant 0.2960 0.2171 0.3750 0.3602 0.2314 0.4890 
R-squared 0.6299   0.6505   
AIC -388.975   -378.382   
BIC -374.810   -328.915   
Note: SE adjusted for 104 clusters 
* Readiness to Change Ruler 
Table 4.3 Regression estimates for QALYs 
                                                          
 
15  On the other hand, adding covariates might generate issues due to small numbers and potential 
collinearities. 
16 Generalized linear models were also considered and Park test was performed to assess the appropriate 
model form. Test results indicated that Gaussian distribution provides the most appropriate fit to the data. 
88 
 
In both models baseline EQ-5D scores have a positive and statistical significant impact on the 
outcome of interest. As regards the other additional controls, it seems that none of them has a 
relevant impact on total QALYs, and including or excluding them from the regression does not affect 
coefficients and CIs of the intervention allocation and baseline EQ-5D. R squared values are 
comparable between the two models (though slightly higher in model 2), whereas AIC and BIC 
suggest that Model 1 performs better than Model 2. For this reason, Model 1 was chosen. 
4.3.2.2. Average QALYs per intervention allocation 
From Model 1, the coefficients associated with BA and BLC are -0.0230 (95% CI: -0.0600; 0.0141) 
and -0.0277 (95% CI: -0.0564; 0.0011) respectively. As discussed in Sub-section 4.2.1, QALYs are 
built on a scale going from zero to one, where zero corresponds to death and one to perfect health. 
Consequently, while these differences are small, they still equate to some meaningful drop in health 
status. In fact, these coefficients mean that on average BA is associated with a reduction of 
approximately 8 days in perfect health in a year, compared to the Minimal intervention; BLC is 
associated with a reduction of approximately 10 days in perfect health, compared to the Minimal 
intervention. 
Using the results from the regression, it was then possible to estimate the predicted QALYs means 
adjusted for the differences in baseline health scores. As the discount rate is generally only 
applicable in cases where the duration of the trial is greater than 12 months, QALYs were not 
discounted in this analysis (Hunter et al., 2015). As illustrated in Table 4.4, a hypothetical individual 
having a 0.846 EQ-5D baseline score (which is the average EQ-5D score at baseline across all 
individuals) would experience 0.8670, 0.8441 and 0.8394 QALYs (i.e. 316, 308, and 306 days in 
perfect health) if treated for one year with CIL, BA and BLC, respectively. Differential QALYs 








Minimal 83 0.8661 0.8670 0.8435 0.8905 
Brief Advice 91 0.8351 0.8441 0.8158 0.8724 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling 81 0.8672 0.8394 0.8214 0.8574 
Table 4.4 QALYs adjusted for baseline EQ-5D scores 
The number of total observations (255) is lower than the number of total patients (525). This is due 
to the considerable presence of missing observations. The issue of missing data will be explored via 




4.3.2.3. The impact of clusters 
An additional analysis was conducted in order to assess the impact of clusters and investigate 
whether building a multilevel model was worth it. Alternative regression models were compared 
and the actual impact of clusters on QALYs turned out to be negligible. Multilevel regressions 
provided almost the same results as OLS regressions, and the Intracluster Correlation Coefficients 
(ICCs) were estimated to be zero. Details of this analysis can be found in Appendix C. 
Given the negligible role of the clusters, it was concluded that performing a multilevel analysis 
would have only added layers of complexity (especially in performing missing data analysis) that 
would have not improved the quality of this case study. 
4.4. Health care resource use analysis 
Health care units 
Table 4.5 summarises the health-related categories of resource use and associated unit costs, as 
they were recorded in the SIPS questionnaire. In the table, ‘PSSRU’ refers to the publication by 
Curtis (2013) on Unit Costs of Health and Social Care, and NHS reference costs are taken from the 
costs report published by the Department of Health and Social Care (2010). Costs reported in years 
different from the reference year (2010) were adjusted using the Bank of England Inflation 
Calculator17. 
Unit Details Cost (£) Source 
Treatment for drinking problems   
Drinkline calls 
No information available in the literature. Here it is assumed 
these are 10-minute calls with an alcohol related worker 
(£33 per hour) 
5.5 PSSRU 
Counselling18 
Cost per consultation by Alcohol Related Workers (i.e. 
experienced nurses who have undertaken specific training in 




No information available in the literature. Same costs as 
outpatient treatment for drinking problems were assumed 
87  
Detoxification20 
Cost per patient day of inpatient detoxification for people 
who misuse drugs/alcohol 
142 PSSRU 
                                                          
 
17 Available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/inflation-calculator 
18  Aggregated counselling in Hospital, Primary care, Day care programme, Alcohol Treatment facility, 
Voluntary. 
19 Aggregated day care in Hospital, Day care programme, Alcohol Treatment facility, Voluntary. 




Unit Details Cost (£) Source 
Outpatient treatment 
for drinking problems21 
Outpatient attendances, drug and alcohol consultant 




No information available in the literature. Same costs as 
detoxification were assumed 
142  
Overnight  after care 
hostel 







No information available in the literature. Same costs as 




Temporary accommodation in housing association stock: 




Use of hospital services (excluding treatment for drinking problems)   
A&E visits leading to 
not admitted 
Weighted average of attendance of A&E treatments leading 
to not admitted 
97 PSSRU 
A&E visits leading to 
admitted 




Cost per day calculated using the average cost per episode 






Outpatient visits Weighted average of all outpatient procedures 152 PSSRU 
Day case visits Weighted average of all stays 637 PSSRU 
Emergency ambulance 
travels 
NHS Trusts Paramedic Services: Emergency Transfers / 






NHS Trusts Patient Transport Services (PTS): average of 
Admitted Patient Care (£40), Outpatient (£31) and Other 





Private travels Average transportation cost per visit used for GP home visit 5 PSSRU 
Primary care and social services   
GP visits 
Sum of surgery consultation costs (including qualification 
costs, excluding direct care staff costs) and actual 
prescription costs per consultation (£39) 
71 PSSRU 
Nurse visits Nurse (GP). Cost per consultation, including qualifications 12 PSSRU 
Social worker visits 
Costs per hour, including qualifications. From PSSRU it was 
not possible to estimate a cost per visit. Assumed 60 min per 
visit 
53 PSSRU 
Home Visit: GP 
Cost per home visit, excluding direct care staff costs, 
including qualification costs, including actual prescription 
costs per consultation (£39) 
147 PSSRU 




Community nurse. Cost per home visit, including 
qualifications 
27 PSSRU 
Home Visit: Others 
(e.g. dietitian) 
Costs per hour of home visiting, including qualifications. 
From PSSRU it was not possible to estimate a cost per visit. 
Assumed 60 min per visit 
57 PSSRU 
Home Visits: Social 
worker 
No information available in the literature. Same costs as 
social worker visits were assumed 
53 PSSRU 
                                                          
 
21 Aggregated outpatient treatment in Hospital, Alcohol Treatment facility. 
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Unit Details Cost (£) Source 
NHS Direct 
Average cost of a call to NHS Direct line estimated in 2007 




NHS walk in Walk in services 37 PSSRU 
Table 4.5 Unit costs of health care resource use 
Accident and emergency (A&E) resource units were slightly adapted with respect to the way they 
were recorded in the SIPS questionnaire. Originally one of the resource use measures was the 
number of nights spent in Admission and Emergency Department (AED). Nevertheless, the values 
recorded were frequently not consistent with the information about inpatient nights spent as an 
inpatient from the same individuals, and there were some cases of double counting. A new rule was 
therefore implemented: A&E events were distinguished into A&E visits leading to not admitted and 
A&E visits leading to admitted. For those individuals reporting A&E visits leading to admission, all 
the additional nights after the first spent in AED were moved to inpatient nights (if not already 
recorded there). This categorisation is also more consistent with PSSRU estimates categories. 
Average prescription costs were included in visit tariffs. 
Costs per resource use category 
Unit costs were assigned to the health care resource consumption data in order to estimate the 
costs of the health care resource use. Health care resource use data are reported in Appendix D. 
Average costs per group for each cost category are described in Table 4.6. Estimates are based on 
the total resource use over the whole follow-up, which is the sum of resource use of the first six 
months (recorded at month 6) and the second six months (recorded at month 12). By aggregating 
resource use data collected at the two time points, only complete cases are kept; if the resource 




Cost category CIL BA BLC 
Drinkline calls 0.9 (8.3) 86 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 87 
Counselling 46.1 (232.7) 86 79.2 (491.7) 100 71.5 (259.2) 87 
Day care 5 (27.8) 86 0 (0) 100 10 (76.7) 87 
Detoxification 1.6 (15.3) 86 4.2 (31.6) 100 14.6 (137) 87 
Outpatient treatment for drinking problems 2 (13.1) 86 0.8 (8.7) 100 10 (75.5) 87 
Overnight hospital detoxification 0 (0) 87 0 (0) 100 27.7 (258.8) 87 
Overnight after care hostel 0 (0) 87 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 87 
Overnight alcohol treatment facility 1.6 (15.2) 87 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 87 
Overnight residential programme 0.1 (1.2) 87 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 87 
A&E visits leading to not admitted 26.4 (70.1) 88 49.9 (97.5) 101 36 (84.2) 86 
A&E visits leading to admitted 8.9 (33.2) 88 12.9 (77.5) 101 12.1 (55.4) 86 
Inpatient nights 37.5 (193.2) 89 318 (1985.9) 102 126.1 (501.1) 87 
Outpatient visits 162.2 (665.5) 89 162.4 (490.6) 102 109.8 (290.4) 86 
Day case visits 21.4 (115.6) 89 99.9 (769.7) 102 29.6 (134.9) 86 
Emergency ambulance travels 93.8 (556.2) 89 21.6 (109.8) 102 45.1 (203.6) 87 
Ambulance travels 0.7 (6.8) 89 0.3 (3.1) 102 0 (0) 86 
Private travels 0.8 (8.4) 89 0.1 (0.8) 102 1.7 (16.1) 86 
GP visits 197.1 (298.5) 89 314.9 (599.7) 100 211.4 (328.3) 86 
Nurse visits 12.6 (30.2) 89 8.8 (24.2) 100 6.4 (16.8) 86 
Social worker visits 25 (124.5) 89 42.7 (224) 101 11 (50.1) 86 
Home Visit: GP 1.6 (15.5) 89 10.1 (63.2) 101 10.2 (66.8) 86 
Home Visit: Nurse 2 (19) 89 0.9 (8.1) 101 0.6 (6.4) 86 
Home Visit: Community psychiatric nurse 0 (0) 89 6.8 (40.1) 101 0.3 (2.9) 86 
Home Visit: Others 1.9 (18.1) 89 1.6 (17) 101 0 (0) 86 
Home Visits: Social worker 8.4 (45.3) 88 49.2 (206) 100 12.4 (42.7) 84 
NHS Direct events 3.1 (11.4) 88 3.2 (12.5) 101 2.9 (13.5) 84 
NHS walk in events 4.7 (13.7) 85 15.6 (40.7) 95 6.1 (21.3) 86 
The table reports: mean cost in 2010 £ (SD22) number of observations, including imputed values 
Table 4.6 Health care costs under the mean imputation scenario 
Looking across the three intervention groups, the main factors contributing to total costs are 
outpatient visits, emergency ambulance travels, GP visits and A&E visits. Moreover, counselling and 
inpatient nights play a fundamental role in determining the additional costs for the BA group. 
Intervention costs 
The three interventions are described in Section 3.4.3. All OMs had to provide the information 
leaflet, which is a common cost for CIL, BA and BLC groups. The 5-minute brief advice from the 
                                                          
 
22 Standard deviations (SD) reported in the tables are based on Normality assumption (which is not realistic 
in this context) and may lead to negative resource use. SDs here should be interpreted only as measure of 
uncertainty and are not used in models or simulations. 
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trained OM was planned only for OMs and offenders allocated to BA and BLC. The 20-minute brief 
lifestyle counselling from AHW was undertaken only if the offender was randomised to the BLC 
group. Resource use categories and their unit costs are reported in Table 4.7. 
Resource use Cost (£) CIL BA BLC 
Information leaflet 0.2 X X X 
5-minute brief advice from trained OM 2  X X 
20-minute brief lifestyle counselling from AHW 11   X 
Total intervention cost per individual (£)  0.2 2.2 13.2 
Table 4.7 Intervention costs 
The cost of the information leaflet was estimated as the price of printing a 16-page stapled booklet 
(from an online order23 of 1,000 booklets). The cost of the 5-minute session was calculated from 
the cost per hour (24£) of a generic one-to-one session of an intervention for substance misuse 
(including qualifications costs). The PSSRU estimates of unit costs in criminal justice were used 
(Brookes et al., 2013). The cost of the 20-minute session with an AHW was calculated using the 
information reported in Table 4.5. 
Costs were assigned according to the actual compliance to the intervention on the basis of the 
information reported in Table 3.6 about who actually received the intervention. 
Costs and decision makers’ budgets 
For the sake of simplicity, frequently in CEAs all costs are aggregated. Here, on the contrary, 
particular attention was devoted to distinguishing costs falling on different decision makers’ 
budgets, in order to assess cross-sectoral costs correctly. Health-related cost categories were 
therefore aggregated according to the different budgets on which costs fall. 
SIPS costs categories were re-arranged according to areas of expenditure: primary care, secondary 
care, non-residential alcohol treatment, residential alcohol treatment, social care, other home 
visits, ambulances, private consumption and CJS. SIPS cost categories and decision makers’ budgets 
are reported in Appendix E. Afterwards, areas of expenditures were associated with the appropriate 
decision maker’s budget. 
  
                                                          
 
23 From: https://www.helloprint.co.uk/ 
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4.4.4.1. Social care and health care costs 
In the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3, a broader perspective for the evaluation was 
described. As summarised in the examples in Table 3.1, a list of potential sectors was proposed, 
based on the 2nd Cost-Effectiveness Panel's impact inventory (Sanders et al., 2016). In this list, 
Health Care and Social Services were distinguished. From a purely theoretical point of view, it can 
be argued that health care and social care impacts fall on different budgets. 
Nonetheless, from a more pragmatic point of view, the division between health and social care is 
more blurred. As mentioned in Sub-section 3.2.1.1, in the UK, NICE guidelines recommend the 
health and social care perspective for the evaluation (NICE, 2013). Consequently, when the analysis 
is carried out from the health care perspective, impacts of health and social care are typically 
measured in QALYs and decision makers in health care base their decision on evaluations where 
health care costs and social care costs are aggregated. 
For this reason, this ‘traditional’ CEA will be based on NICE guidelines (NICE, 2013), and a health 
and social care perspective will be employed for the evaluation. It will be assumed that social care 
costs (i.e. social worker visits and home visits, community psychiatric nurse home visits, and visits 
and home visits by ‘others’) fall on the same health care decision maker’s budget, and effects of 
health and social care are both measured in QALYs. 
The main objective of this case study is to illustrate the methods and the policy impacts of 
conducting a cross-sectoral analysis where budgets, effects and decision makers are clearly 
distinguishable (e.g. health and criminal justice). Nevertheless, the potential separation of health 
care and social care budget and its impacts on decision making are worth to be discussed more in 
detail. Policy impacts, and theoretical and technical issues of implementing the framework using 
‘Social Services’ as a separate dimension will be discussed in the discussion Chapter 8, Sub-section 
8.3. 
4.4.4.2. Decision makers affected by the impacts of SIPS 
Four decision makers (with their own budget) were identified: health care (including social care), 
LA, private consumption and CJS (that paid for the intervention). As illustrated in Table 4.8, it was 
assumed that CJS paid for the intervention. 
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Social care and home visits 
Ambulances 
Non-residential alcohol treatment 
Overnight hospital detoxification 
Overnight after care hostel 
Local authority Overnight alcohol treatment facility 
Overnight residential programme 
Private travels Private consumption 
Intervention costs Criminal justice system 
Table 4.8 SIPS costs and associated budgets 
Table 4.9 summarises the average total costs of complete case observations (where all the resource 
use values in all categories at both 6 and 12 months were not missing) falling on each budget, 
grouped by treatment allocation. 
 CIL BA BLC 
Health care 573.6 (992.6) 75 1316.4 (3032.9) 83 768.7 (1469.5) 77 
Local authority 1.8 (16.3) 75 0 (0) 83 0 (0) 77 
Private consumption 1 (9.2) 75 0.1 (0.9) 83 1.9 (17) 77 
Criminal justice system 0.2 (0) 75 2.1 (0.3) 83 6.7 (5.4) 77 
Total costs 576.8 (999) 75 1318.7 (3033) 83 777.4 (1481.5) 77 
Table reports: mean cost in 2010 £ (SD) number of observations 
Table 4.9 Total costs of SIPS (complete case) 
Total costs recorded using the health-related SIPS questionnaire included costs falling on HC, LA, 
consumption and CJS. Nevertheless, most of the recorded costs do actually fall on the HC budget, 
and only a very small proportion fall on other sectors. However, true impacts on CJS are much bigger 
than those reported in Table 4.9. Here only intervention costs are considered. The analysis of the 
cost-effectiveness of SIPS from the CJS perspective, with the inclusion of the full impacts on CJS, 
will be conducted in the next chapter. 
Health care costs at baseline 
In the SIPS questionnaire, health care resource use in the six months before the intervention was 
also collected. Mean costs at baseline are described in Table 4.10. Only costs falling on health care 
budget were recorded. 
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Cost category Mean (£) SD 
ED patient 64.36 140.70 
Nights as inpatients 387.68 2427.06 
Admitted but not kept in 26.97 93.27 
Outpatient appointments 86.10 299.23 
GP visits 173.45 333.66 
GP home visits (HV) 7.66 53.93 
Practice nurse visits 5.29 34.28 
Nurse HV 1.04 11.59 
Prescriptions 107.00 273.41 
Social worker HV 12.71 74.53 
Social worker visit 27.27 215.53 
Other HV 19.85 138.29 
Other visits 52.71 212.18 
Total baseline costs 974.47 2824.09 
Table 4.10 Baseline health care costs 
Nights as inpatients, GP visits, prescriptions and outpatient appointments are the main health-
related cost categories that contribute to the total amount of baseline costs. This information could 
be potentially used to adjust cost differences of the intervention for differences at baseline. In fact, 
baseline health care costs could be interpreted as differences among individuals in the use of the 
resources due to causes not attributable to the intervention. The role of health care baseline costs 
will be investigated in detail in the next section. 
4.5. CEA under the complete case analysis approach 
This section illustrates the CEA of the SIPS trial under the complete case analysis approach. The 
economic evaluation was performed using the original dataset fixed for resource use intensity as 
illustrated in Appendix D. 
Recalling the costs aggregation summarised in Table 4.9, only costs falling on health care and social 
care budget were considered in this CEA. It would not be correct to include also costs falling on 
other budgets, even though in this particular case their impact on final results would be likely to be 
marginal. Costs falling on CJS will be analysed in the next chapter, and a cross-sectoral CEA will be 
conducted in Chapter 6. 
The distribution of health care costs were highly skewed to the right. This can be observed in Figure 
4.3 and by comparing mean and median costs in all intervention groups. Median costs reported in 




Figure 4.3 Distribution of costs falling on health care budget, by intervention allocation 
 Median cost (£) Mean cost (£) 
CIL 173.5 573.7 
BA 284 1316.4 
BLC 249 768.7 
Table 4.11 Median and mean health care costs per group 
For this reason, two alternative analyses were explored when performing the CEA: costs and QALYs 
were analysed both via seemingly unrelated regressions (SURs) (Zellner, 1962) and using two 
separate regressions. SUR allows estimating not only adjusted mean differences in costs and QALYs, 
but also the correlation between the errors in costs and QALYs regression equations. Nevertheless, 
SUR assumes normality of cost data and there is no option to allow errors to be heteroskedastic 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Consequently, it might be worth trading off the simultaneous estimation 
of correlated costs and QALYs in favour of a better fit of the model, using two separate regressions, 
one for costs and one for QALYs. 
Seemingly unrelated regressions for costs and QALYs 
First, adjusted mean differences in costs and QALYs were estimated via SURs. Two alternative SUR 
models were compared. In Model 1, one regression had QALYs as dependent variable, regressed 
on intervention allocation and baseline EQ-5D scores; the other regression had total costs as 
dependent variable, regressed on intervention allocation. In an alternative SUR model (Model 2), 
the impact of baseline health care costs was investigated by including them in the regression having 
total health care costs as the dependent variable. Regression results are illustrated in Table 4.12. 
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Model 1: no adjustment for baseline costs 
 QALYs Costs 
 Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:             
BA -0.019 -0.054 0.016 742.714 101.382 1384.046 
BLC -0.020 -0.055 0.016 195.034 -458.051 848.119 
Baseline EQ-5D 0.643 0.578 0.707    
Constant 0.321 0.260 0.381 573.689 108.860 1038.518 
Model 2: adjusting for baseline costs 
 QALYs Costs 
 Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:             
BA -0.010 -0.046 0.025 373.646 -180.510 927.801 
BLC -0.018 -0.054 0.018 -226.624 -793.303 340.055 
Baseline EQ-5D 0.658 0.593 0.723    
Baseline costs      0.613 0.491 0.736 
Constant 0.305 0.244 0.366 344.457 -57.371 746.285 
Table 4.12 SUR results for QALYs and costs 
Test for error independence shows a statistically significant negative correlation between the errors 
in the two equations. At the same time, the correlation is not particularly strong (r12= -0.197 in 
Model 1, r12= -0.178 in Model 2, both statistically significant at 1% level24), and efficiency gains of 
using SUR might not be great in comparison to modelling costs and QALYs separately. 
Compared to the Minimal intervention, both BA and BLC appear to be less effective. With regard to 
the impact on costs, BA is also more expensive than CIL. As a consequence BA results to be not a 
cost-effective alternative to CIL, because it is both more costly and less effective. On the contrary, 
BLC appears to be potentially less expensive than CIL. This is particularly the case when including 
baseline costs in the regression model. Therefore, BLC might be a cost-effective alternative to CIL, 
depending on the value assigned to health. 
4.5.1.1. Results of the CEA based on SURs 
In the absence of additional controls for potential baseline differences in resource uses in the costs 
regression, it was decided to include baseline costs in the regression in the primary analysis. 
However, an alternative analysis without adjusting for baseline cost in the SURs was conducted. 
                                                          
 
24 P-values of the Breusch-Pagan test of independence were 0.0025 and 0.0072, respectively. 
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Results of this alternative analysis are discussed briefly at the end of this section, and full results 
are reported in detail in Appendix F. 
ICERs and INBs 
Once differential QALYs and costs (in 2010 £, the reference year for the case study) of BA and BLC 
compared to CIL were estimated, ICERs could be computed. INBs were calculated as well. 
As illustrated in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.1, from the health care perspective, the INHB of an 
intervention is given by the difference between the direct impact on health (H) and the health 
opportunity costs (i.e. what health could be generated if those resources were used elsewhere). 
Opportunity costs depend on the amount of direct costs falling on HC budget (∆CH), and the 
marginal productivity of the HC sector (kH). In other words, opportunity costs are the QALYs that 
would be lost as a result of the resources displaced in order to accommodate the additional 
intervention costs. Equation 3.1 showed how to calculate the INHB. By re-arranging Equation 3.1, 
in Equation 4.4 the same INB is expressed in monetary terms, using the INMB (Drummond, M. et 
al., 2015). 
𝐼𝑁𝑀𝐵 =  ∆𝐻 ∗ 𝑘𝐻 − ∆𝐶𝐻   (4.4) 
QALYs, costs and NMBs associated with BA and BLC, and differential QALYs, costs and NMBs of BA 
and BLC compared to CIL are presented in Table 4.13, where k corresponds to a marginal 








(k = £13,000) 
Average differential with CIL ICER 


















10378.5 -0.018 -226.6 -8.5 12,527 
Table 4.13 CEA results based on SURs (adjusting for baseline costs) 
In Table 4.13 treatment options are presented in rank order of effectiveness. The highest NBs are 
associated with CIL, while BA is dominated by CIL, achieving poorer outcomes at higher costs. With 
regard to BLC, ICER is 12,527 £/QALY, but INMBs are negative. This is because BLC is on average 
cheaper than CIL, but also less effective25. INMBs of BLC are negative also if assuming a k that 
                                                          
 




reflects more traditional recommendations from NICE (2013) of either £20,000 or £30,000 per 
QALY. In fact, for these two alternative values of k, INMBs associated with BLC are £ -135 and £ -
316, respectively. 
CE plane, CEACs and uncertainty around INB estimates 
Results can be illustrated also using the cost-effectiveness (CE) plane, presented in Figure 4.4. The 
CE plane was obtained via bootstrapping and reflects the uncertainty around the estimates. It 
shows that in most of the cases differential costs and QALYs associated with BA fall in the north-
west quadrant, where the incremental cost of BA compared to CIL is positive and the incremental 
effect is negative. With regard to the comparison of BLC and CIL, most of the estimates fall in south-
west quadrant (i.e. comparator is cheaper and less effective). BLC is therefore cost-effective if its 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio is higher than the threshold for ICERs (Drummond, M. et al., 
2015). 
 
Figure 4.4 CE plane 
To reflect the uncertainty around the estimates, the confidence interval around the INBs was 
estimated, and CEACs were plotted. 
The 95% CI around the INMBs was estimated parametrically. As shown in Figure 4.5, even though 
the expected INMBs associated with both BA and BLC are always negative for thresholds higher 
than £13,000 per QALY, INMBs associated with BLC are more uncertain and also include positive 
values within the 95% CI. Such difference is particularly clear when looking at the blue line 





Figure 4.5 INMBs and 95% CIs 
CEACs were obtained both parametrically and via bootstrapping. Results were very similar and 
CEACs based on bootstrapping are presented here; parametric CEACs can be found in Appendix G. 
As shown in Figure 4.6, the probability that BA is cost-effective is always close to zero. For very low 
values of the threshold, BLC has the highest probability of being cost-effective. The higher the 
threshold (i.e. the higher the value assigned to health) the lower is the probability that BLC is cost-
effective. Three grey dashed lines represent three potential threshold values of 13,000, 20,000 and 
30,000 £/QALYs. 
 
Figure 4.6 CEACs 
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Figure 4.6 shows that with higher threshold values, CIL has the highest probability of being cost-
effective. However, with a threshold of 13,000 £/QALY, BLC is associated with the highest 
probability of cost-effectiveness (even though really similar to CIL). However, at the same time, 
negative INBs are associated with BLC even for a threshold of 13,000 £/QALYs. This is because BLC 
has indeed the highest probability of being cost-effective, but still the (less likely) negative impacts 
more than offset the (more likely) positive impacts. 
Results of the CEA based on an alternative SUR model 
As highlighted at the beginning of this section, these results are based on SURs that included 
baseline health care costs in the costs analysis. If baseline costs are not included in the regression 
models, it is even more likely for CIL to be cost-effective when compared to both BA and BLC. 
Results of this alternative analysis can be found in Appendix F. 
In brief, without adjusting for baseline costs, CEACs show that both BA and BLC have a very low 
probability of being cost-effective when compared to CIL, independently of the threshold value. 
Moreover, looking at the ICERs, both BA and BLC are dominated. In the CE plane, most of estimates 
of differential costs and QALYs fall in the north-west quadrant, where the comparator (BA or BLC) 
is dominated by CIL. 
Separate regressions for QALYs and costs 
As an alternative to SUR, costs and QALYs can be modelled separately. A regression model for QALYs 
was already illustrated in Section 4.3.2, and regression estimates are already reported in Table 4.3. 
With regard to costs, alternative generalized linear model (GLM) models were explored. In order to 
choose the most appropriate family function, a Park test was performed (Jones et al., 2013) and 
results of the test indicated that Gamma distribution provides the best fit to the data. Tests for the 
link function also confirmed the appropriateness of using a log-link function. An alternative analysis 
was therefore conducted, where a log-gamma regression (with robust SE) was employed for costs. 
Again, the impact of baseline costs was also assessed (excluded in Model 1, included in Model 2). 
Costs regression outcomes and average marginal effects are summarised in Table 4.14. 
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Log-gamma regression models for costs 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:             
BA 0.831 0.251 1.410 0.263 -0.301 0.826 
BLC 0.293 -0.223 0.808 0.020 -0.495 0.536 
Baseline costs      0.000 0.000 0.001 
Constant 6.352 6.036 6.668 6.026 5.592 6.460 
AIC 15.508     15.092   
BIC -934.415    -963.507   
Average marginal effects 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 dy/dx 95% CI dy/dx 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:             
BA 720.575 32.901 1408.249 3780.621 -12697.420 20258.660 
BLC 263.361 -222.606 749.329 289.369 -7189.627 7768.365 
Baseline costs       7.053 -28.904 43.010 
Table 4.14 Log-gamma regression outputs 
The role of baseline costs appears to be less crucial. 
CEACs for Model 1 and Model 2 are reported in Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8, respectively. CEACs show 
that including baseline costs in the regression (Model 2) only increases the uncertainty around the 
estimates, but the probability of cost-effectiveness for BA and BLC is always much lower than CIL. 
 




Figure 4.8 CEACs based on separate regressions for costs and QALYs (Model 2) 
Conclusions 
From the analysis based on the complete case approach, it could be concluded that (from the health 
care prospective) BA and BLC are not cost-effective compared to CIL. 
4.6. Missing data and Multiple Imputation 
The role of missing data 
Missing data are a frequent problem in CEA conducted alongside RCTs (Faria et al., 2014). In 
particular, as described in Table 3.5, SIPS trial was a pragmatic study. Attending follow-up visits was 
entirely voluntary and it is therefore reasonable that only a minority of offenders returned 
questionnaire replies. For this reason, the amount of missing data is considerable, and its impact 
must be investigated. 
In the presence of missing data, the complete case approach (i.e. ignoring missing data) might 
produce biased results. This is because costs or health outcomes in individuals with missing data 
may be systematically different from those with fully observed information (Faria et al., 2014). 
Inadequate handling of the missing data in a statistical analysis can lead to biased estimates of 
parameters as well and ultimately can affect the decision of whether an intervention is good value 
for money (Faria et al., 2014, White, Royston & Wood, 2011). 
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4.6.1.1. Assumptions about missing data 
According to the framework proposed by Little and Rubin (2014), missing data can be categorised 
as: 
- Missing completely at random (MCAR): the probability of data being missing does not 
depend on the observed or unobserved data; 
- MCAR conditional on baseline missing data (CD-MCAR): the probability of data being 
missing does not depend on the observed or unobserved data, after controlling for baseline 
variables; 
- Missing at random (MAR): the probability of data being missing does not depend on the 
unobserved data, conditional on the observed data; 
- Missing not at random (MNAR): the probability of data being missing depend on the 
unobserved data, conditional on the observed data. 
4.6.1.2. Multiple imputation 
Multiple imputation (MI) is a popular statistical technique for handling missing data which uses the 
distribution of the observed data in order to predict and replace missing observations with a set of 
plausible imputed values. MI can handle missing data under MAR and can be modified to handle 
MNAR (Faria et al., 2014, White, Royston & Wood, 2011). 
When missing values occur in several variables, MI by chained equations (MICE) can be used. MICE 
generates imputations based on a set of imputation models, one for each variable with missing 
values. Imputed values in one variable are used to predict missing values in other variables in an 
iterative way until the model converges to a stable solution (Faria et al., 2014, White, Royston & 
Wood, 2011). 
In the following section, SIPS missing data are analysed and a MI procedure based on MICE is 
conducted. 
MI procedure 
4.6.2.1. Descriptive analysis of SIPS missing data 
Only a few values were missing in the baseline variables. On the contrary, approximately one third 
of the effectiveness outcomes were missing at month six, and roughly 40% were missing at month 
twelve. The amount of missing data for cost variables was considerable, and ranged from more 
than 30% at month 6, to around 40% at month 12. Roughly half of the total costs were missing. 
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Details of the descriptive analysis of missing data are reported in Appendix H. 
Aggregation of cost categories 
There were too many cost variables with too few observations to run the MI model. For the MI 
model to converge, it was necessary to reduce the number of cost categories drastically. Costs 
aggregation aimed at merging similar cost categories at 6 and 12 months, separately. 
It must be stressed again that only costs falling on the health and social care budget were 
considered here, and costs related to overnight after care hostels, overnight alcohol treatment 
facilities, overnight residential programmes and private travels were excluded from this analysis. 
Three groups were created: treatment for drinking problems, hospital and AED, visits and home 
visits. Components of each grouping are illustrated in Table 4.15. 
Treatment for drinking problems Hospital and AED Visits and home visits 
Drinkline calls A&E visits (not admitted) GP visits 
Counselling A&E visits leading to admitted Nurse visits 
Day care Inpatient nights Social worker visits 
Detoxification Outpatient visits Home Visit: GP 
Outpatient treatment for drinking 
problems 
Day case visits Home Visit: Nurse 
Overnight hospital detoxification Emergency ambulance travels 
Home Visit: Community psychiatric 
nurse 
 Ambulance travels Home Visit: Others 
 NHS Direct events Home Visits: Social worker 
 NHS walk in events  
Table 4.15 Grouping of cost categories before MI 
Missing data patterns 
Figure 4.9 shows that over time EQ-5D scores exhibit an intermittent missing pattern: there are 
offenders who did not report the outcome at time t, but they did report it at time t+1. Information 
about QALYs is missing when EQ-5D score is missing at baseline or at 6 or 12 months. Missing data 
patterns for the grouped cost at both month 6 and 12 are reported in Figure 4.10 and exhibit the 




Figure 4.9 Missing data patterns for health outcomes 
 
Figure 4.10 Missing data patterns for costs at month 6 and 12 
4.6.2.2. Associations with missing outcomes 
Logistic regressions were used to investigate the association of baseline and outcome variables on 
the probability of missingness. Indicators of missingness were regressed first on baseline 
characteristics. Afterwards other observed covariates were included in the regressions. Full 




Testing for MCAR 
Firstly, the dependence of health outcomes missingness on baseline variables was tested. Age was 
found to have a positive statistically significant (at 5% level) impact on missingness of health 
outcomes at month 6 or 12. Moreover, AUDIT scores at baseline were significantly and negatively 
associated with missingness of outcomes at month 6, and high values of baseline readiness to 
change were significantly positively associated with missing data at 12 months. 
While it appears reasonable that older offenders are less responsive to such an intervention, the 
impact of drinking status and readiness to change is less clear. Regressions show a positive 
correlation between missingness and readiness to change (more likely to be missing when more 
willing to change behaviour), and a negative correlation of missingness with AUDIT score (more 
likely to be missing if the individual had lower scores at baseline in the questionnaire about alcohol 
use disorders). These findings might suggest a lower engagement with the programme for 
individuals with lower levels of alcohol dependence and more inclined to change their behaviour. 
With regard to the missingness of cost variables (i.e. hospital and AED costs, visits and home visits 
costs, and treatment for drinking problems costs) at 12 months, it was found that they were all 
significantly associated with age, sex and having high levels of readiness to change. 
These results highlight that data are unlikely to be MCAR. This information would support both CD-
MCAR and MAR assumptions. 
Testing for CD-MCAR 
The subsequent step was to check whether the probability that data are missing depends on 
observed baseline covariates, but is independent of the missing and observed outcome (i.e. data 
are CD-MCAR). 
Firstly, the association between missing health endpoints and other outcomes was tested. An 
indicator of missing EQ-5D at 12 months was regressed on previously observed EQ-5D scores and 
previously observed AUDIT, alcohol related problems – measured using the Alcohol Problems 
Questionnaire (APQ) – and readiness to change scores. Regression results showed that other than 
age, readiness to change at 6 months could have a role in predicting missing health outcomes data. 
Secondly, indicators of missing health care costs at 12 months were regressed on costs at 6 months, 
and it was found that previously observed costs related to the treatment of drinking problems were 
significantly and negatively associated with missingness of cost data. This finding is very reasonable 
and highlights that the more it was spent in treating the individuals, the less likely it was to having 
missing values at 12 months. 
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Lastly, it was investigated whether costs could have been predictors of health outcomes 
missingness. A statistically significant negative association between missingness of health 
outcomes at 12 months and visits and home visits costs at 6 months was found. In other words, as 
it could be expected, the more resources were spent in visits and home visits, the less likely it was 
to have missing values in health outcomes at 12 months. 
These findings show that data are not CD-MCAR. 
Conclusions 
Given the previous results, data were assumed to be MAR. It is thus assumed that the probability 
of data to be missing does not depend on the unobserved data, conditional on baseline and 
observed data (Faria et al., 2014). 
Nevertheless, such an assumption cannot be demonstrated using the data collected within the 
study (Mason et al., 2018, Faria et al., 2014). For example, it has been claimed that if data are based 
on self-reported outcomes, patients in relatively poor health may be less likely to complete the 
requisite questionnaires. Outcome data may be therefore MNAR (Mason et al., 2017). 
The assumption that data are MAR is therefore arguable and the true data generating process is 
unknown. However, the potential MNAR nature of the data is not demonstrable. Moreover, from 
a pragmatic point of view, modelling MNAR data is not the main focus of this analysis, and would 
require more advanced methods (e.g. a Bayesian framework incorporating expert opinion) that go 
beyond the purpose of this analysis (Mason et al., 2018). It is however acknowledged that if data 
were actually MNAR, not only would both the MI and complete case approach be biased, but also 
MI might yield results that are more biased than those under complete case approach. This is the 
case even with very strong correlations between fully observed variables and variables with missing 
values, such that the data are very nearly MAR (Pepinsky, 2018). 
4.6.2.3. Imputing missing values in the baseline variables 
Some missing values were found in the baseline variables. This could affect the analysis because 
baseline variables must be used as predictors of missingness in the MI process. Following Faria et 
al. (2014), mean values were imputed to replace missing values in baseline variables. Such 
operation ensures that imputed values are independent of the treatment allocation and prevents 
the creation of additional covariate imbalance (Faria et al., 2014). This was performed for age, 
degree, education, AUDIT score, readiness to change and baseline costs. As regards baseline EQ-
5D, to ensure not to lose any information available, mean imputation was undertaken for each of 
the five missing individual EQ-5D scores at baseline, and not for the total score. Some replies to the 
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health questionnaires were in fact partially complete, even though the overall EQ-5D scores were 
missing. 
4.6.2.4. Specification of the MICE model 
Given the previous results, missingness of health outcomes and health care costs was assumed to 
depend on baseline covariates (and in particular on: age, ethnicity, sex, baseline AUDIT score, and 
baseline RCR), readiness to change at 6 months and other observed health outcomes and costs at 
6 and 12 months. The MI model was thus constructed and included all baseline variables as 
predictors, and the following incomplete variables to be imputed: EQ-5D scores at 6 and 12 months, 
health care costs at 6 and 12 months and RCR at 6 months. Observed values of these incomplete 
variables were also used as predictors for each other. Total health care costs and QALYs were re-
calculated passively using imputed values. 
As a rule of thumb, White et al. (2011) suggested to create m imputed datasets such that m is equal 
to the percentage of incomplete cases. In this analysis the proportion of missing values ranged from 
around 31% to 41%, and m was thus set to 40. Basically, 40 imputations by treatment allocation 
were conducted. 
Ordered logistic regression and predictive mean matching (PMM) were used to predict ordinal and 
non-Normal continuous variables, respectively. PMM is a method of imputing missing values using 
observed values from other similar individuals; this ensures that imputed values are plausible (e.g. 
positive costs and HR-QOL always lower than one) (Faria et al., 2014, White, Royston & Wood, 
2011). 
4.6.2.5. MI results 
Once appropriate methods for imputing each endpoint were defined, MI with chained equations 
was conducted. 
Imputed and observed data were then compared and it was found that imputed values generally 
resembled the distribution of observed values. Imputation graphical diagnostics for the first four 
imputations for all dependent variables (EQ-5D scores and health care costs at 6 and 12 months) 




Economic evaluation after MI 
The economic evaluation was conducted again using the multiple imputed dataset. 
Table 4.16 reports the results of the SURs adjusted for baseline health and costs. ICERs and INMBs 
were computed and are reported in Table 4.17. CEACs were re-estimated parametrically and are 
illustrated in Figure 4.11. 
 QALYs Costs 
  Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:         
BA -0.031 -0.061 -0.002 395.538 -137.864 928.940 
BLC -0.025 -0.055 0.005 -258.613 -742.812 225.586 
Baseline EQ-5D 0.590 0.524 0.657    
Baseline costs      0.242 0.144 0.340 
Constant 0.371 0.310 0.433 720.410 382.823 1057.997 
Table 4.16 SUR results after MI for QALYs and costs 
Compared to CIL ICER 
INMB 
(for k=13,000) 
BA Dominated -803 £ 
BLC 10315 £/QALY -67 £ 
Table 4.17 ICERs and INMBs after MI 
 
Figure 4.11 CEACs after MI 
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Results resemble the findings of the CEA under the complete case analysis approach, and confirm 
again that from the health care prospective it is probably not cost effective to choose BA or BLC, 
when compared to CIL. 
Alternative results based on SURs without baseline adjustment of costs are reported in Appendix 
H. 
4.7. Impact of outliers 
Heath care cost categories were summarised in Table 4.6. The main cost components contributing 
to the amount of total costs were: counselling, emergency ambulance travels, outpatient and GP 
visits. In this section, the impact of potential outliers affecting the mean values of the four main 
cost components is investigated. 
Figure 4.12 reports the box plots showing the distributions of costs for each component and the 
presence of outliers. With regard to the costs associated with emergency ambulance travels, there 
is one outlier that affected costs in the CIL group considerably. Differentials in emergency 
ambulance travel costs are mostly due to one individual allocated to CIL who used the emergency 
ambulance 20 times. Similarly, one individual allocated to the BA arm affects considerably the total 
costs for counselling in their own treatment group. The presence of outliers in GP and outpatients 
visits is less evident. 
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Figure 4.12 Distributions of the main cost components 
Adjusting for baseline costs might be a way of smoothing the impacts of outliers if their particularly 
high consumption of resources is persistent in time. Nevertheless, it was found that baseline costs 
associated with these individuals were not particularly high. 
If there are reasons to believe that such an intense use by only one individual is caused by 
something not related to the intervention, or if there was an error in the data collection procedure, 
the outlier might actually bias the analysis. However, it was found that even removing the individual 
in the BA group did not change the results. Removing outliers in the CIL group would only emphasize 
its cost-effectiveness by potentially reducing costs even further. Results of the analysis results 





In this chapter, a ‘traditional’ CEA from the health (and social) care perspective was conducted. This 
CEA was based exclusively on costs falling on the health and social care budget, and effects on trial 
participants measured in QALYs. 
Alternative regression models under the complete case approach led to similar results and same 
judgments on cost-effectiveness. A substantial proportion of missing values was found. 
Nevertheless, results based on MI data did not affect the recommended adoption decision. In 
summary, from this first analysis, it could be concluded that (from the health care prospective) BA 
and BLC are not cost-effective compared to CIL. 
Uncertainty appears to have a significant role. Value of Information (VOI) analysis could be 
performed to investigate the value of reducing the uncertainty in the estimates. Nevertheless, such 
an analysis would go beyond the purpose of this thesis. Instead of conducting further analyses from 
the HC perspective, the objective of this work is to investigate the impact of the intervention first 
from an alternative perspective, and then from a broader and integrated point of view. 





Chapter 5:  CEA from the criminal justice system perspective 
5.1. Introduction 
Objective of this chapter 
Chapter 4 described the first part of the case study, and assessed the cost-effectiveness of SIPS 
from the health care system perspective. However, the impact of alcohol misuse may also extend 
beyond health consequences. In fact, in the UK, alcohol is a major factor in crime and anti-social 
behaviour. One third of people in police custody have committed an alcohol related offence (Man, 
2002) and 40% of prisoners claimed alcohol played a role in the crime they committed (Parkes et 
al., 2010). Further, 47% of violent offences in England and Wales were alcohol related (Flatley, 
2016). Alcohol imposes significant costs on the NHS and the criminal justice system with alcohol 
related crime and social disorder estimated to cost UK tax payers £11bn per year (Institute of 
Alcohol Studies, 2016). 
The aim of this chapter is to carry out a CEA of SIPS from the CJS perspective. In the next chapter, 
results of the CEAs from the HC and CJS perspectives presented in Chapters 4 and 5 will be linked 
and a cross-sectoral analysis will be conducted. 
Structure of the chapter 
This chapter is divided into two parts. 
The first part spans from Section 5.2 to Section 5.4 and describes the methods used to conduct CEA 
in the criminal justice (CJ) context. Specifically, Section 5.2 provides an overview of the use of 
economic evaluation in the CJS context and compares the methods to those employed in the HC 
context. Section 5.3 introduces the proposed methods for the CEA, which reflect the analysis usually 
conducted from the HC perspective. Section 5.4 explores alternative strategies for the estimation 
of the opportunity costs. 
The second part (Sections 5.5 - 5.9) is devoted to the description of the case study. The analysis 
plan for the case study is illustrated in Section 5.5. In Sections 5.6 and 5.7, the effectiveness of the 
intervention is assessed using two alternative data sources. The analysis of costs in response to 
criminal activity is conducted in Section 5.8. Results of the CEA are described in Section 5.9; 
alternative scenarios are also presented here. Conclusions of the CEA from the CJS perspective are 
summarised in Section 5.10. 
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5.2. Methods for economic evaluation in the CJ context: overview of current 
practice and comparison to HC context 
This section aims to provide an overview of the use of economic evaluation in the CJS context. First, 
Sub-section 5.2.1 describes the existing methods for CEA in CJS. Then, Sub-section 5.2.2 compares 
them to the methods typically employed in HC and discusses potential limitations. 
An assessment of previous CEAs from the literature 
Similarly to the HC sector, the CJS has limited resources. Assessing only the effectiveness of an 
intervention conducted in the CJ sector would not be sufficient to inform decision making. By 
contrast, as compared to an analysis solely of the effect of an intervention, an economic evaluation 
provides additional information to policy makers (Marsh, Chalfin & Roman, 2008). 
Looking at the literature of economic evaluation of CJ interventions, various and different analytical 
techniques have been employed to assess the impacts of interventions in the CJS sector, such as 
cost analysis, CEA and CBA (French & Drummond, 2005, Swaray, Bowles & Pradiptyo, 2005, 
McDougall et al., 2003). Because the proposed framework is based on CEAs, the focus of this 
chapter is on this particular analytical technique. CEA has the objective of informing decisions by 
assessing and comparing incremental costs and effects of a CJ intervention. CEAs might show that 
expenditures on treatment programs for offenders might be not only justified in terms of 
effectiveness, but also produce substantial monetary and nonmonetary benefits (Daley et al., 
2004). 
This sub-section reviews some examples of CEAs taken from the literature of economic evaluations 
of CJ interventions. The aim is not to produce an exhaustive review of the economic evaluation 
methods in CJ context, but to develop an understanding of which methods are employed and how 
these compare to the healthcare sector. Studies were taken from published reviews of economic 
analyses of criminal justice interventions (Swaray, Bowles & Pradiptyo, 2005, McDougall et al., 
2003).To identify more recent economic evaluations, a rapid review was also conducted. A 
summary of the main characteristics and potential issues (if any) of the selected CEAs is reported 
in Appendix I. 
In the CEA performed by Daley et al. (2004), results were presented as a comparison between costs 
and cost savings. Opportunity costs were not taken into consideration. Moreover, cost savings were 
not included in the total costs of the intervention and were instead used as a measure of benefit 
(Daley et al., 2004). In many CEAs performed by McCollister et al. (2004, 2003, 2003), re-
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incarceration was recognised as a useful measuring tool of criminal recidivism, and ICERs resulting 
from CEAs were interpreted as the marginal cost of achieving one less incarceration day in the 
treatment study condition relative to control study condition (McCollister, French, Prendergast, et 
al., 2003). Nevertheless, decision criteria were vague and benefits (i.e. recidivism and cost savings) 
were not explicitly compared to opportunity costs. Analyses did not take into account the 
alternative results that could have been achieved with the same resources. Frequently ICERs were 
compared to the average daily cost of incarceration: if the ICER was higher than the daily cost of 
incarceration, the intervention was deemed not to be cost-effective (McCollister et al., 2004, 
McCollister, French, Inciardi, et al., 2003, McCollister, French, Prendergast, et al., 2003).  
In the studies reviewed, the need of a cost-effectiveness threshold and its fundamental role in 
informing investment decisions was frequently not mentioned. One example is the evaluation from 
Griffith et al. (1999), which is to my knowledge the first CEA conducted from CJS perspective that 
can be found in the literature. The choice of conducting a CEA was based on the controversy 
surrounding the methodologies used for translating variables into monetary values. ICERs 
(representing the amount of money required per person to realise a 1% reduction in 
reimprisonment) were estimated, but the need of comparing ICERs to a cost-effectiveness 
threshold was not mentioned. Similarly, Shanahan et al. (2004) undertook an analysis considering 
both time to the first offense and offending frequency per unit time, and they included all relevant 
costs from the CJS perspective (i.e. treatment costs, cost of court appearance, costs of probation, 
and penalty per day). Nevertheless, estimated ICERs were not compared to any benchmark value 
and it is not clear how conclusions about cost-effectiveness were drawn. 
By contrast, Barrett and Byford (2012), after conducting a CEA in order to determine the 
incremental cost of the programme per serious offence prevented, acknowledged the necessity of 
comparing results to a benchmark26. According to the authors, judgement on the programme could 
be made depending on a decision maker’s willingness to pay for preventing a serious offence, but 
such an estimate is not available. The role of a WTP to prevent criminal events was also mentioned 
in the analysis by Muser et al. (2015). The authors estimated several ICERs per event avoided, and 
compared them to a benchmark value represented by the community WTP to prevent incarceration 
estimated previously by Cohen et al. (2004). 
                                                          
 




Focusing more specifically on the alcohol context, in the CEA conducted by Mansdotter et al. (2007) 
costs and cost savings of the intervention were simply compared. The authors did not consider 
where the intervention costs fall and aggregated the monetary consequences to the judicial system, 
production changes, HC and other damage. Moreover, to assess the cost-effectiveness of the 
intervention from the HC perspective, they compared the ratio of the cost of implementing the 
intervention and health gains to a cost-effectiveness threshold representing the incremental 
marginal costs per QALY. By doing this, they compared intervention costs that did not fall entirely 
on HC sector to an estimate of health care opportunity costs. 
A comparison of economic evaluations in HC and CJS contexts 
When comparing CEAs conducted in HC and CJ contexts, some inconsistencies in the definition and 
in the operationalisation of the analytical techniques can be identified. This sub-section explores 
the similarities and potential links between methods for the economic evaluation in HC and CJ. 
First of all, in the CJ context, CEA is frequently viewed as an incomplete CBA exercise, and the main 
difference between the two is that CBA allows monetising program costs and outcomes (McIntosh 
& Li, 2012, Swaray, Bowles & Pradiptyo, 2005). By contrast, in the HC context, both CBA and CEA 
could in principle include a monetary valuation of health outcomes (Sculpher & Claxton, 2012), and 
the main difference is that CEA recommendations depend crucially on the explicit comparison of 
health impacts (e.g. expressed in terms of QALYs) with an estimate of the opportunity costs (Culyer 
& Chalkidou, 2019). 
Theoretical and pragmatic inconsistencies in the approach to economic evaluation of interventions 
conducted in the HC and CJS contexts become apparent when looking at examples of guidance on 
the methods for the economic analysis in crime prevention. For example, in the Canadian 
Department of Public Safety guidance (McIntosh & Li, 2012), it is argued that the cost-effectiveness 
(CE) ratio can be obtained by comparing what the author defined as ‘net effects of programme’ and 
its ‘total costs’ (Equation 5.1). 
𝐶𝐸 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 (𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 
         (5.1) 
The CE ratio is claimed to be the result of the CEA, and an intermediate step before computing the 
benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of the programme. The formula to compute the BCR is reported in Equation 
5.2. 
𝐵𝐶𝑅 = 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 (𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒) ∗ 𝐶𝐸 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜        (5.2) 
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As illustrated in the previous sub-section, several examples of CEAs of CJ interventions in the 
literature follow this approach to the analysis. When such an approach is compared to the 
techniques typically employed in the HC sector (see Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.2.3.1), inconsistencies 
in the methods for measuring costs, valuing benefits and opportunity cost become evident. Details 
of each are listed below. 
5.2.2.1. Methods for measuring costs 
In CJS, the total cost of a programme is defined as the direct cost of the intervention, i.e. the sum 
of administrative, capital and indirect costs. Other CJS cost components such as police and 
investigative costs, prosecution, courts, corrections, are not included (McIntosh & Li, 2012). Thus, 
if an intervention is associated with a reduction in crime, cost savings from the CJS perspective (e.g. 
reduced correction costs) are not included in the total cost of the programme; instead they are 
treated as societal benefits. 
For the CE ratio to be consistent with the ICER typically employed in health care context, it would 
be necessary to estimate the full costs falling on the CJS budget and incorporate them in the total 
cost of the programme. These costs might be negative due to reduction in crime. 
Moreover, the victims’ medical costs, both tangible (i.e. medical and mental health care) and 
intangible (e.g. pain and suffering, decreased quality of life, fear of crime, emotional/psychological 
distress), should be included in the analysis as well. However, it should be remembered that these 
costs do not fall on CJS budget. The same applies to the direct property losses and productivity 
losses (i.e. lost workday and schooldays for victims and incarcerated offenders), which fall on 
private consumption. 
5.2.2.2. Methods for valuing effects 
The analysis conducted using Equation 5.2 represents a comparison between costs and cost savings; 
benefit is assumed to be captured in cost savings related to crime, and no value is placed on the 
reduction in crime itself. By contrast, in CEA in the HC context, the health itself is included in the 
outcomes. This is because the HC decision maker has the objective of maximising health, which has 
a value per se (Drummond, M. et al., 2015). 
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Similarly, it can be argued that the aim of the CJS decision maker is to reduce crime because a 
negative value is associated with crime per se27 and that the socio-democratic process confers the 
authority to the decision maker to strive for a reduction in crime. If the assumption about the 
intrinsic value of crime is accepted, measuring the effectiveness of an intervention in terms of cost 
savings alone can underestimate the benefit of the intervention. Cost savings of course must be 
taken into account, but they should be included in the total costs (as highlighted in section 5.2.2.1). 
Afterwards, total incremental costs (obtained as the sum of costs and cost savings) must be 
compared to the variation in crime, which has a value itself. 
5.2.2.3. Opportunity costs 
As it is formulated in Equations 5.1 and 5.2, the analysis does not take into account the opportunity 
costs of the intervention and the existence of a CJS budget. To be consistent with the CEA approach 
in the HC context, total costs falling on CJS budget (including costs savings) should be then 
compared to CJS opportunity costs. 
As explained in Chapter 3, the objective of the proposed framework is to conduct similar and 
compatible analyses from different perspectives, and potentially combine their results. Therefore, 
Section 5.3 proposes an approach to conduct CEA from the CJS perspective which is compatible 
with the methods used in the HC context.  
5.3. Proposed approach for the CEA from the CJS perspective 
The importance of developing a standardised methodology for calculating the relative costs and 
benefits of CJ programs has been pointed out in the literature (Swaray, Bowles & Pradiptyo, 2005, 
McDougall et al., 2003). This is also because the lack of a standardised outcome measures prevents 
the comparison of costs and benefits of different sentencing options (McDougall et al., 2003). 
Moreover, it has been argued that policy-relevant findings appear to be generally based on less 
rigorous28 methods of economic analysis when compared to HC interventions (Swaray, Bowles & 
Pradiptyo, 2005). 
The aim of this section is to borrow the CEA methods usually employed in the HC context, and adapt 
them to the CJ context. As explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.3, from the perspective of a ‘non-
                                                          
 
27 As explained later in Section 5.4, individuals have in fact a positive WTP to reduce crime (Cohen et al., 
2004). 
28 On the basis of an economic analysis rating scale that helps researchers to judge the quality of costs and 
benefits information in the literature developed in McDougall et al. (2003). 
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health care sector’, direct non-health effects (∆N) and direct non-health costs (∆CN) can be 
assessed. From the narrow perspective of the non-health sector decision maker, if the Incremental 
Net Non-health Benefit (INNB) – given by the difference of DEs and OCs – is positive, the 
recommended decision will be to implement the intervention. 
The formula to compute a generic INNB was illustrated in Equation 3.3, and can be adapted for the 
specific case of the CJS. In the CJ context, the INNB depends on the two usual components: DEs 
(falling on offenders treated with the intervention), and OCs. Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 describe each 
component in further detail, while section 5.3.3 illustrates how to assess the incremental net 
benefits. 
Direct effects 
To measure the DEs of an intervention, it is necessary to select an outcome measure that is deemed 
appropriate by the decision makers involved in the decision making process. For example, a CEA 
from the health care perspective aims to assess incremental cost per QALY, while criminal justice 
providers base their funding decisions on re-offending (Fox & Albertson, 2011). Recidivism (often 
measured using reconvictions as a proxy) has been deemed an appropriate outcome measure to 
assess the effectiveness of interventions from the CJS perspective (Pearson et al., 2016, Muser et 
al., 2015, McCollister, French, Inciardi, et al., 2003, Griffith et al., 1999). 
In the approach proposed here, avoided reconvictions are employed as a proxy to measure criminal 
activity, and DEs are measured in terms of reconvictions avoided (R) by the offenders treated with 
the programme. 
Opportunity costs 
Similarly to the HC context, OCs in the CJS context are generated by the displacement of CJS 
resources to accommodate the costs of the new intervention. Displacement of resources implies 
that other (unknown) offenders will commit crimes as the resources for their programmes are 
displaced. The magnitude of the OCs depends on the marginal productivity of CJS sector in avoiding 
reconvictions (kR) and on the total costs (CCJS) falling on the CJS budget (i.e. the amount of 
resources displaced). 
Total costs falling on the CJS budget (CCJS) are composed by the incremental costs of the 
intervention and the costs related to re-offending (e.g. prosecution, courts, custodial sentencing 
costs, prison costs). Costs associated with re-offending are those costs that occur in response to 
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crime, and therefore become cost-savings if the intervention reduces crime. Total costs falling on 
CJS budget include thus also a cost saving component if crime is reduced. In other words, the 
novelty of the proposed approach is that a component of the total costs is a function of the direct 
effects of the intervention. The implications of such relationships are explored in the case study, in 
Sub-section 5.9.1. 
Incremental Net Benefits 
INBs are obtained by the DEs net of the OCs. If expressed in natural units (i.e. reconvictions), INBs 
can be defined as Incremental Net Reconviction Benefits (INRBs) and can be computed as illustrated 
in Equation 5.3. The same benefits can be expressed in monetary terms (INMBs) as well. 
𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐵 = 𝑅 −
𝐶𝐶𝐽𝑆
 𝑘𝑅
     (5.3) 
As opposed to the methods discussed in the previous section, such a formulation considers both 
the DEs and the potential cost savings associated with potential crime reduction. These costs 
components will be illustrated in detail using the SIPS case study and are examined again in Sub-
section 5.9.1. 
To operationalise the formula illustrated in Equation 5.3, a cost-effectiveness threshold 
representing the marginal productivity (k) of the CJS would be required. Once an estimate of k is 
available, INBs of the intervention from the CJS perspective can be calculated. Nevertheless, as 
explained in the next section, such an estimate is not available in the literature, and alternative 
proxies must be used. 
5.4. Strategies for the estimation of the opportunity costs in CJS 
As explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.1, a pragmatic approach typically followed in the HC context 
is to measure health in QALYs and use an estimate of the marginal productivity (k) of the HC sector 
to estimate the opportunity costs of the investment (i.e. what could be alternatively done with the 
same resources) (Claxton, Martin, et al., 2015). Similarly, to perform a CEA from the CJS perspective, 
and to operationalise Equation 5.3, it would be necessary to use an estimate of the marginal 
productivity of the CJS sector in avoiding re-offending. 
Nonetheless, a well-recognised limitation in conducting CEAs outside the HC sector is the lack of 
evidence on the benefits displaced elsewhere by diverting resources to the intervention being 
evaluated (i.e. what benefits could be generated if the resources were used for another purpose) 
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(Hill et al., 2017). In fact, no estimates of the marginal productivity of the CJS in reducing re-
offending currently exist. 
In light of this, an alternative pragmatic approach might be to use an estimate of the social decision 
maker’s WTP for a gain in a unit of outcome from the production of a service (i.e. for reducing re-
offending) as a proxy29. Under the assumption that social decision maker’s WTP is the best estimate 
of the OCs, it can be considered a proxy of k for that sector (Remme, Martinez-Alvarez & Vassall, 
2017). 
Two approaches to estimating the social decision maker’s WTP are proposed in this section. The 
first approach uses examples of Payments by Result (PbR) agreements and Social Impact Bonds 
(SIB) already in place in the CJS as proxies for decision makers’ WTP (Palumbo & Learmonth, 2014, 
Fox & Albertson, 2011). The second approach uses individuals’ WTP (v) for reducing crime to 
estimate k. Such an approach assumes that budget allocation across sectors is consistent with the 
individual WTP for the selected outcome. Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 describe and discuss each 
approach in detail. 
Payment by result (PbR) and social impact bond (SIB) 
PbRs are schemes that allow the government to pay a provider of services on the basis of the 
outcomes their service achieves rather than the inputs or outputs the provider delivers. More 
precisely, social impact bonds (SIBs) are one specific form of PbR which allow the financing of social 
outcomes via private investment (Fox & Albertson, 2011). Social decision maker’s WTP estimates 
could be therefore estimated from examples of PbR agreements already in place in the CJS. 
Examples of SIBs are already in place in the CJS (Palumbo & Learmonth, 2014, Fox & Albertson, 
2011). For example, details of the Peterborough SIB – the first pilot model based on SIB in the 
English and Welsh CJS – can be found in Appendix J (Anders & Dorsett, 2017, Social Finance, 2017, 
Disley et al., 2015, Jolliffe & Hedderman, 2014, Cave et al., 2012). 
These SIBs provide evidence that decision maker in the CJS does actually base investing decisions 
on reductions in reconviction frequency. However, available information was not sufficient to infer 
an estimate of the decision maker’s WTP for reducing re-offending. Publicly available information 
                                                          
 
29 Such an estimate should not be confused with the individuals’ WTP for a unit of outcome, generally referred 
to as v (Woods et al., 2016). 
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about the actual payment and about the details on the agreement was vague. No clear decision 
criteria could be deduced from examples of actual SIBs. 
Alternative pragmatic solution 
The initial part of Section 5.4 highlighted the lack of an estimate of CJS’s marginal productivity for 
a unit of outcome and the difficulties in determining a proxy of decision maker’s WTP from SIBs. An 
alternative pragmatic solution is to estimate a proxy of CJS’s marginal productivity starting from the 
individuals’ WTP for reducing crime. 
This alternative approach was proposed by Claxton et al. (2019) and is based on the assumption 
that the socio-democratic process allocates resources to each sector so that a pound spent in any 
sector at the margin generates the same benefit as a pound spent in another based on individual 
WTP. In other words, it is assumed that the ratio of societal willingness to pay (v) over marginal 
productivity (k) is constant across sectors, so that a pound spent in HC generates the same benefit 
as a pound spent in CJ, based on individual WTP. A similar explorative assumption was made by 
Woods et al. (2016) in order to obtain initial estimates of country-level cost-effectiveness 
thresholds. In their analysis, the authors assumed that the discrepancy between v and k for HC is 
constant in relative terms across countries. Here the assumption is made within the country, but 
across sectors. Limitations and assumptions of this approach are further discussed at the end of 
this section and in the discussion chapter, Sections 8.4 and 8.5. 
As explained in the next sub-section, k and v in the health sector can be used to shadow price other 
forms of public expenditure where the equivalent estimates for that sector are absent (Claxton et 
al., 2019). Estimates of k and v are available for the HC sector. Consequently, k for CJS can be 
computed starting from societal WTP for reducing crime. 
5.4.2.1. Individual WTP for improvements in health 
With regard to the HC context, in 2009 the Department of Health and Social Care estimated that a 
QALY had a monetised value of £ 60,000 (Glover & Henderson, 2010). A more recent review of the 
evidence in the literature confirmed a mean WTP of around € 75,000 (in 2010 Euros), which means 
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approximately £ 63,500 (in 2010 GBP) (Ryen & Svensson, 2014). It is thus assumed that the societal 
WTP for a QALY is £ 60,000 (in 2010 GBP)30. 
As illustrated in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.1, k for HC sector was found to be approximately £ 13,000  
per QALY (Claxton, Martin, et al., 2015). The WTP for a QALY (v) is therefore about 4.6 times bigger 
than k. 
5.4.2.2. Individual WTP for reducing crime 
Moving to the CJ context, there are different WTPs that can be estimated. In the literature, several 
studies that investigate individuals’ WTP to reduce their likelihood of being a victim of a violent 
crime can be found (Manning, Fleming & Ambrey, 2016, Ambrey, Fleming & Manning, 2013, Bishop 
& Murphy, 2011, Atkinson, G., Healey & Mourato, 2005). These analyses use contingent valuation 
(CV) methods, the life satisfaction approach or hedonic models, and their results can be interpreted 
as estimates of the intangible costs of crime. 
However, the WTP for reducing the risk of being a victim of a violent crime is conceptually different 
from the WTP to reduce crime per se. In fact, the latter WTP might be driven by different reasons, 
not only the risk of being a victim (e.g. a natural aversion to criminality), and the inclusion of impacts 
on victims’ health in the WTP estimate would lead to double counting of the effects of the 
intervention on health. The individual WTP for reducing crime per se is therefore needed for the 
calculation of the threshold representing the OCs of the CJS. Having this in mind, the study by Cohen 
et al. (2004) appears to be the best proxy available in the literature. Their findings have been already 
employed in another recent CEA (Muser et al., 2015). 
Using CV methods, Cohen et al. (2004) estimated individuals’ WTP for crime prevention programs, 
and found that the WTP amounts to approximately $25,000 (in year 2000 $) per burglary and 
$70,000 per serious assault, with amounts increasing as the seriousness of the offense increased. 
With regard to White-Collar and Corporate Crime, Cohen (2015) estimated a WTP of $1,200 per 
consumer fraud and $12,000 for financial fraud. 
Assuming the transferability of these specific WTPs to the UK context (limitations are discussed at 
the end of this section), a generic WTP for a generic crime averted can be calculated. A weighted 
average of WTPs per crime was computed using the numbers of criminal events in the UK as 
                                                          
 
30 For the sake of simplicity, it could be assumed that this WTP is constant in time. However, the reference 
year of the SIPS case study is 2010. Therefore, the WTP value does not need to be discounted. 
126 
 
weights. The numbers of criminal events were taken from the Home Office Statistical Bulletin on 
crime in England and Wales (Chaplin, Flately & Smith, 2011). 
WTPs and number of events for each crime category are reported in Table 5.1. Original WTP values 
for burglary, armed robbery, serious assaults, rape and sexual assaults, and murder were updated 
to the year 2010 (the reference year of the case study) and converted into GBP. WTP associated 
with fraud was obtained as an average of the two WTP values for consumer and financial fraud, and 
converted from 2015 USD in 2010 GBP31. 
Crime 
Implied WTP per 
crime (2010 $) 
Category of crime from Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin 
No. of events in 
2009/2010 in UK 
Burglary 31,650 Total burglary offences 540,660 
Armed Robbery 293,712 Robbery of personal property 66,923 
Serious Assaults 88,620 
Violence against the person with 
injury 
401,629 
Rape and sexual 
assaults 
300,042 Total sexual offences 54,355 
Murder 12,280,200 Homicide 618 
Fraud 6,072 Fraud and forgery offences 152,241 
Table 5.1 WTPs and number of events for each crime category 
Resulting weighted average WTP (v) was approximately $ 80,000, or equivalently £ 51,000 when 
converted into 2010 GBP. 
5.4.2.3. Resulting proxy for k in the CJ sector and its limitations 
If the ratio of v and k is assumed to be constant across sectors, the proxy of k for the CJS would be 
approximately £ 11,000 per criminal event averted. In other words, with £ 11,000 CJS can prevent 
one episode of recidivism at the margin. As stressed previously, there are a number of limitations 
in the estimation of such a value. 
First of all, the estimate is based on the assumption that resource allocation reflects the democratic 
process and is consistent across sectors when compared to the individual WTP values. This does 
not necessarily correspond to reality. Nevertheless, the pragmatic assumption that the ratio 
between v and k is constant can be modified if alternative evidence about the allocation across 
sectors is provided. 
                                                          
 




Secondly, it must be stressed that the study by Cohen et al. (2004) is quite old and it was conducted 
in the US. Individuals’ preferences might change according to the year and the specific national 
context. WTP values reported might therefore not reflect the preferences of the UK population in 
2010. Nevertheless, to my knowledge, no other more recent attempts of updating these estimates 
have been conducted. Moreover, the focus of this research is not to investigate societal WTP for 
reducing crime, but to illustrate how these estimates could be used in order to estimate the OCs of 
the CJS. If better evidence is provided, the proxy for k can be adjusted accordingly. 
Thirdly, two issues regarding the value of the estimated WTP must be highlighted. The generic WTP 
per criminal event averted does not take into account other theft offences, criminal damage 
offences and drug offences because no individual WTP was found for these crime categories. 
Moreover, it is acknowledged that the estimated WTP might actually be an upper bound of the true 
intrinsic value of crime. In fact, it is probably unavoidable to somehow include also consequences 
on victims’ health in the WTP to reduce crime per se, unless such a value is specifically investigated. 
Lastly, it was assumed that the estimated WTP could be used to find a proxy of the marginal 
productivity of CJS in preventing crime. However, estimated WTP was referred to a reduction in 
criminal events, while marginal productivity of the CJS is measured in terms of reconvictions. It 
must be therefore assumed that the reduction in criminal events corresponds to a reduction in 
reconvictions. 
That being said, it must be highlighted that this has the aim of being an exploratory work, with the 
objective of showing how to operationalise a theoretical framework. The adoption of some 
pragmatic assumptions is necessary to address the lack of data. Gaps in the literature and the need 




5.5. Analysis plan for the case study 
The Screening and Intervention Programme for Sensible drinking (SIPS) trial was selected as case 
study. Introduced extensively in Chapter 3, SIPS aims to tackle alcohol consumption in offenders 
and comprises three intervention arms: Client Information Leaflet, Brief advice, and Brief Lifestyle 
Counselling. Each intervention arm is an intensified version of the previous. 
In the previous chapter, a CEA of the SIPS trial from the HC perspective was conducted. The aim of 
this second part of Chapter 5 is to operationalise the methods just illustrated and conduct a CEA of 
SIPS from the CJS perspective. This section summarises briefly the analysis plan. 
The analysis of criminal outcomes (i.e. the effectiveness of the programme from the CJS 
perspective) is reported in Sections 5.6 and 5.7 using Police National Computer (PNC) data and self-
reported data, respectively. In Section 5.7, the two measures of effectiveness are compared and a 
summary of the findings is presented. Section 5.8 covers the analysis of the budgetary impact of 
the intervention. Results of the CEA from the CJS perspective are reported in Section 5.9. CEA is 
based on the methods proposed in Section 5.3. INBs were computed using social decision maker’s 
WTP to avoid one additional reconviction (based on individuals’ WTP to reduce crime) as a proxy 
for k in the CJS context. To assess the robustness of results, alternative scenarios are also discussed. 
In Section 5.10, conclusions are presented. All analyses were performed using STATA 15 (StataCorp, 
2015) and Microsoft Excel 2010 (Microsoft, 2010) 
5.6. Assessment of recidivism using PNC data 
For the analysis of the SIPS trial, two sources of information for criminal events were available: an 
extract from the PNC database and self-reported events from questionnaires. This section is 
devoted to the analysis of PNC data. Section 5.7 illustrates the analysis of self-reported outcomes. 
Assumptions about available data 
Due to the scarcity of information about the dataset extracted from the PNC database, crucial 
details about the collected variables (such as details about crime committed and dates of the 
offences) were unclear or unavailable. As a consequence, a few assumptions were made before 
starting the analysis process. 
Firstly, in the available PNC dataset, names of the variables and labels were sometimes incoherent. 
For example, it was unclear whether PNC records measured conviction or caution episodes. 
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Nevertheless, in the analysis of SIPS previously published (Newbury-Birch et al., 2014), results were 
interpreted in terms of (re)-convictions32. The following analysis relied on this interpretation of the 
data. 
Secondly, it was unclear whether conviction data were collected over the year following the 
screening, or the year after the intervention; previously published analyses provide contrasting 
descriptions (Newbury-Birch et al., 2014). Keeping in mind that this case study has mainly an 
illustrative purpose, in the following analysis it was assumed that conviction rates were collected in 
the year following the intervention. 
Thirdly, convictions before the intervention were also reported. This variable was used in the 
analysis to adjust the number of convictions after the intervention for potential baseline differences 
in previous conviction events. However, it is important to note that the timing of the reported 
convictions was not stated, and it was unlikely to reflect the previous year as average values were 
higher than national annual frequencies. 
Descriptive analysis of reconviction rates 
The criminal behaviour in the year following the intervention was assessed using the PNC conviction 
data. Table 5.2 summarises the number of individuals for each intervention group who were 
convicted at least once in the year following the intervention. 
Convicted CIL BA BLC Total 
No 
90 110 99 299 
(50.28 %) (63.95 %) (61.88 %) (58.51 %) 
Yes 
89 62 61 212 
(49.72 %) (36.05 %) (38.13 %) (41.49 %) 
Total 
179 172 160 511 
(100 %) (100 %) (100 %) (100 %) 
Table 5.2 Convictions in the year after the intervention 
As reported in the original analysis of SIPS (Newbury-Birch et al., 2014), over the next 12 months, 
offender treated with BA and BLC were less likely to be reconvicted. Half of the offenders treated 
with CIL were reconvicted at least once during the year after the interventions, whereas only 36% 
and 38% of the individuals in the BA and BLC groups were reconvicted. 
                                                          
 
32 Only probation workers participated in the trial. Consequently, any conviction after the intervention was 
actually a re-conviction episode. 
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In Table 5.2, reconvictions were measured using a binary variable assessing the number of 
individuals reconvicted at least once. Although this can provide a good overview of the 
effectiveness of the intervention, as stressed in the introduction, CJ decision makers usually base 
their decisions on the frequency of reconviction events (Disley et al., 2015). Boxplots in Figure 5.1 
show the effectiveness of the programme if frequency of reconviction events is selected as the 
outcome metric. 
 
Figure 5.1 Reconviction events 
Data appear to be right skewed. Median values for all groups are zero, and BLC has the largest 
interquartile range.  The histogram in Figure 5.2 emphasises the presence of a high number of 
individuals who were not re-convicted after the intervention. 
 
Figure 5.2 Distribution of convictions after the intervention 
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An excessive number of zeros could potentially introduce biases in the analysis. For this reason, 
appropriate regression models are investigated in the next sub-section. 
Analysis of reconviction frequency 
To assess differences in reconvictions, it might be desirable to adjust the average number of 
reconviction events after the intervention for differences at baseline. In fact, randomisation itself 
is not a perfect process, and CJ outcomes were not the main focus of the SIPS trial. Therefore, 
unadjusted differences in reconvictions might be biased also by differences in baseline 
characteristics between groups. 
To adjust the differences in CJ outcomes it would be necessary to take into account not only the 
available baseline characteristics (e.g. age and gender), but also other factors such as: social 
economic status, violent behaviour, substance misuse. However, these factors are not available in 
the dataset. Moreover, it would not be feasible to build a complex regression model and adjust for 
all these covariates due to the limited sample size. For these reasons, baseline conviction events 
were used as a proxy to correct for potential imbalances in personal characteristics, criminal history, 
and prior sentences between groups at baseline. It was therefore assumed that convictions at 
baseline were the best proxy to summarise potential baseline differences in criminal behaviour. 
None of the other baseline variables were included to avoid potential collinearity issues, and two 
alternative baseline corrections were investigated: the before-intervention conviction data from 
PNC, and a self-reported reconviction count before the intervention. 
The number of reconvictions events in each group was investigated. Table 5.3 summarises the two 
potential alternatives for baseline correction (i.e. self-reported arrests or cautions in the previous 
6 months and reconvictions pre-intervention) and the variable of interest (i.e. reconvictions one 
year after intervention). 
 Self-reported data PNC database 
  N 
Number of arrests or 
cautions in the previous 








reconvictions one year 
after intervention 
CIL 180 1.116 (1.499) 179 2.508 (2.768) 179 1.458 (2.358) 
BA 175 0.857 (1.211) 172 2.616 (2.064) 172 0.912 (1.853) 
BLC 161 1.18 (2.402) 160 2.893 (3.01) 160 1.15 (2.824) 
Table 5.3 Reconvictions before and after the intervention 
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Arrests and reconvictions at baseline appear to be similar across groups, and both BA and BLC 
appear to be associated with greater reductions in reconviction episodes. However, alternative 
regression models were employed in order to adjust group differences in reconvictions for potential 
baseline differences, and obtain unbiased estimates. Three regression models were explored: PNC 
data and self-reported data were used in Model 1 and Model 2, respectively; Model 3 includes both 
sources of information and adjusted for the presence of clusters, due to the randomization at the 
level of offender manager (OM). With regard to the functional form of the regression models, three 
alternatives were investigated: Poisson, negative binomial (NB) and zero inflated regression 
models. Appropriateness, strengths and limitations of each alternative are discussed in the next 
sub-sections. 
5.6.3.1. Poisson regression model 
Since the dependent variable was a count variable, a Poisson regression model was judged the most 
appropriate. This consideration was confirmed by a Park test; compared to a Gaussian, Gamma and 
Inverse Gaussian, results of the test indicated that a Poisson distribution provided the most 
appropriate fit to the data. The model passed also two tests (Pregibon’s link test and Hosmer-
Lemeshow Test) for the appropriate link function (Jones et al., 2013). 
The three regression models using PNC and self-reported data to adjust for baseline differences 
provided similar results. The number of cautions before the screening were found to be positively 
and statistically significantly associated with the number of convictions after the intervention. 
Outputs of the Poisson regression models are reported in Appendix K. 
Poisson regression models are based on the assumption that the dependent variable is not over-
dispersed (i.e. mean and variance are the same) and does not have an excessive number of zeros 
(Jones et al., 2013). As reported in the two following sub-sections, both assumptions were tested, 
and regression models based on alternative functional forms were investigated. 
5.6.3.2. Negative binomial regression models 
Negative binomial regressions can take into account extra variation (i.e. greater than the mean) and 
do not assume the absence of overdispersion. Outputs of the three negative binomial regression 
models are reported in Table 5.4, to compare alternative corrections for baseline differences. 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:         
  
Brief Advice -0.388 [-0.755, -0.020] -0.362 [-0.731, 0.006] -0.356 [-0.727, 0.015] 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling -0.542 [-0.936, -0.147] -0.209 [-0.689, 0.270] -0.537 [-0.951, -0.123] 
Number of cautions prior to 
screening 
0.195 [0.148, 0.242]     0.177 [0.127, 0.227] 
Number of times in last 6 
months been arrested or 
cautioned (at baseline) 
    0.225 [0.100, 0.349] 0.108 [0.002, 0.214] 
Constant -0.263 [-0.545, 0.018] 0.032 [-0.265, 0.329] -0.349 [-0.649, -0.049] 
Alpha 1.861 [1.457, 2.378] 2.437 [1.918, 3.096] 1.850 [1.448, 2.364] 
AIC 1401   1420   1374 
 
BIC 1422   1441   1400 
 
Table 5.4 Negative binomial regression models 
Overdispersion (i.e. the Alpha parameter in Table 5.4) is estimated to be 1.86 and the null 
hypothesis that it equals zero is rejected. This means that the equidispersion property imposed by 
the Poisson model is rejected, and a negative binomial regression model would provide a better fit 
for the data. 
Comparing the three models, Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) values appear to be slightly in favour of Model 3. The second best option would be Model 1. 
Results across the three models are however quite similar. When compared to Model 3, Model 1 
would be more consistent in terms of source of data, because both the explanatory and dependent 
variable are taken from the PNC database. Moreover, including in the regression two variables 
which should theoretically measure the same outcome (i.e. criminal activity before the 
intervention) might generate multicollinearity issues. For these reasons, Model 1 was chosen as the 
final model for the analysis. 
By exponentiating the coefficients of a negative binomial regression model, incidence rate ratios 
(IRRs) can be obtained. According to Model 1, the IRR associated with BA is 0.678 (95% CI: 0.469, 
0.980), and the IRR associated with BLC is 0.582 (95% CI: 0.392, 0.863). In other words, when treated 
with BA (BLC) the mean rate of conviction is expected to decrease by a factor 0.678 (0.582) 
compared to CIL. The corresponding adjusted numbers of reconvictions associated with each 
intervention allocation were also computed, and results are summarised in Table 5.5. 
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Intervention allocation Average reconvictions Compared to CIL 
CIL 1.57 - 
BA 1.06 -0.51 
BLC 0.91 -0.66 
Table 5.5 Average reconvictions 
5.6.3.3. Zero inflated regression models 
As highlighted in Figure 5.2, the distribution of reconviction events after the intervention was 
characterised by a high proportion of zeros. For this reason, zero inflated regression models were 
employed to investigate whether positive values and zeros might be generated by different 
mechanisms (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). 
Full regression results of the zero inflated models are reported in Appendix K. In summary, 
comparing the zero inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression model to the zero-inflated Poisson 
(ZIP) regression model, the test on overdispersion confirmed the relevant role of the alpha 
parameter. Due to the presence of overdispesion, a ZINB regression was more appropriate than a 
ZIP regression. Nevertheless, AIC and BIC were almost identical in ZINB and NB models. More 
specifically, AIC and BIC for non-inflated NB Model 1 regression were slightly lower than ZINB, and 
this suggested using the non-inflated model. Tests comparing zero-inflated models to standard 
negative binomial models did not provide evidence for adopting two part models, especially for 
Model 1. 
5.6.3.4. Summary 
Alternative regression models were explored, and the negative binomial model ‘Model 1’ 










5.7. Self-reported crime outcomes 
Results presented in Section 5.6 were based on PNC data on reconvictions. This section illustrates 
the analysis of self-reported data on criminal episodes committed in the last six months, at six and 
twelve months of follow-up. 
SIPS questionnaires collected information about a list of the most common violent and criminal 
events. Individuals reported on these events either as a victim or a perpetrator. In this analysis only 
events committed as the perpetrator were considered. Episodes of violence included: generic 
violence, assault, and wounding. With regard to criminal offences, the list of episodes included: 
vehicle and non-vehicle theft, burglary, criminal damage, robbery, and ‘other’. When choosing the 
‘other’ option, respondents could add details about the criminal or violent event committed. Other 
events were therefore re-classified in the following additional categories: shop lifting, sexual 
offences, drug offences, driving offences and other fines. 
The overall proportions of self-reported crimes committed for each category across all three 
intervention arms are reported in Table 5.6. 
Violent offences  Criminal offences  
Violence 21.7% Theft (non-vehicles) 12.7% 
Assault 27.6% Vehicles theft 1.3% 
Wounding 25.4% Burglary 1.8% 
Sexual offences 0.3% Criminal damage 3.8% 
All violent offences 75.0% Robbery 1.6% 
  Shop lifting 0.3% 
  Drug offences 0.8% 
  Driving offences 2.4% 
  Other fines 0.5% 
  All criminal offences 25.0% 
Table 5.6 Distribution of self-reported criminal events 
Of all self-reported crimes, 75% were violent offences, while the rate of generic violence, assault 
and wounding were comparable. Most of the remaining criminal offences were thefts. 
Before analysing the self-reported data, the correspondence between self-reported and PNC data 
was explored. Results are reported in Sub-section 5.7.1. It must be however remembered that the 
potential correspondence of self-reported and PNC data is based on the crucial assumptions 
enunciated in Section 5.6.1. It is possible that in reality the two variables simply did not measure 
the same outcome. In fact, from the available data, it was not clear whether convictions were 
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measured one year after the screening or the intervention, and it was not possible to check whether 
PNC and self-reported data had different time horizons. 
Exploring the correspondence between self-reported and PNC data 
The aim of this sub-section is to check whether individual self-reported data corresponds to PNC 
records. A two-way table was created to assess the proportions of convicted individuals who did or 
did not self-report at least one criminal event. Results are reported in Table 5.7. 
 
PNC database 
  Not convicted Convicted Total 
No self-reported 
criminal events 
153 47 200 
82% 55% 74% 
At least one self-reported 
criminal event  
33 39 72 
18% 45% 26% 
Total 
186 86 272 
100% 100% 100% 
Table 5.7 Convictions and self-reported crimes 
Out of 186 offenders who were not reconvicted after the intervention, 153 (82%) did not self-report 
any criminal offence; the remaining 33 (18%) declared that they committed at least one criminal 
event, but this did not result in a conviction. Out of 86 offenders who were reconvicted at least 
once after the intervention, only 39 (45%) self-reported at least one criminal event; the remaining 
47 (55%) did not report the criminal event that they did actually commit. 
Even though assumptions stated in Section 5.6.1 would theoretically imply the consistency of the 
information collected from the two sources of data, it appears from Table 5.7 that PNC and self-
reported variables do not actually match. Moreover, looking at the frequencies of convictions and 
self-reported criminal offences, variables show even greater discrepancies. For this reason, no 
attempts of linking each reconviction episode to a specific criminal offence was made. 
The two variables are therefore investigated as if they were two independent CJ outcomes. Similarly 
to what has been done with PNC data, in Sub-section 5.7.2 the analysis of self-reported criminal 
events is conducted to see if there are differences in terms of effectiveness. Afterwards, in Sub-





Analysis of self-reported criminal events 
The purpose of this analysis is to assess the effectiveness of the intervention from the CJS 
perspective, using self-reported outcomes. In particular, the aim is to investigate the frequencies 
of violent and criminal offences. 
5.7.2.1. Data cleaning and assumptions about missing criminal events 
The structure of the CJ section of the SIPS questionnaire was similar to the HC resource 
consumption questionnaire illustrated in Appendix D. A generic ‘yes or no’ question was followed 
by more specific questions about the frequencies of criminal events33. 
As summarised in Table 5.8, the proportion of incomplete records (i.e. missing frequencies of 
criminal events corresponding to a ‘yes’ in the generic question) is really small when compared to 
the totality of correctly reported values (i.e. answer to the generic question is coherent with the 
stated frequency of a criminal event). 
 Complete records Incomplete records 
6 months 4573 25 
12 months 4006 22 
Complete cases 3531 36 
Table 5.8 Criminal events correctly reported and imputed 
Only 36 out of 3567 (i.e. approximately 1%) records have missing frequencies of criminal events 
which corresponded to a ‘yes’ in the generic question. Similarly to the analysis of HC resource use 
(see Appendix D), keeping in mind the almost negligible proportion of incomplete records, two 
alternative scenarios were constructed to enlarge the complete cases data set on the basis of 
alternative assumptions on the missing information about crime frequencies when the generic 
question was instead completed: the ‘mean imputation scenario’ and the ‘minimum imputation 
scenario’. 
Tables summarising criminal events at six and twelve months in the original, mean and minimum 
imputation scenarios are presented in Appendix L. As expected, given the small proportion of 
missing values, the numbers of average criminal events are almost identical in minimum and mean 
imputation scenarios. Only the average frequency of assaults slightly differs depending on the 
                                                          
 
33 E.g. have you committed this crime? If yes, how many times? 
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different assumptions regarding the missing values. Nevertheless, (as it will be illustrated later in 
the analysis of costs) the unit cost of assaults in one of the lowest, therefore the impact of their 
variation on total costs is still minimal. To sum up, the total number of imputed events is low and 
overall differentials between alternative scenarios are negligible. As previously done in the analysis 
of HC resources consumption, the mean imputation scenario was chosen as the reference case. 
It must be stressed that this analysis is still conducted under the complete case criterion, because 
only individuals who answered to the generic questions about criminal activity at both six and 
twelve months were considered. The mean imputation only refers to a small proportion of missing 
frequencies that were not correctly reported in the questionnaires. However, these results are 
based on only 269 out of 525 offenders who self-reported the crimes they committed. Such a 
considerable presence of missing observations could be investigated via multiple imputation 
procedure (see Chapter 4, Section 4.6). However, such an analysis would go beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
5.7.2.2. Self-reported criminal events 
Average numbers of criminal events committed in the year after the intervention for each group 
are presented in Table 5.9 and Table 5.10. In Table 5.9 violent crimes and other criminal offences 
were aggregated. In Table 5.10 all criminal events were distinguished, and table reports: average 
frequency (SD) group size by intervention allocation. Minimal differences in total frequencies between 
the two tables are due to slightly different sample sizes: some individuals did not provide 
information across all criminal categories and were therefore dropped when aggregating the group 
of offences. 
 CIL BA BLC 
 N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD 
Violent offences 86 0.77 2.17 100 1.32 6.18 83 0.94 3.75 
Criminal offences 87 0.37 1.45 100 0.12 0.48 83 0.61 2.9 
Total offences 86 1.14 3.12 100 1.44 6.23 83 1.55 6.31 
Table 5.9 Summary of violent and criminal offences across groups 
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 CIL BA BLC 
Violent offences    
Violence 0.38 (1.33) 88 0.28 (0.89) 102 0.24 (0.88) 87 
Assault 0.36 (1.06) 88 0.37 (2.13) 102 0.41 (1.71) 87 
Wounding 0.14 (0.46) 88 0.63 (3.63) 102 0.23 (1.25) 87 
Sexual offences 0.01 (0.1) 87 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 83 
Criminal offences    
Theft (non-vehicles) 0.07 (0.31) 87 0.03 (0.3) 100 0.46 (2.55) 83 
Vehicles theft 0.03 (0.23) 87 0 (0) 100 0.02 (0.15) 83 
Burglary 0.06 (0.45) 87 0.01 (0.1) 100 0 (0) 83 
Criminal damage 0.06 (0.45) 87 0.02 (0.16) 100 0.07 (0.3) 83 
Robbery 0.02 (0.15) 87 0.01 (0.1) 100 0.03 (0.24) 83 
Shop lifting 0.01 (0.1) 87 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 83 
Drug offences 0.03 (0.18) 87 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 83 
Driving offences 0.05 (0.27) 87 0.03 (0.17) 100 0.01 (0.1) 83 
Other fines 0 (0) 87 0.02 (0.14) 100 0 (0) 83 
Table 5.10 Complete cases under the mean imputation scenario 
The average number of criminal events per individual in the three groups were: 1.14 (PIL), 1.44 (BA) 
and 1.55 (BLC). While the proportion of violent episodes and criminal offences committed by 
individuals treated with CIL and BLC are comparable (approximately 65% violent crimes and 35% 
criminal offences), offenders treated with BA committed almost exclusively violent crimes. Looking 
at the specific crimes committed, violence and assaults are the most common events across all 
groups. Wounding and non-vehicle thefts have higher frequencies in BA and BLC groups, 
respectively. Even if the distribution of criminal events do not follow a Normal distribution, 
standard deviations help highlighting the great degree of uncertainty around these estimates. 
Standard deviations are very high when compared to mean estimates, and this indicates the 
presence of high variability in the groups. 
5.7.2.3. Results of the analysis of self-reported criminal events 
For each group, all the self-reported criminal events were aggregated and their frequency was 
assessed. Similarly to the analysis of PNC data conducted in Sub-section 5.6.3, Poisson, negative 
binomial, and zero inflated regression models were investigated. 
The overdispersion coefficient was found to be statistically significant, therefore the Poisson 
regression was deemed inappropriate. Values of AIC and BIC associated with the NB and ZINB 
models were almost identical, even though a slightly lower BIC was associated with the NB model. 
Moreover, the appropriate test did not support the creation of a zero inflated negative binomial 
model. Consequently, a negative binomial regression was performed using the total number of self-
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reported offences in year following the intervention (complete cases only) as the dependent 
variable. Estimates were adjusted for self-reported baseline criminal events (presented previously 
in the first column of Table 5.3) and for the presence of clusters. Complete output of the regressions 
can be found in Appendix M. 
IRR associated with BA was 1.24 (95% CI: 0.46, 3.32); IRR associated with BLC was 1.35 (95% CI: 
0.41, 4.49). Offender treated with BA (BLC), are therefore expected to have an offending rate 1.24 
(1.35) times greater compared to those treated with CIL. The resulting average self-reported 
criminal offences are summarised in Table 5.11. 
Intervention allocation Average criminal offences Compared to CIL 
CIL 1.16 - 
BA 1.44 0.28 
BLC 1.57 0.41 
Table 5.11 Average self-reported criminal offences 
Summary of effectiveness estimates 
The analysis of PNC and self-reported data provide different insights about the impact of SIPS on 
criminal activity. As reported in Table 5.5, according to the PNC data, BA and BLC are both 
associated with lower reconviction episodes when compared to CIL. On the contrary, results from 
the analysis of self-reported data indicate that the average number of self-reported crimes is higher 
in BA and BLC groups compared to CIL. The uncertainty around the estimates is quite high. 
Nevertheless, if the focus of the analysis is shifted from the frequencies of criminal events to the 
proportion of offenders re-committing at least one crime, PNC and self-reported data show similar 
patterns across the groups. In fact, from PNC data, being allocated to BA or BLC is associated with 
a lower risk of recidivism. Similarly, according to self-reported data, being allocated to BA or BLC is 
associated with a (non-statistically significant) reduction in the risk of committing another crime at 
least once within the year after the intervention. Details of the analysis are reported in Appendix 
N. 
Even though self-reported and PNC data exhibit some differences in the frequencies of criminal 
events, the proportions of individual re-committing at least one crime are similar. As summarised 
in Table 5.12, ORs of getting reconvicted and re-offending at least once after the intervention are 





OR (95% CI) of committing at least one crime 
PNC data Self-reported data 
BA 0.53 (0.34, 0.83) 0.58 (0.27, 1.25) 
BLC 0.60 (0.38, 0.95) 0.71 (0.33, 1.56) 
Table 5.12 Probability of committing at least one crime after the intervention 
Results might suggest that even if the number of crimes self-reported by offenders treated with CIL 
is lower when compared to BA and BLC, the proportion of individuals recommitting at least one 
crime is higher in the CIL group. Nevertheless, self-reported data are probably less reliable than the 
more objective records from the PNC. In fact, the reliability of self-reports offending surveys is 
typically based on the finding that individuals who self-report offenses are more likely to have 
official records than those who do not report offenses, and individuals with officially recorded 
crimes usually admit these crimes 34  (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2014). However, such a correlation 
between self-reported and official records was not observed in this analysis (see Sub-section 5.7.1). 
For this reason, in this analysis it has been decided to use PNC data as the main measure of 
effectiveness of the intervention. 
The CEA will be therefore based on PNC data. However, as explained in the next section, the analysis 
will borrow information on criminal events from self-reported data. In fact, due to the lack of details 
on PNC records, self-reported data will be used to integrate the information about the nature of 
the criminal events.  
                                                          
 
34 This evidence does not actually cover self-report surveys of probation workers with alcohol misuse issues. 




5.8. Costs in response to crime 
In this analysis only costs falling on CJS budget are considered. Other budget impacts such as HC 
costs (e.g. impacts on victims of crime), lost wages, and any other impact on private consumption 
and damaged or stolen properties are not considered. The inclusion of these components would 
imply considering other sectors in the analysis (e.g. HC or private consumption), whereas the focus 
now is on the impact of SIPS from the CJS perspective. This CEA conducted from a ‘narrow’ CJS 
perspective will be extended in the next chapter, where an integrated cross-sectoral analysis 
considering both CJ and HC sectors will be conducted. The potential inclusion of other dimensions 
such as private consumption (in terms of lost wages, property stolen or damaged) will be discussed 
in Chapter 6, Sub-section 6.3.3.3. 
The use of CJS’s resources was not collected alongside the SIPS trial. For this reason, total cost of 
SIPS falling on the CJS budget were estimated indirectly. As mentioned in Sub-section 5.3.2, total 
costs are composed by the incremental costs of the intervention and the costs in response to crime. 
The first component is investigated in Sub-section 5.8.1. To estimate the second component, PNC 
re-conviction records were used to determine the variation in criminal activity, and therefore the 
variations in CJS resource use. Nevertheless, PNC records of re-conviction episodes were not 
associated with a description of the type of crime committed. For this reason, self-reported 
questionnaires were used to investigate the potential distribution of specific criminal events. PNC 
records of criminal activity based on re-conviction frequencies were therefore integrated with a 
more specific list of self-reported criminal episodes (Sub-section 5.8.2). Afterwards, appropriate 
unit costs (described in Sub-section 5.8.3) were associated with each criminal event (Sub-section 
5.8.4). 
Costs of the intervention 
In Chapter 4, Table 4.8, all decision makers and associated budgets involved in the programme were 
summarised. As discussed in Sub-section 4.4.4, costs of implementing SIPS were assumed to fall 
entirely on the CJS budget. 
Costs of the intervention were computed already in Chapter 4, Sub-section 4.4.3. Costs of 
implementing SIPS were very low and are reported in Table 4.7. The cheapest treatment is CIL, 
which costs £0.2 per individual (the cost of the leaflet). BA and BLC are slightly more expensive: 
£2.2 and £13.2, respectively. Such estimates are likely to be a lower bound of the actual costs of 
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the intervention. For this reason a wide range of variation around intervention costs is explored in 
the scenario analysis presented in Section 5.9. 
Using self-reported data to characterise the distribution of criminal events 
The impact of SIPS on criminal activity can be measured by assessing variations in reconvictions 
from PNC data. As reported in Sub-section 5.6.3.2, compared to CIL, average reconvictions avoided 
by BA and BLC were 0.51 and 0.66, respectively. On the contrary, to estimate the costs in response 
to crime, a more detailed description of the types of crime committed is necessary. However, the 
available records extracted from the PNC database do not provide any information about the 
specific offence committed for each reconviction episode. 
Given the lack of detail about reconviction episodes, PNC records were integrated with the 
information provided by self-reported questionnaires. Self-reported data offered in fact an overall 
representation of the types of crimes committed more frequently by offenders treated with SIPS, 
and were used as a reference to characterise the distribution of criminal events recorded in the 
PNC database. However, the assumption that the distribution of criminal events followed the self-
reported data was necessary only because of the lack of data. The need of a more accurate 
procedure to record resource use consumption in the CJS is further discussed in Chapter 8, Sub-
section 8.5.1. 
Categories of self-reported criminal events across all three intervention arms were summarised in 
Table 5.6. It was found that 75% of self-reported crimes were violent offences, roughly equally 
distributed among generic violence, assault and wounding. Thefts constituted most of the 
remaining criminal offences. Self-reported frequencies were used to integrate the PNC records and 
estimate the number of criminal events avoided by the intervention. These are reported in Table 
5.14. 
Once estimates of the specific criminal offences committed are available, appropriate unit costs 
can be associated. 
Unit costs of criminal events 
Estimates of the unit costs for each specific criminal event were taken from: the Home Office 
Research Study 217 (Brand & Price, 2000), the Home Office Online report 30/05 (Dubourg, Hamed 
& Thorns, 2005), an analysis of alcohol misuse costs (Leontaridi, 2003), and a National Audit Office 
technical paper (Imran Akhtar, 2011). For each criminal event, unit costs included all the costs in 
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response to crime, namely: police activity, prosecution, magistrates' court, crown court, jury 
service, legal aid, non-legal-aid defence, probation service, prison service, other CJS costs, CJS 
overhead, and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority costs. With regard to driving offences, cost 
components were: drink driving arrests, magistrates’ courts, and crown courts (including 
sentencing). Cost per violent episode was assumed to be the same as the cost of an assault. 
Unit cost estimates were updated to 2010 prices (the reference year of the case study) using the 
Bank of England Inflation Calculator35. As summarised in Table 5.13, the highest unit costs are 
associated with sexual and driving offences, followed by robbery, wounding, burglary in a dwelling 
and drug offences. 
Category Unit cost (in 2010 £) Source 
Crime against individuals and households     
Wounding 2,189 Home Office 30/05 
Sexual offences 4,067 Home Office 30/05 
Common assault 314 Home Office 30/05 
Violence 314 Home Office 30/05 
Robbery 3,207 Home Office 30/05 
Burglary in a dwelling 1,402 Home Office 30/05 
Theft - not vehicle 371 Home Office 30/05 
Theft of vehicle 245 Home Office 30/05 
Criminal damage 155 Home Office 30/05 
Commercial and public sector victimisation    
Theft from a shop 27 Home Office 217 
Drug offences 2,601 NAO 2011 
Driving offences 4,231 Leontaridi 2003 
Other fines 283 NAO 2011 
Table 5.13: Unit costs per criminal event 
It is important to note that the main reference used for the estimation of the unit costs is quite old 
and the accuracy of results might be disputable (Bhattacharya, 2017). However, to my knowledge, 
no other more recent attempts of updating these cost estimates have been conducted. Moreover, 
the focus of this research is not on the values of the unit costs of criminal events themselves, but 
on how to use them to inform a CEA from the CJS perspective. If better evidence is provided, unit 
costs can be adjusted accordingly. 
                                                          
 
35 Available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-policy/inflation/inflation-calculator 
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The need for better quality data about costs of crime is further discussed in Chapter 8, Sub-section 
8.5.1. In this analysis, uncertainty around cost estimates is addressed in the scenario analysis 
described in Section 5.9. 
Cost (savings) in response to (reductions in) crime associated with SIPS 
Unit costs described in the previous sub-section were linked to the avoided criminal events 
associated with BA and BLC. Resulting costs in response of crime falling on the CJS budget were 
thus estimated. Table 5.14 summarises the estimated criminal events avoided and the 
corresponding cost savings associated with BA and BLC. 
Offences Events avoided CJS cost savings (£) 
Violent offences BA BLC BA BLC 
Violence 0.111 0.143 34.8 45.0 
Assault 0.141 0.182 44.2 57.2 
Wounding 0.130 0.168 283.9 367.4 
Sexual offences 0.001 0.002 5.4 7.0 
Criminal offences         
Theft (non-vehicles) 0.065 0.083 23.9 31.0 
Theft vehicles 0.007 0.009 1.6 2.1 
Burglary 0.009 0.012 13.1 17.0 
Criminal damage 0.019 0.025 3.0 3.8 
Robbery 0.008 0.010 25.7 33.2 
Shop lifting 0.001 0.002 0.0 0.0 
Drug offences 0.004 0.005 10.4 13.5 
Driving offences 0.012 0.016 50.8 65.8 
Other fines 0.003 0.003 0.8 1.0 
Total 0.510 0.660 497.7 644.1 
Table 5.14 SIPS costs in response to crime 
As illustrated in Sub-section 5.6.3.2, it was found that both BA and BLC were associated with a 
reduction in criminal activity. In this analysis, cost savings triggered by the reduction in criminal 
activity were estimated to be approximately £498 and £644 for BA and BLC, respectively. Moreover, 
a ‘generic’ cost of £976 per SIPS reconviction episode was also estimated. This was obtained as a 
weighted average of the specific unit costs, using the frequency of events self-reported by SIPS 




5.9. Cost-effectiveness analysis of SIPS from the CJS perspective 
A note on the relationship between effectiveness and total costs 
As explained in Sub-section 5.3.2, total costs falling on the CJS budget (CCJS) are composed by the 
incremental costs of the intervention and the costs in response to crime. This second component is 
a function of the direct effects (i.e. reconvictions avoided) of the intervention. In particular, because 
of the way costs were estimated in this analysis, it is acknowledged that there is a linear function 
linking the effectiveness output and total costs. In fact, for reasons related to data availability, total 
costs falling on CJS budget were simply estimated as shown in Equation 5.4. In this formulation 
benefits are measured in terms of reconvictions avoided (R). For this reason, costs in response to 
crime are treated as cost-savings associated with each reconviction episode avoided. 
𝐶𝐶𝐽𝑆 = 𝑅 ∗ (−𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡)  +  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠  (5.4) 
As a consequence, both differential direct effects and differential costs depend on recidivism. 
However, the relationship between effectiveness and cost savings does not imply any double 
counting. Actually, as pointed out already in Section 5.2.2, costs (savings) due to (reductions in) 
recidivism must be added to the incremental intervention costs and contribute to the total impact 
on CJS budget. Avoided reconvictions (and not the related cost savings) are a proxy of criminal 
activity and measure the effectiveness of the intervention. 
Adapting the methods to the analysis of SIPS 
Incremental costs and effectiveness of the alternative intervention allocations can be compared 
using the CEA methods illustrated in Section 5.3. Similarly to the HC context, resulting Incremental 
Net Benefits (INBs) from the CJS perspective can be expressed in natural units (i.e. reconvictions) 
or in monetary terms. If expressed in monetary terms, direct effects (falling on offenders treated 
with SIPS) can be computed as shown in Equation 5.5, where k is the marginal productivity of the 
CJS. 
𝐷𝐸𝑠 = ∆𝑅 ∗ 𝑘     (5.5) 
The two components of the opportunity costs (falling on other unknown offenders) are calculated 
as illustrated in Equations 5.6 and 5.7, where CR is the ‘generic’ cost of reconviction for SIPS (see 
Sub-section 5.8.4). 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 = ∆𝑅 ∗ (−𝐶𝑅)  (5.6) 
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     𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ∆𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑡   (5.7) 
Incremental Net Reconviction Benefits (INRB) and Incremental Net Monetary Benefits (INMB) can 
be therefore obtained as reported in Equations 5.8 and 5.9, respectively. 






)   (5.8) 
𝐼𝑁𝑀𝐵 = ∆𝑅 ∗ 𝑘 − (∆𝑅 ∗ (−𝐶𝑅) + ∆𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑡)  (5.9) 
Once an estimate of k is available, the cost-effectiveness of BA and BLC compared to CIL can be 
assessed. 
Results of the CEA from the CJS perspective 
As illustrated in Section 5.4, the required cost-effectiveness threshold representing the marginal 
productivity k of the CJS is not available. Nevertheless, from the analysis conducted in Sub-section 
5.4.2, a pragmatic solution could be to assume that, at the margin, with £ 11,000 CJS can prevent 
one episode of recidivism, measured in terms of avoided reconvictions. In other words, the 
marginal productivity of the CJS is £ 11,000 per criminal event averted. 
Table 5.15 provides a summary of all variables involved in the analysis and estimated in the previous 
sections. 
Description Variable CIL BA BLC 
 
Intervention costs (falling on CJS) Cint £0.2 £2.2 £13.2 











Reconvictions avoided R - 0.51 0.66 
 
Cost per reconviction (specific for SIPS crimes) CR £976 
Marginal productivity of the CJS k £11,000/R 
Table 5.15 Summary of the variables 
Looking at the DEs of SIPS on offenders, when compared to CIL, both BA and BLC are more effective 
(i.e. R is positive for both, due to a greater reduction in recidivism) suggesting that more intense 
treatments help reduce crime. 
With regard to the OCs, two components can be distinguished. More intense intervention 
allocations (BA and BLC) are more costly to implement (i.e. Cint is positive for both). Consequently, 
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to accommodate the additional cost of the treatment, the CJS must displace resources that could 
have been invested otherwise to achieve potential reductions in recidivism. A second component 
of the OCs is represented by the cost savings due to the reduction in criminal events. 
DEs (falling on SIPS offenders) and OCs (falling on unknown offenders) were calculated using 
Equations 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. INRBs and INMBs were obtained as illustrated in Equations 5.8 and 5.9, 
respectively. Resulting INBs and their components are reported in Table 5.16, and are expressed 
both in natural (i.e. recidivism) and monetary units. 
 Natural units (Reconvictions) Monetary units (£) 
 DE OC INRB DE OC INMB 
BA vs CIL 0.51 - 0.045 0.555 5610 - 496 6106 
BLC vs CIL 0.66 - 0.057 0.717 7260 - 631 7891 
Table 5.16 DEs, OCs and INBs of SIPS 
Compared to CIL, both interventions are associated with more reconvictions avoided, and therefore 
to positive monetary impacts. With regard to the impacts on unknown offenders, both 
interventions are associated with negative OCs. This is because cost savings due to reduction in 
recidivism outweigh the costs of implementing the intervention. Consequently, both BA and BLC 
are associated with cost-savings, and therefore to further reductions in re-offending (due to 
additional resources being used by the CJS in other programmes). 
Results presented in Table 5.16 did not include the uncertainty around the estimates. To reflect the 
uncertainty around the effectiveness of the interventions (which therefore translates into 
uncertainty about DEs and costs in response to crime), the 95% CIs of the INMBs were also 
computed. It must be pointed out that the covariance between costs and outcomes is equal to one, 
because costs directly depend on the same outcome variable (i.e. reconvictions).  Moreover, in Sub-
section 5.4.2, a marginal productivity of £ 11,000 per criminal event averted was estimated, and 
this value was used in the CEA. Nevertheless, such a value is highly uncertain and the impact of the 
intervention under alternative assumptions about the marginal productivity of the CJS should be 
explored. 
INMBs for BA and BLC and their 95% CIs are presented in Figure 5.3. INMBs are expressed as a 




Figure 5.3 INMBs for BA and BLC 
INMBs for both BA and BLC are positive and the 95% CIs do not include zero for all scenarios 
investigated. BLC appears to be the overall cost-effective option. For the same value of k, BLC is 
associated with greater INMBs compared to BA. Moreover, the higher the value of k, the greater 
the INMBs for both interventions compared to CIL. In fact, higher values of k mean that more money 
is required by the CJS to prevent one additional reconviction. Consequently, interventions that are 
more effective in reducing crime are associated with higher INMBs. A supplementary note about 
the interaction between k and cost components of SIPS is also provided in Appendix O. The notes 
explain how the magnitude of costs savings and incremental intervention costs affects the trends 
of INRB and INMB when k increases. 
5.9.3.1. Scenario analyses 
To explore the robustness of these results, two scenario analyses were carried out. Details can be 
found in Appendix O. 
As pointed out in Sub-section 5.8.1, intervention costs might have been underestimated. A range 
of alternative costs of the intervention was therefore investigated in the first scenario analysis. It 
was found that INMBs were always positive, even when the costs of implementing the intervention 
were much higher. A second scenario analysis explored different costs in response to crime. In fact, 
as highlighted in Sub-section 5.8.3, estimates of the CJS costs associated with each re-conviction 
episode might be questioned. It was found that INMBs of BA and BLC compared to CIL were likely 
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to be positive even if costs in response to crime (and therefore cost savings associated with BA and 
BLC) were lower. 
5.10. Conclusions 
While from the health care prospective both BA and BLC were found to be not cost-effective 
compared to CIL (see Chapter 4), from the CJS perspective, INBs for both BA and BLC are positive. 
More specifically, the INB associated with BLC is higher than the INB associated with BA. It is 
therefore worth investing both in BA and BLC when compared to CIL, but the overall cost-effective 
intervention is BLC. 
From this analysis, it can be concluded that from the CJS perspective it would be probably cost-
effective to invest in BLC. These results are based on several assumptions, mostly forced by the lack 
of data. Assumptions have been however explicitly stated, and sensitivity and scenario analyses 
have been conducted. Potential issues, limitations and policy implications of this analysis are 
further discussed in Chapter 8. 
Further analyses from the CJS perspective could be performed (e.g. MI to address missing data 
issues, or VOI analysis), but are not strictly necessary to conduct the cross-sectoral economic 
evaluation proposed in this thesis. These analyses are therefore left as potential further research. 
In the next chapter, the cross-sectoral analytical framework proposed in Chapter 3 is 




Chapter 6:  Cross-sectoral analysis of SIPS 
6.1. Cross-sectoral analysis of an intervention to reduce alcohol misuse 
Chapter 2 firstly introduced methods and approaches to economic evaluation, and then illustrated 
from a purely theoretical point of view the issues in assessing public health interventions with 
impacts on multiple sectors. The focus of Chapter 3 was on the description of a theoretical 
framework for a cross-sectoral and cross-temporal cost-effectiveness analysis of public health 
interventions, with the inclusion of a health equity assessment. 
The framework proposed in Chapter 3 would be particularly useful for the evaluation of alcohol 
interventions, where the need to consider wider societal perspectives, impacts on health inequity, 
and long-term outcomes has been highlighted (Hill et al., 2017). From a theoretical point of view, 
all three of these concerns (i.e. wider perspectives, impacts on inequity and cross-temporal) could 
be addressed using the proposed framework. However, the objective of this chapter is to focus on 
the cross-sectoral stage of the framework, and show how to pragmatically address the issue of 
conducting an evaluation from a wider perspective, using the SIPS case study. The other potential 
extensions of the cross-sectoral analysis are explored in the next two chapters. More precisely, the 
inclusion of health equity concerns in the economic analysis will be investigated in Chapter 7, 
whereas the cross-temporal aspects will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
Structure of the chapter 
From Chapter 4 onwards, a case study using SIPS trial was selected as a vehicle to demonstrate the 
framework proposed in Chapter 3. SIPS trial aimed at evaluating interventions to reduce alcohol 
consumption among offenders. Details about the SIPS trial can be found in Chapter 3, Section 3.4. 
In Chapter 4, a ‘traditional’ CEA from the HC perspective was conducted. This perspective 
considered health-related costs and health effects on the offenders alone. In Chapter 5, a similar 
analysis was carried out, but from the CJS perspective.  The CEA from the CJS perspective assessed 
costs falling on CJS budget and used recidivism (in terms of avoided reconvictions) as a measure of 
effectiveness. Figure 6.1 summarises the main variables assessed in the two independent CEAs 




Figure 6.1 CEAs from HC and CJS perspectives 
The analyses carried out in this chapter build on the evaluations conducted in Chapters 4 and 5. The 
chapter is composed of two parts: firstly, cross-sectoral data are used to revise the CEA from the 
narrow HC perspective; secondly, a cross-sectoral CEA from an integrated perspective is conducted. 
6.1.1.1. Part 1: using cross-sectoral data to revise the CEA from the HC perspective 
In Section 6.2, the ‘traditional’ CEA from the HC perspective (conducted in Chapter 4) is revised. 
The objective is still to maintain a ‘narrow’ HC perspective, but to expand the CEA to incorporate 
victims’ health costs and effects as well. In fact, in the CEA conducted in Chapter 4, the focus was 
only on costs falling on HC budget and on QALYs impacts for trial participants (i.e. the offenders 
treated with SIPS). This approach failed to reflect the potential health and health care consequences 
on victims through impacts on the CJS. To estimate the true impacts on health and the HC budget, 
consequences on health of the victims and additional costs falling on HC budget should actually be 
considered, even if taking a narrow HC perspective. 
In the revised CEA, impacts on crime victims in terms of QALYs lost and additional costs falling on 
HC budget are estimated and included in the evaluation, and revised incremental net benefits for 
each population subgroup from the HC perspective are computed. Such an adjustment of the CEA 
from the HC perspective requires the modelling of costs and consequences from the CJS perspective 
first. This is because health spill-over effects through the CJS can only be computed after modelling 
impacts on criminal offences and opportunity costs in CJS. 
The analysis conducted in the first part of this chapter is therefore based on cross-sectoral data, 
but the perspective of the analysis is still the narrow viewpoint of the HC system. An analysis from 





6.1.1.2. Part 2: cross-sectoral CEA conducted from an integrated perspective 
In Section 6.3, an analysis across both sectors from an integrated perspective is conducted. Such an 
evaluation has the objective of showing the consequences (e.g. differences in the recommended 
decisions) of conducting a CEA from an integrated perspective, instead of conducting multiple 
fragmented and independent analyses, as is typically the case. 
On the basis of the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3, cross-sectoral costs and benefits 
are made explicit and results of the CEAs from HC and CJS perspectives are aggregated. Potential 
compensation schemes that consider both HC and CJS costs and consequences are proposed to 
address resource allocation issues. In fact, when costs fall on one sector and benefits another, 
compensations across decision makers can lead to funding potentially cost-effective interventions. 
6.2. Adjustment of the CEA from the HC perspective 
The aim of this section is to revise the ‘traditional’ CEA of SIPS performed in Chapter 4, and include 
HC costs and consequences on victims, previously ignored. It must be stressed that this ‘revised’ 
CEA is still conducted from a narrow HC perspective, even though cross-sectoral data are used. The 
reason is that it is necessary to carry out an analysis from the CJS perspective first, in order to 
estimate the consequences of crime on victims and the CJ opportunity costs of funding an 
intervention. 
From the HC perspective, three groups of individuals affected by the intervention can be identified: 
the offenders treated with the intervention, the general population bearing the opportunity costs 
and the victims of crimes. Victims are in turn composed of two subgroups: direct and unknown 
victims. The former are victims of crimes committed by offenders treated with SIPS; the latter bear 
the consequences of the opportunity costs generated in the CJS. In other words, when CJS displaces 
resources to accommodate the costs of a new intervention, unknown offenders will commit crimes 
(and hurt unknown victims) as the resources for their programmes are displaced. To model the 
impacts on unknown victims it is therefore necessary to assess the opportunity costs in CJS. 
Figure 6.2 outlines the revised CEA scheme. Two CEAs were previously conducted, one from the HC 
perspective and another one from the CJS perspective. As illustrated in Chapter 5, the outcomes of 
interest in a CEA conducted from the CJS perspective are the impacts on CJS budget and recidivism. 
Nevertheless, consequences on (direct and unknown) victims can be computed as well, and these 




Figure 6.2 Scheme for the revised CEA from HC perspective 
The focus of this analysis is on the impacts from the HC perspective. In Figure 6.2, the ‘true’ impacts 
on HC budget and health are described by the dashed rectangles A and B, respectively. These 
include the estimates from the original ‘traditional’ CEA, and the additional components (the green 
rectangles) that are usually (incorrectly) ignored. These additional components comprise: direct 
impacts on the victims’ health (C); additional health opportunity costs due to the additional 
treatment necessary to assist the direct victims (D); health impacts and additional health 
opportunity costs related to crime involving unknown victims, due to the CJ opportunity costs of 
the intervention (E). 
Methods for the estimation of the revised INHBs from the HC perspective 
The general formula to calculate the INHB with the inclusion of health spill-over effects generated 
by a non-health sector was presented in Chapter 3, Equation 3.4. This formula can be adapted to 
the specific context of a CEA conducted from the HC perspective that includes health spill-over 
effects generated in the CJS. 
Table 6.1 summarises DEs and OCs falling on the four groups previously identified. In addition to 
the DE on offenders treated with the intervention (∆HO), additional DEs on victims are included. 
∆HV represents the health effects (measured in QALYs) on direct victims. General population 
impacts depend on the total variations in the HC budget. Compared to the ‘traditional’ CEA, two 
additional components are introduced: the additional costs due to HC services for victims (∆CHv) 
and unknown victims (∆CHvu). Moreover, OCs in CJS also generate health effects (measured in 
QALYs) on unknown victims (∆HVu). Table 6.1 reports the variables measured in natural units (i.e. 
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QALYs). Costs are therefore expressed in QALYs using the marginal productivity of the HC sector, kH 
(Claxton, Martin, et al., 2015). 
Group affected DE OC 
Offenders ∆HO  
Direct victims ∆HV  
Unknown victims  ∆HVu 
General population  
∆CH + ∆CHv + ∆CHvu
kH
 
Table 6.1 Health impacts on population subgroups 
As shown in Equation 6.1, the revised INHBs can be obtained as the DEs net of the OCs. 
𝐼𝑁𝐻𝐵 = (∆𝐻𝑂 + ∆𝐻𝑉) − (
∆𝐶𝐻+∆𝐶𝐻𝑣+∆𝐶𝐻𝑣𝑢
𝑘𝐻
+ ∆𝐻𝑉𝑢)  (6.1) 
In this analysis, all impacts are simply aggregated on the basis of the principle that “a QALY is a 
QALY”, irrespectively of who is the beneficiary. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.3, 
the analysis can be underpinned by alternative value judgments, and potential equity concerns can 
be incorporated in the evaluation. In the next chapter, alternative solutions and considerations 
about how to aggregate health impacts falling on different population subgroups will be explored. 
In the two following sub-sections, impacts on direct and unknown victims are estimated. Revised 
INBs are presented in Sub-section 6.2.4. 
Impacts on direct victims of SIPS 
As mentioned previously, impacts on direct victims consists of two components: direct impacts on 
the victims’ health, and additional health OCs due to the additional treatments necessary to assist 
the direct victims. 
QALY losses experienced by victims of various criminal offences are illustrated in Sub-section 
6.2.2.1. Additional costs falling on HC budget due to the treatment of victims of violence are 
described in Sub-section 6.2.2.2. Resulting impacts of SIPS on direct victims are presented in Sub-
section 6.2.2.3. 
6.2.2.1. QALYs lost by victims of crime 
Various methods can be used to estimate crime’s impacts on health such as the WTP approach (see 
Sub-section 5.4.2.2) or the QALY approach (Wickramasekera et al., 2015). To be consistent with the 
156 
 
CEA methods in the HC context, the QALY approach has been chosen for this analysis (Dolan & 
Peasgood, 2007, Dolan, Loomes, et al., 2005). 
Dolan et al. (2005) investigated the intangible costs of crime for the victims and provided estimates 
of the discounted QALY losses experienced by the victims of the main crime categories. Impacts on 
victims’ health associated with each criminal event are summarised in Table 6.2. 
Crime category Discounted QALY loss 
Homicide 17.791 
Wounding 0.111 
Sexual offences 0.160 
Rape 0.561 
Common assault 0.007 
Violence 0.007 
Robbery 0.028 
Other criminal offences  
(e.g. burglaries in a dwelling, thefts, criminal damages…) 
0.000 
Table 6.2 QALY losses associated with violent crime, adapted from Dolan et al. (2005) 
Due to the lack of data, in this analysis it was assumed that common assaults and generic violent 
episodes were associated with the same health impact on victims. Moreover, because Dolan et al. 
(2005) did not report any impacts quantifiable in QALYs associated with burglaries in a dwelling, 
thefts, criminal damages and other commercial and public sector victimisations, it was assumed 
that no QALY loss was associated with these events. Lastly, no direct impact on health was 
associated with driving offences because it was assumed that their impacts were already included 
in the estimate of generic wounding. The estimate for generic wounding was in fact obtained as an 
average of ‘serious’ (car accidents included) and ‘other’ wounding (Dolan, Loomes, et al., 2005). 
In this analysis, it is assumed that all health consequences on crime victims are described by the 
QALY losses presented in Table 6.2. Nonetheless, theoretically, consequences on victims’ health 
could be further explored and additional components could be incorporated in the analysis. 
Potential estimates of fear of crime can be found in the literature (Dolan & Peasgood, 2007) and 
impacts on mental distress could be investigated. This is further discussed in Chapter 8, Sub-section 
8.4.1.3. 
6.2.2.2. Additional HC costs to treat victims of crime 
Criminal events are not only associated with direct health losses for the victims, but also to 
additional costs (falling on the HC budget) to treat victims of violence. These costs are usually 
neglected, but are actually additional HC opportunity costs and should be considered in the 
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analysis. Additional HC costs fall on unknown patients that cannot be treated due to the resources 
displaced by the HC system to accommodate the additional treatments for the victims of crime. 
Average costs falling on HC budget to treat victims of violent crimes were computed using the 
estimates from the Home Office Online Report 30/05 (Dubourg, Hamed & Thorns, 2005). All unit 
cost estimates were updated to 2010 prices (the reference year for the case study) using the 
appropriate inflator index, and are summarised in Table 6.3. 
Crime category 




Sexual offences 1,129 
Rape 2,567 
Common assault 152 
Violence 152 
Robbery 596 
Other criminal offences  
(e.g. burglaries in a dwelling, thefts, criminal damages…) 
0 
Table 6.3 Average HC costs associated with criminal events 
From the HC perspective, the most expensive criminal event is rape, followed by wounding and 
generic sexual offences. These values should be interpreted with caution because the accuracy of 
the original estimates might be arguable and no confidence intervals were provided. However, to 
the best of my knowledge, no other more recent attempts of updating these cost estimates have 
been found in the literature. 
6.2.2.3. Estimates of the impacts on direct victims 
As illustrated in Chapter 5, Sub-section 5.8.2, PNC reconviction data were integrated with self-
reported information in order to characterise the distribution of criminal events committed by the 
offenders, and estimate the number of criminal events avoided by SIPS. Compared to CIL, BA and 
BLC were associated with a reduction of 0.51 and 0.66 reconvictions, respectively (see Chapter 5, 
Sub-section 5.6.3.2). When PNC data were integrated with the frequencies of self-reported crimes 
(summarised in Table 5.6), the number of criminal events avoided were computed. 
Criminal events avoided are summarised again in the first columns of Table 6.4. Appropriate 
discounted QALY losses (Dolan, Loomes, et al., 2005) and average health services costs (Dubourg, 
Hamed & Thorns, 2005) were linked to each criminal event avoided. Table 6.4 illustrates the 
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resulting avoided victims’ QALY losses and the HC cost savings corresponding to the criminal events 
avoided with BA and BLC compared to CIL. 
Offences Events avoided Avoided victims’ QALY losses HC cost savings (£) 
Violent offences BA BLC BA BLC BA BLC 
Violence 0.111 0.143 0.001 0.001 16.8 21.7 
Assault 0.141 0.182 0.001 0.001 21.3 27.6 
Wounding 0.130 0.168 0.014 0.019 215.6 279.0 
Sexual offences 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 1.5 2.0 
Criminal offences             
Theft (non-vehicles) 0.065 0.083 - - - - 
Theft vehicles 0.007 0.009 - - - - 
Burglary 0.009 0.012 - - - - 
Criminal damage 0.019 0.025 - - - - 
Robbery 0.008 0.010 0.000 0.000 4.8 6.2 
Shop lifting 0.001 0.002 - - - - 
Drug offences 0.004 0.005 - - - - 
Driving offences 0.012 0.016 - - - - 
Other fines 0.003 0.003 - - - - 
Total 0.510 0.660 0.017 0.021 260.0 336.5 
Table 6.4 Impacts of BA and BLC on victims, compared to CIL 
Compared to CIL, BA and BLC were associated on average with cost savings of £ 260 and £ 336.5, 
and health gains of 0.017 and 0.021 QALYs, respectively. According to the distribution of avoided 
criminal events, the greatest benefits were associated with wounding episodes avoided. 
Impacts on unknown victims of SIPS 
A similar approach was followed to quantify the impact on unknown victims, generated by the 
opportunity costs in the CJS (i.e. what could have been obtained by using the CJS resources for an 
alternative purpose). Because both BA and BLC are associated with cost savings, more CJS resources 
would be available if BA or BLC were implemented (opportunity costs are negative). Additional 
reconvictions could be therefore avoided. 
6.2.3.1. Frequencies of ‘generic’ criminal events 
The distribution of criminal events reported in Table 5.6 refers specifically to the criminal activity 
associated with SIPS. These frequencies might be potentially appropriate for other alcohol 
interventions, but cannot be used to estimate the impacts on unknown victims resulting from OCs 
in CJS. In fact, when the resources for their programmes are displaced, unknown ‘generic’ offenders 
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might commit all sorts of crimes. The frequencies of criminal events committed by generic 
offenders will be different from the criminal events committed by offenders treated with SIPS. 
The 2011 Home Office Statistical Bulletin (Chaplin, Flately & Smith, 2011) was used to investigate 
the frequencies of criminal events committed in the year 2010 (the reference year for the case 
study). As summarised in Table 6.5, in 2010 in the UK more than 4 million criminal events were 
recorded. Of these, homicide accounted for 0.01%, wounding 1.03%, assault 8.15%, rape 0.35%, 
sexual assault 0.90%, robbery 1.72%, other offences without consequences on health (e.g. criminal 
damage, violence without injury and thefts) 87.83%. 
Crime category Events Category from HORS Proportion 
Homicide 618 Homicide 0.01% 
Wounding 45,043 
Violence against the person with injury (excluding 
homicide and ABH) 
1.03% 
Assault 355,968 Actual bodily harm 8.15% 
Rape 15,084 Rape of a female and male 0.35% 
Sexual assault 39,271 Sexual offences (excluding rape) 0.90% 
Robbery 75,105 Robbery 1.72% 




Burglary, violence against the person without 
injury, offences against vehicles, other theft , fraud 
and forgery, criminal damage, drug and other 
miscellaneous offences 
87.83% 
Total 4,365,372   100.00% 
Table 6.5 Frequencies of criminal events committed in the UK in 2010 
These frequencies provide an overall idea of the types of crimes committed more frequently by 
‘generic’ offenders in the UK. 
6.2.3.2. Estimates of the impacts on unknown victims of SIPS 
OCs in CJS can be expressed either in monetary or natural units. When expressed in natural units, 
OCs represent the (avoided) reconvictions due to costs (savings) falling on the CJS budget. As 
reported previously in Table 5.16, compared to CIL, BA and BLC were associated on average to 0.045 
and 0.057 avoided reconvictions, respectively. 
Frequencies of criminal events for generic offenders summarised in Table 6.5 were used to estimate 
the numbers of specific criminal events avoided. Afterwards, appropriate discounted QALY losses 
and average health services costs (illustrated in Sub-sections 6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2, respectively) were 
linked to each criminal event. Resulting impacts on unknown victims in terms of QALY losses 




Events avoided Avoided QALY losses by victims HC cost savings (£) 
BA BLC BA BLC BA BLC 
Homicide 0.000 0.000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0 0.0 
Wounding 0.000 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 0.8 1.0 
Assault 0.004 0.005 0.0000 0.0000 0.6 0.7 
Rape 0.000 0.000 0.0001 0.0001 0.4 0.5 
Sexual assault 0.000 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 0.5 0.6 
Robbery 0.001 0.001 0.0000 0.0000 0.5 0.6 
Other offences without 
consequences on health 
0.040 0.050 0.0000 0.0000 0.0 0.0 
Total 0.045 0.057 0.0004 0.0005 2.7 3.4 
Table 6.6 Impacts on unknown victims of BA and BLC compared to CIL 
Average impacts on unknown victims’ health and HC cost savings are close to zero. From a 
pragmatic point of view, health effects associated with the OCs in the CJS are probably negligible. 
Nonetheless, the focus of this analysis is more on the methodological approach, rather than on the 
numerical results of the analysis. 
6.2.3.3. Marginal productivity of CJS in producing health 
The magnitude of health and HC costs associated with the OCs generated in the CJS is linked to the 
inter-sectoral marginal productivity of CJS in producing health. 
As explained in Sub-section 5.4, the marginal productivity of the CJS in avoiding reconvictions was 
estimated to be £ 11,000 per unit of effect. In other words, with £ 11,000 CJS can prevent one 
episode of recidivism (i.e. one reconviction episode) at the margin. Avoided recidivism is associated 
with impacts on victims that can be quantified with the methods illustrated in this section. Using 
the frequencies summarised in Table 6.5, it can be estimated that for each reconviction avoided, 
the CJS avoids also 0.0081 QALYs lost by victims, and generates cost savings for approximately £ 59. 
Knowing the marginal productivity of the HC system kH (i.e. with £ 13,000 HC sector can generate 1 
QALY), these cost savings correspond to additional 0.0045 QALYs gained. 
A proxy for the inter-sectoral marginal productivity of CJS in producing health (kRH) can be 
computed. On average, at the margin, with an investment of £ 11,000, the CJS generates 0.0126 
QALYs through avoided reconvictions. Consequently, kRH is approximately equal to 870,000 £/QALY. 
As expected, kRH is much higher than kH. In fact, it is reasonable to assume that the most efficient 
way to generate QALYs is operating through the HC sector. In other words, if the main objective is 
to improve health, investments should be made in the HC sector. Nevertheless, the CJS can also 
generate QALYs, and kRH can help to quantify them. 
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Revised estimate of incremental net benefits from HC perspective 
6.2.4.1. Results of the ‘traditional’ CEA 
Estimates of differential QALYs and costs of BA and BLC compared to CIL obtained from the 
‘traditional’ analysis conducted in Chapter 4 were reported in Table 4.13. 
In summary, compared to CIL, BA was associated with a negative impacts on offenders’ health (on 
average: -0.010 QALYs), and it was also more expensive (on average £ 373.6 additional costs). BLC 
was also associated with negative impacts on health (on average: -0.018 QALYs), but it was cost 
saving (on average £ 226.6 cost savings). Overall, INBs associated with both BA and BLC were 
negative. 
6.2.4.2. Revised results of the CEA from the HC perspective 
Revised INBs of BA and BLC from the HC perspective were obtained as the difference between DEs 
and OCs. Details about methods used to compute the revised INBs were described in Sub-section 
6.2.1. 
INBs can be expressed either in natural (INHB) or monetary (INMB) units. Impact matrices and 
revised INHBs are presented in Table 6.7 for BA and BLC, compared to CIL. Revised INMBs from the 
HC perspective are reported in Table 6.8. In the first column of each table, the estimates from the 
‘traditional’ CEA are reported 36 . ‘Traditional’ results are then adjusted for the additional 
components, previously ignored.  
                                                          
 
36 If compared to the original results summarised in Table 4.13, small differences in the ‘traditional’ estimates 
of the INBs are due to rounding. For example, ‘traditional’ INMBs in Table 4.13 were -509.4 for BA and -8.5 




‘Traditional’ estimate Additional component Total 
DE OC DE OC DE OC 
Brief advice (BA) vs CIL 
Offenders -0.010      -0.010   
Victims   0.017  0.017   
Unknown victims     -0.0004   -0.0004 
General population  0.029   -0.020   0.009 
INHBs -0.039 QALYs 0.037 QALYs -0.002 QALYs 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling (BLC) vs CIL 
Offenders -0.018      -0.018   
Victims     0.021  0.021   
Unknown victims      -0.0005   -0.0005 
General population   -0.017  -0.026   -0.044 
INHBs -0.001 QALYs 0.048 QALYs 0.048 QALYs 
Table 6.7 Revised INHBs from the HC perspective 
Group affected 
‘Traditional’ estimate Additional component Total 
DE OC DE OC DE OC 
Brief advice (BA) vs CIL 
Offenders -130       -130   
Victims     215.7  215.7   
Unknown victims      -4.7   -4.7 
General population   373.6   -262.6   111.0 
INMBs -503.6 £ 483.1 £ -20.5 £ 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling (BLC) vs CIL 
Offenders -234.0       -234.0   
Victims     279.2  279.2   
Unknown victims      -6.0   -6.0 
General population   -226.6  -339.8   -566.4 
INMBs -7.4 £ 625.0 £ 617.6 £ 
Table 6.8 Revised INMBs from the HC perspective 
In the proposed formulation, costs savings are expressed as negative OCs. For example, an 
intervention like BLC, which is on average cost saving from both HC and CJS perspectives, is 
associated with negative OCs (i.e. positive impacts) falling on both the general population and 
unknown victims (i.e. is associated with an increase in QALYs due to cost savings). 
Looking at the additional components of the analysis, convictions avoided by BA and BLC engender 
QALY gains for both direct and unknown victims. These corresponds to the avoided QALY losses 
associated with avoided criminal events. Moreover, additional HC costs savings are generated, 
which fall on the general population. For example, impacts associated with BA falling on the general 
population were calculated as summarised in Table 6.9. 
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OCs falling on general population Amount (£) Source 
Traditional estimate:   
HC costs from the ‘traditional’ CEA 373.6 Table 6.8  
Additional components:   
HC cost to treat direct victims -260.0 Table 6.4 
HC cost to treat unknown victims -2.7 Table 6.6 
Total additional component -262.6  Table 6.8 37 
Total impacts of BA on general population 111.0   
Table 6.9 Impact on general population associated with BA 
6.2.4.3. Conclusions of the revised CEA from the HC perspective 
Looking at the total INHBs (last column in Table 6.7) and total INMBs (last column in Table 6.8), INBs 
are greater compared to their ‘traditional’ estimates. While average INBs of BA remain negative, 
the impact of the additional components is particularly relevant for BLC. In fact, in the traditional 
CEA, BLC was associated with negative INBs, while revised INBs are now positive. In other words, 
even from a narrow HC perspective, failing to account for the effects on health via criminal justice 
results in a failure to consider the full implications for the outcome of interest. If the full impacts 
on health are accounted for, BLC becomes on average cost-effective from the HC perspective. The 
conclusion of the revised CEAs would be to fund BLC, being the intervention that provides the 
highest INBs, compared to CIL and BA. 
It must be stressed that these results are based on mean estimates. Further sensitivity analyses 
should be therefore conducted in order to investigate the uncertainty around these revised 
estimates and the robustness of the results. However, the focus of this analysis is more on the 
methods and less on the numerical results. 
  
                                                          
 
37 The sum of 260.0 and 2.7 is 262.6 because, more precisely, cost savings components were 259.987 and 
2.656. Resulting total cost savings amounted to 262.643. 
164 
 
6.3. Cross-sectoral CEA of SIPS from an integrated perspective 
The analysis carried out in Section 6.2 was based on cross-sectoral data, but it was still conducted 
from the narrow HC perspective. Cross-sectoral data were only used to estimate health impacts on 
(direct and unknown) victims of crimes, and to adjust the amount of the HC opportunity costs. 
The objective of this section is to carry out an evaluation from an integrated perspective, including 
costs and effects falling on both HC and CJ sectors. More specifically, Sub-section 6.3.1 aims to show 
how to operationalise the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3 and based on the work of 
Claxton et al. (2007), Sculpher et al. (2014) and Walker et al. (2019). Results of the cross-sectoral 
analysis are illustrated in Sub-section 6.3.2 and discussed in Sub-section 6.3.3. 
Methods for conducting the analysis from an integrated perspective 
In brief, the analytical framework proposed in Chapter 3 aims at informing decisions to be made by 
legitimate decision makers about interventions characterised by multiple objectives and impacts 
on multiple budget constraints. Cost-effectiveness is assessed from an integrated perspective, and 
results of the analysis can be used to suggest compensation schemes (i.e. transfers) across decision 
makers. Further details about the framework can be found in Chapter 3. 
The formula to calculate the cross-sectoral Incremental Net Monetary Benefits (INMBs) was 
proposed in Chapter 3 (see Equations 3.7 and 3.8), and involved DEs and OCs falling on the HC 
sector, a generic non-HC sector, and private consumption. The original generic formulation can be 
adapted to the specific context of a cross-sectoral analysis involving the HC and CJ sectors, as shown 
in Equation 6.2. 
𝐼𝑁𝑀𝐵 = 𝑉𝐻 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝐻𝐵 + 𝑉𝑅 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐵   (6.2) 
Cross-sectoral INMB can be obtained by aggregating INHB and INRB when expressed in monetary 
consumption units. To measure health benefits in monetary consumption units, INHB is multiplied 
by the social valuation (estimated with WTP) of a QALY (VH). Similarly, INRB is multiplied for the 
estimated WTP of a reconviction episode (VR). As highlighted in Equation 6.3, INHB and INRB are 
given by the DEs net of the OCs. The resulting cross-sectoral INMB formula is illustrated in Equation 


















)   (6.3) 
A description of the variables included in Equation 6.3 is provided in Table 6.10. Further details 
about this formulation, the variables involved and the underlying assumptions can be found in 
Chapter 3. 
Variable Description 
∆H Direct effect on health (including impacts on direct victims) 
∆R Direct effect on recidivism 
∆CH Costs falling on HC budget (including impacts on direct victims) 
∆CR Costs falling on CJS budget 
kH Marginal productivity of the HC sector (in generating health) 
kR Marginal productivity of the CJS (in preventing recidivism) 
kRH Marginal productivity of the CJS in generating health 
kHR Marginal productivity of the HC sector in preventing recidivism 
VH Social valuation (estimated with WTP) of a health outcome (QALY) 
VR Social valuation (estimated with WTP) of a CJ outcome (recidivism) 
Table 6.10 Description of the variables included in Equation 6.2 
For the sake of simplicity, compared to the INB formulae used in Chapter 5 (e.g. Equation 5.9), 
incremental costs of the intervention (Cint) and costs in response to crime38 are aggregated here. 
Basically, all costs falling on CJS budget are aggregated, and resulting total costs are referred to as 
CR. Consequently, CR now does not include only reconviction costs, but all costs falling on CJS 
budget39. 
Moreover, for pragmatic reasons related to the lack of data, it was assumed that no impact on 
recidivism is generated from the HC sector. Put differently, it was assumed that 𝑘𝐻𝑅 is ‘infinite’ (i.e. 
an infinite amount of resources should be invested in the HC sector to reduce recidivism). With 
regard to the marginal productivity of the CJS in producing health (𝑘𝑅𝐻), an estimate was already 
implicitly calculated in Sub-section 6.2.3.3. In brief, kRH was estimated to be approximately equal to 
870,000 £/QALY. 
                                                          
 
38 Given by the product of avoided reconvictions (R) and cost savings per reconviction avoided (-CR). 
39 Probably it would have been reasonable to label them CCJS to distinguish them from the costs falling on HC 
budget (CH). Nevertheless, using three letters in the subscript (CJS) might lead to confusion when dealing also 
with cross-sectoral marginal productivities (e.g. between HC and private consumption, kHC). For this reason it 
has been decided to identify these costs only with the letter R, to also highlight their link to reconviction and 




As discussed previously in Chapter 5, Sub-section 5.4.2, it can be assumed that the socio democratic 
process allocates resources to each sector so that a pound spent in any sector at the margin 
generates the same benefit as a pound spent in another, based on individual WTP. Consequently, 
the ratio of v and k is constant across sectors and it is approximately equal to 4.6, being VH ≈ £60,000 
(Glover & Henderson, 2010) and kH ≈ £13,000 (Claxton, Martin, et al., 2015). Equation 6.3 thus 
reduces to the formula described in Equation 6.4, where the two components falling on HC and CJ 
sectors are highlighted in red. 
 
𝐼𝑁𝑀𝐵 = 4.6 (𝑘𝐻∆𝐻 − ∆𝐶𝐻 − 𝑘𝐻
∆𝐶𝑅
𝑘𝑅𝐻
) + 4.6(𝑘𝑅∆𝑅 − ∆𝐶𝑅)  (6.4) 
Looking at the impact on the HC sector, as pointed out in Table 6.10, ΔH includes the DEs falling on 
both offenders (ΔHO) and direct victims (ΔHV). Similarly, ΔCH includes the HC costs to treat both 
offenders (ΔCHo) and direct victims (ΔCHv). The ratio of ΔCR over kRH describes the health 
consequences on unknown victims generated by the OCs in the CJS, namely: health effects on 
unknown victims (ΔHvu) and additional HC costs to treat them (ΔCHvu). Equation 6.4 can be thus re-
arranged as shown in Equation 6.5. 
 
     𝐼𝑁𝑀𝐵 = 4.6 [𝑘𝐻(∆𝐻𝑂 + ∆𝐻𝑉) − (∆𝐶𝐻𝑜 + ∆𝐶𝐻𝑣 + ∆𝐶𝐻𝑣𝑢 + 𝑘𝐻∆𝐻𝑉𝑢)] + 4.6 (𝑘𝑅∆𝑅 − ∆𝐶𝑅) (6.5) 
From an integrated perspective, if the INMB is positive, then the new intervention should be 
introduced; if the IMNB is negative it should not. However, this will only be the case if HC and CJS 
decision makers accept this reflection of net benefits. In reality, HC (CJS) decision maker may only 
care about health (recidivism), as such only the net health (reconviction) benefit would be 
important (Walker et al., 2019). 
Results of the cross-sectoral analysis of SIPS trial 
Table 6.11 summarises the results of the cross-sectoral evaluation of BA and BLC, compared to CIL, 
based on methods illustrated in Sub-section 6.3.1. 
Impacts on HC sector are taken from the revised results of the CEA from the HC perspective 
(presented in Section 6.2) and take into account also the spill-over effects on victims’ health. 
Impacts on the CJ sector are taken from the CEA conducted in Chapter 5. DEs and OCs are presented 
both in monetary and in natural units (i.e. QALYs or Reconvictions). Total INMBs (expressed in 
CJ sector HC sector 
HC sector CJ sector 
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monetary consumption units) are calculated using Equation 6.5 and are reported in the last column 
of Table 6.11. 
Group affected 
Health Care Sector Criminal Justice System Total 
DE OC DE OC DE OC 
Brief advice (BA) 
Offenders 
-130 £   5610 £   
25208 £ 
 
(-0.010 QALYs)  (0.51 R)    
Unknown 
offenders 
     -496 £  
-2280 £ 
     (-0.05 R)  
Victims 
216 £      
992 £ 
 
(0.017 QALYs)       
Unknown victims  
-5 £      
-22 £ 
 (-0.0004 QALYs)     
 
General population 
  111 £      
510 £ 
  (0.009 QALYs)      
INMB 
-20 £ 6106 £ 
27992 £ 
(-0.002 QALYs) (0.56 R) 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling (BLC) 
Offenders 
-234 £   7260 £   
32320 £ 
 
(-0.018 QALYs)  (0.66 R)    
Unknown 
offenders 
     -631 £  
-2903 £ 
     (-0.06 R)  
Victims 
279 £      
1284 £ 
 
(0.021 QALYs)       
Unknown victims  
-6 £      
-28 £ 
 (-0.0005 QALYs)     
 
General population 
  -566 £      
-2606 £ 
  (-0.044 QALYs)      
INMB 
618 £ 7891 £ 
39140 £ 
(0.048 QALYs) (0.72 R) 
Table 6.11 Cross-sectoral INMBs of BA and BLC compared to CIL 
From an integrated and broader perspective, both BA and BLC are associated with positive INMBs 
when compared to CIL. On average BLC provides the highest INMBs. Consequently, the 
recommended decision would be to implement BLC. 
Looking at the impacts on HC and CJ sectors, the implementation of BLC would not require any 
compensation across sectors. This is because, after modelling the full impact of the programme, 
BLC is associated with positive INBs from both the HC and CJS perspective. 
On the contrary, it would be more problematic for HC and CJS decision makers to find a consensus 
on whether BA should be introduced or not. In fact, even though BA appears to be cost-effective 
from an integrated perspective compared to CIL (i.e. cross-sectoral INMBs associated with BA are 
positive), on average BA is associated with negative INHBs. To fund the intervention it would be 
necessary to ensure that a compensation across sectors takes place. To put it differently, the CJS 
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decision maker should renounce to a share of the benefits and compensate the negative impact of 
the intervention on HC. 
Discussion 
6.3.3.1. Uncertainty around the results of the CEA 
Results presented in this chapter are based on mean estimates and should be therefore interpreted 
with caution. To assess the robustness of the results, sensitivity analyses reflecting the uncertainty 
about estimates should be conducted. However, the main objective of this analysis was to illustrate 
how to operationalise the theoretical cross-sectoral framework proposed in Chapter 3. The 
investigation of uncertainty around results is left as a suggestion for potential further research. 
6.3.3.2. Investigating potential double counting of health impacts 
Results of the cross-sectoral CEA of SIPS presented in Sub-section 6.3.2 showed that both BA and 
BLC provided positive INMBs compared to CIL. As highlighted in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.2.3, cross-
sectoral INMBs are based on the results of the CEAs conducted from the HC and CJS perspectives, 
under the assumption that outcomes are not overlapping or correlated, and the aggregation across 
dimensions is simply additive. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out in Sub-section 5.4.2.3, it might be argued that the value associated 
with avoided recidivism already includes the impacts on victims’ health. In other words, 
consequences on victims’ health might be indirectly included in the WTP to reduce crime, which 
was instead assumed to be a reflection of the intrinsic value of reducing crime per se. If the WTP to 
reduce crime already includes the health benefits of avoiding being a victim, it would not be 
appropriate to aggregate the results by summing impacts across dimensions. 
A pragmatic way to ensure potential double counting is avoided is to exclude the adjustment for 
health impacts on victims. For this reason, an alternative cross-sectoral analysis was conducted, 
which did not consider the adjustment for the health impacts on victims of crime. This alternative 
cross-sectoral analysis was based on estimates of DEs and OCs of the ‘traditional’ CEA from the HC 
perspective (see Chapter 4), and the CEA from CJS perspective (see Chapter 5). DEs and OCs are 
presented both in monetary and in natural units (i.e. QALYs or Reconvictions). INMBs for BA and 




Health Care Sector Criminal Justice System Total 
DE OC DE OC DE OC 
Brief advice (BA) 
Offenders 
-130 £   5610 £   
25208 £ 
 
(-0.010 QALYs)   (0.51 R)    
Unknown 
offenders 
      -496 £  
-2280 £ 
      (-0.05 R)  
General population 
  374 £      
1719 £ 
  (0.029 QALYs)     
 
INMB 
-504 £ 6106 £ 
25770 £ 
(-0.039 QALYs) (0.56 R) 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling (BLC) 
Offenders 
-234 £   7260 £   
32320 £ 
 




     -631 £ 
 
-2903 £ 
     (-0.06 R) 
 
General population 
  -227 £      
-1042 £ 
  (-0.017 QALYs)     
 
INMB 
-7 £ 7891 £ 
36265 £ 
(-0.001 QALYs) (0.72 R) 
Table 6.12 Revised cross-sectoral INBs of BLC compared to CIL 
Total INMBs associated with BA and BLC are both positive, and the highest INMBs are associated 
with BLC. Therefore, from an integrated perspective, the recommended decision would not change. 
However, according to this alternative analysis, both interventions would require the CJS decision 
maker to compensate the HC decision maker. This is because both BA and BLC are not cost-effective 
from the HC perspective (i.e. they are associated with negative INHBs), whereas they are both 
associated with positive INRBs. 
This analysis aimed to briefly highlight that cross-sectoral evaluation might become more 
problematic when outcomes are overlapping or correlated. This issue is further discussed in 
Chapter 8, Section 8.3. 
6.3.3.3. Potential inclusion of impacts on private consumption 
Time and resource constraints often prevent a comprehensive collection of all data required to 
expand the evaluation perspective. It has been argued that attempts should be made to include as 
many relevant costs and outcomes as possible within the resources available, prioritising those that 
are likely to have the greatest impact on the outcome of the evaluation (Hill et al., 2017). For this 
reason, in this analysis it was decided to focus the attention on impacts on health and criminal 
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justice. A potential further extension of the cross-sectoral analysis could also include impacts on 
private consumption. 
In the analysis carried out in Sub-section 6.3.3, impacts on private consumption were ignored. In 
other words, impacts on productivity, employment and properties stolen or damaged were not 
considered. Nevertheless, as pointed out in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3.2, when INHB and INNB are 
aggregated using individual WTP values, Incremental Net Consumption Benefits (INCB) can be 
aggregated as well. To conduct a cross-sectoral analysis involving HC, CJ and private consumption, 
the formula used to aggregate the results of the CEAs conducted from the HC and CJS perspectives 
(see Equation 6.3) can be expanded as shown in Equation 6.6, where: ∆Cc is the DE on private 
consumption; kRC is the marginal productivity of the CJS in generating private consumption; kHC is 
the marginal productivity of the HC sector in generating private consumption. 



















The same procedure used to estimate HC impacts on victims can be employed to compute the 
additional impacts on individual consumption introduced in Equation 6.6. Lost outputs and stolen, 
damaged, destroyed and recovered properties associated with each criminal event are available in 
the literature (Dubourg, Hamed & Thorns, 2005). Numbers of criminal events avoided by the 
intervention can be computed, and can be linked to the appropriate impacts on private 
consumption. Lastly, it would be necessary to estimate the spill-over effects on consumption 
generated in the HC and CJ sector (see Sub-section 8.5.2.2). 
6.3.3.4. Incorporation of health equity concerns and cross-temporal extension 
In the theoretical framework proposed in Chapter 3, two additional stages of the evaluation were 
illustrated from a theoretical point of view: the incorporation of health equity concerns, and a cross-
temporal extension. 
The next chapter will cover the incorporation of equity concerns on health inequalities. As 
highlighted in Sub-section 6.2.1, this analysis was grounded on the principle that “a QALY is a QALY”. 
Nevertheless, the evaluation can be underpinned by alternative value judgments, and alternative 
aggregation functions of health impacts can be used. 
The operationalisation of the cross-temporal extension of the analysis (i.e. extrapolating effects and 




Chapter 7:  Incorporating health equity concerns in the cross-sectoral CEA 
7.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 2, the methodological and technical issues of evaluating public health interventions were 
described. Similar considerations apply to the evaluation of interventions which specifically address 
alcohol issues. Three main challenges have been highlighted in the literature, namely: the 
consideration of wider societal perspectives, the incorporation of impacts on health inequity and 
the inclusion of long-term outcomes (Hill et al., 2017). 
In Chapter 6, the ‘wider perspectives’ issue was addressed and a cross-sectoral analysis was carried 
out. The cross-sectoral analysis emphasised the importance of considering not only health and HC 
consequences of alcohol interventions, but also their impact on CJ. Focusing the analysis only on 
health costs and consequences potentially underestimates the full impact of the intervention. 
However, the analysis conducted in Chapter 6 overlooked that health impacts of alcohol 
interventions might fall on different groups of individuals (e.g. offenders, victims, individuals from 
various socio-economic groups), and this might raise potential equity issues. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Sub-section 2.4.2, public health interventions often aim to tackle unfair 
inequalities in health. For this reason, the inclusion of equity concerns related to the distribution of 
health impacts between population sub-groups might become relevant (Weatherly, Cookson & 
Drummond, 2014, Weatherly et al., 2009, Chalkidou et al., 2008). With regard to the specific context 
of alcohol interventions, it has been argued that alcohol misuse has a wide impact across a range 
of issues related to (potentially unfair) health inequalities. For this reason, addressing alcohol issues 
is frequently linked to the attempt to reduce health inequalities in general (Smith & Foster, 2014). 
Health equity concerns and alcohol interventions 
Despite health equity being a recognised area of need, in the economic evaluations of alcohol 
prevention interventions there is little evidence of attempts to address this issue (Burton et al., 
2017, Hill et al., 2017). For example, none of the studies identified in the systematic review 
conducted by Hill and et al. (2017) specifically addressed or even discussed equity in health. 
Similarly, the impact on health inequalities was frequently not identified in the effectiveness and 
cost-effectiveness studies of alcohol control policies in England reviewed by Burton et al. (2017). 
Nevertheless, it was reported that some interventions (e.g. regulating marketing and availability, 
providing information and education, managing the drinking environment) could be used to 
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address health inequalities, if implemented in areas with greater deprivation or directed to specific 
groups (Burton et al., 2017). 
Some evidence was identified on price regulation and taxation, which was found to provide greater 
health benefits to heavy drinkers who experience the greatest harm (Burton et al., 2017). Using the 
Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model40 (SAPM), Holmes et al. (2014) investigated the equity implications 
of a minimum unit price (MUP) and how alcohol-related mortality and morbidity can vary by 
socioeconomic status (SES). Health benefits from the policy were found to be unequally distributed, 
with individuals in the lowest socioeconomic group benefitting more (Holmes et al., 2014). 
Similarly, using a newer version of the SAPM, Meier et al. (2016) found that different alcohol 
taxation and price control systems could contribute substantially to the reduction of health 
disparities between socioeconomic groups. Alcohol-content-based taxation and MUP policies can 
in fact reduce the harms associated with alcohol consumption, which are more likely to be suffered 
by less affluent groups (Burton et al., 2017, Meier et al., 2016). 
With regard to Identification and Brief Advice (IBA) policies, the lowest socioeconomic groups were 
again estimated to experience the greatest absolute reduction in harms (Burton et al., 2017). 
Nevertheless, the impact of IBA policies is likely to be substantially lower than MUP policies in terms 
of reducing absolute socioeconomic inequalities in health, unless targeted at lower socioeconomic 
groups (Angus, Colin et al., 2015). For example, if implemented in the CJS context, IBA interventions 
can reduce alcohol consumption and harm in offenders and contribute to reducing health 
inequalities (Burton et al., 2017). 
To summarise, alcohol-focused interventions have been rarely evaluated in a manner that enables 
an analysis of differential health impacts by population subgroups. More research is needed in 
order to explore how alcohol interventions can impact different social groups’ health (Smith & 
Foster, 2014). 
Objective and methods of this analysis 
As summarised in Chapter 2, Sub-section 2.4.3, various analytical techniques could theoretically 
accommodate the inclusion of health equity concerns in the economic evaluation of a public health 
                                                          
 




intervention. Similarly, the analytical framework proposed in Chapter 3 can be extended in order 
to assess also impacts on health inequities, based on alternative value judgments (see Section 3.3). 
In Chapter 3, the ‘health inequality assessment’ extension of the framework was illustrated from a 
theoretical point of view. The aim of this chapter is to use the SIPS case study to show how to 
operationalise the inclusion of health equity concerns in the evaluation of a public health 
intervention with effects on HC and CJ. 
7.1.2.1. Scheme of the analysis 
In the previous chapters, the analytical framework was used to address issues related to the 
perspective of the evaluation. SIPS trial was selected as a vehicle to demonstrate the methods 
proposed in Chapter 3, and a cross-sectoral analysis of SIPS was carried out in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
The cross-sectoral analysis of SIPS consisted of four steps. A brief recap of the methods and results 
of each step is offered below. 
The objective of this chapter is to revise the third and the fourth step of the SIPS case study, in order 
to incorporate equity concerns in the evaluation of the intervention. 
Step 1 
In Chapter 4, a ‘traditional’ CEA from the HC perspective was conducted. This perspective 
considered health-related costs and health effects only on the offenders. From this first analysis, it 
was concluded that from the HC prospective BA and BLC were probably not cost-effective compared 
to CIL. 
Step 2 
In Chapter 5, a CEA from the CJS perspective was conducted, using avoided reconvictions as a 
measure of effectiveness. From this second analysis, it was concluded that from the CJS perspective 
it was probably cost-effective to invest in BLC, when compared to CIL. 
Step 3 
After modelling the costs and consequences from the CJS perspective, in the first part of Chapter 6 
the narrow CEA from the HC perspective was expanded to incorporate victims’ health costs and 
effects. 
In the ‘traditional’ CEA from the HC provider perspective (carried out in Chapter 4) the focus was 
on costs falling on HC budget and on QALY impacts for trial participants. This approach fails to 
reflect the potential health impacts on victims through the impacts on the CJS. In reality, reductions 
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in criminal activities engender avoided QALY losses for the victims. Moreover, additional HC costs 
savings are generated. 
From a ‘narrow’ HC perspective, the true impacts on health and HC budget can be described by the 
two dashed rectangles A and B in Figure 7.1. These include not only the impacts on offenders’ health 
and the associated HC costs (the blue rectangles), but also the additional impacts on victims’ health 
and the additional costs falling on HC budget to treat the victims of crime (the green rectangles). 
 
Figure 7.1 Scheme of the revised CEA from the HC perspective (Step 3) 
When these additional components were included in the CEA, CIL provided on average positive 
Incremental Net Health Benefits (INHBs). The conclusion of the revised CEAs conducted from the 
HC perspective was to choose BLC, as that intervention provided the greatest INHBs. 
Step 3 revised 
The true impacts of SIPS on health fall on different groups of individuals, namely offenders, victims 
and general population. Potential equity issues might therefore arise when these health impacts 
are aggregated. 
In the analysis previously conducted (Step 3), differential QALYs for offenders and victims were 
simply summed. In other words, the aggregation within the health dimension was simply based on 
the sum the unweighted changes in health across individuals. It was thus implicitly assumed that 
distribution of health effects was not relevant. However, the aggregation within dimension (see 
Sub-section 3.2.2.1) could potentially take into account the distribution of impacts across 
population subgroups, and alternative functional forms representing alternative normative 
judgements are possible (Walker et al., 2019). 
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In this chapter, the third step of the original analysis is revised. Using the methods illustrated in 
Chapter 3, Sub-Section 3.3.3, alternative solutions about how to aggregate health impacts which 
fall on different population subgroups are investigated. 
Step 4 
In the second part of Chapter 6, an analysis from an integrated perspective that considers both the 
HC and CJ sectors was conducted. The aim was to inform decisions to be taken by decision makers. 
The analysis was based on the framework formulated by Claxton et al. (2007), and further 
developed by Sculpher et al. (2014) and Walker et al. (2019). Multiple objectives and impacts on 
multiple budget constraints were included in the evaluation Results of the analysis were used to 
suggest compensation schemes across decision makers. Further details about the framework can 
be found in Chapter 3. 
Step 4 revised 
The cross-sectoral analysis conducted in Chapter 6 (here referred to as ‘Step 4’) was based on the 
results of the original Step 3 of the analysis, and was therefore grounded on the value judgment 
that “a QALY is a QALY”. Nevertheless, if the CEA from the HC perspective is underpinned by 
alternative value judgements, and alternative aggregation functions are used (Step 3 revised), the 
cross-sectoral analysis must be revised as well. 
In this chapter, methods and results of the fourth step of the analysis are revised. The final objective 
of this chapter is to show how the proposed framework can incorporate health equity concerns in 
the cross-sectoral analysis, and inform decisions to be taken from an integrated and broader 
perspective by legitimate decision makers. 
7.1.2.2. Health impacts on different population subgroups affected by SIPS 
As pointed out in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.3.2, CEAs are typically underpinned by the assumption 
that “a QALY is a QALY”, irrespectively of who is the beneficiary (Cookson et al., 2017, Drummond, 
M. et al., 2015). If, on the contrary, alternative value judgements are incorporated in the evaluation, 
it becomes necessary to specify characteristics of the individuals affected by the interventions and 
assess the distribution of health impacts across the population. 
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Health impacts of SIPS fall on three main groups of individuals: offenders treated with the 
intervention, (direct and unknown) victims of crimes and general population bearing the 
opportunity costs41. 
Offenders treated with the intervention 
The intervention had the aim of reducing alcohol misuse and was aimed at individuals on probation. 
Therefore, direct effects of SIPS fell on offenders (on probation) with a history of alcohol misuse. 
Such a population subgroup might be deemed socially marginalised and is characterised on average 
by a lower SES when compared to the general population (Bramley et al., 2015). Because alcohol 
related harms follow a social gradient with the most alcohol related harms experienced by deprived 
socioeconomic groups (Smith & Foster, 2014), the incorporation of health equity concerns might 
affect substantially the results of the analysis. 
Victims 
The group of the victims is in turn composed of two subgroups: direct victims of crimes committed 
by offenders treated with SIPS, and unknown victims who bear the consequences of the OCs 
generated in the CJS. In fact, when CJS displaces resources to accommodate the costs of a new 
intervention, unknown offenders are likely to commit crimes (and hurt unknown victims) as the 
resources for their programmes are displaced. 
General population 
OCs of HC fall on the general population. These costs include also the additional HC costs to treat 
victims of crimes. In fact, this additional component falls on unknown patients that cannot be 
treated due to the resources displaced by the HC system to accommodate the additional HC 
treatments for the victims of crime. Assuming that resources displaced come from the generic HC 
budget, consequences are distributed across all population subgroups. 
7.1.2.3. Two potential value judgments about health inequalities 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.3.2, the perceived unfairness of health inequalities can 
be based on a broad range of other factors. In this chapter, two alternative value judgments are 
explored, and two alternative solutions to aggregate health impacts falling on different population 
                                                          
 




subgroups are proposed. Both analyses are firstly conducted from the ‘narrow’ HC perspective42 
(Step 3 revised). Secondly, a cross-sectoral analysis is carried out (Step 4 revised). 
First scenario 
The first analysis is based on the hypothesis that impacts on victims’ health are valued differently 
from generic health variations. Different weights are therefore assigned to variations in health if 
these are caused by criminal activity. To incorporate this alternative value judgment in the 
evaluation, an equity trade-off analysis based on equity weighting is conducted. Methods were 
introduced in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.3.3.1, and their operationalisation is illustrated in detail in 
Section 7.2. 
Second scenario 
The second analysis is based on the hypothesis that decision makers might want to prioritise 
interventions that benefit disadvantaged and least healthy groups. The impact of this alternative 
value judgment is investigated in Section 7.3, where costs and outcomes of SIPS are disaggregated 
by equity-relevant subgroups, and an equity impact analysis based on a DCEA is conducted. 
7.2. Equity trade-off analysis 
The equity trade-off analysis was introduced in Chapter 3, Sub-Section 3.3.3. Briefly, in the equity 
trade-off analysis, ‘equity weights’ can be used to value health benefits that apply to people with 
characteristics that reflect considerations of fairness or that are disadvantaged because of factors 
beyond their control (Cookson et al., 2017). For example, on the basis of vertical equity 
considerations, the general public might associate a different value (i.e. different weights) to health 
impacts due to someone else’s responsibility, such as medical negligence or malpractice (Brazier et 
al., 2007). Similarly, a different equity weight might be put on health impacts if caused by being a 
victim of crime. 
In this section the equity weighting method proposed by Round and Paulden (2018) and illustrated 
in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.3.3.1, is used to explore the effects of this alternative value judgment. 
                                                          
 
42 The analysis from the HC perspective includes the spill-over effects from CJS on victims’ health and is 
therefore still based on cross-sectoral data. 
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In Sub-section 7.2.1 the methods are described. Results of the analysis from the HC perspective and 
from an integrated perspective are reported in Sub-sections 7.2.2 and 7.2.3, respectively, and are 
discussed in Sub-section 7.2.4. 
Equity weighting and victims of crime 
In Chapter 3, the generic formula to estimate the Incremental Net weighted Health Benefit (INwHB) 
of an intervention was proposed (see Equation 3.11). The generic formula can be adapted to reflect 
the specific value judgment investigated in this analysis, as shown in Equation 7.1. 
𝐼𝑁𝑤𝐻𝐵 = 𝜔 ∗ (𝑄𝑔𝑣 − 𝑄𝑑𝑣) + (𝑄𝑔𝑝 −  𝑄𝑑𝑝) > 0  (7.1) 
Where: Qgv and Qdv are the QALYs gained and displaced by victims of violent crimes, respectively; 
Qgp and Qdp are the QALYs gained and displaced by other patients, respectively; ω represents the 
weight applied to QALYs gained or lost by victims of violent crimes. Because the weight is applied 
only to victims, in this formulation it is assumed that health impacts falling on offenders and general 
population have the same weight. 
Equation 7.1 can be linked to the Equation 6.1 from Chapter 6 (reported again below), which 
describes the full impact of the intervention on HC, including the health spill-over effects on the 
victims of crime. 
𝐼𝑁𝐻𝐵 = (∆𝐻𝑂 + ∆𝐻𝑉) − (
∆𝐶𝐻+∆𝐶𝐻𝑣+∆𝐶𝐻𝑣𝑢
𝑘𝐻
+ ∆𝐻𝑉𝑢)  (6.1) 
Similarly, INwHBs can be expressed in terms of health impacts on offenders’ health, health impacts 
on (direct and unknown) victims and the costs falling on HC budget. 
Resulting DEs (i.e. QALYs gained by victims of violent crimes and other individuals) of the 
intervention can be then computed as shown in Equation 7.2. As previously stressed, the equity 
weight is applied only to victims of crime, therefore the only distinction made is between ‘victims’ 
and ‘other individuals’ (which include also the offenders). Consequently, QALYs gained by victims 
of violent crimes (Qgv) are the variations in direct victims’ health (∆HV), while QALYs gained by other 
individuals (Qgp) are the health impact on offenders’ health (∆HO).  
𝑄𝑔𝑣 = ∆𝐻𝑉   𝑄𝑔𝑝 = ∆𝐻𝑂   (7.2) 
To compute the OCs (i.e. QALYs displaced in patients who are victims of violent crimes and other 
patients) of the intervention it is necessary to disentangle the HC resources used to treat generic 
patients from those used for victims of criminal offences. In other words, how the total costs (which 
179 
 
fall on the HC budget) are generated43 is not relevant, but it is crucial to understand where the 
resources are displaced. In fact, total displaced resources due to costs falling on HC budget affect 
the magnitude of resources that would have been alternatively used to treat both other general 
unknown patients and other unknown victims of violence. Total HC costs are thus disaggregated 
into variations in the resources available for general patients (∆CP) and for victims of crimes (∆CV). 
These components are described more in detail in the next sub-section. 
OCs can be therefore calculated as shown in Equation 7.3. QALYs displaced in victims of violent 
crimes (Qdv) consist of the variations in costs falling on the HC and otherwise used to treat victims 
of crime (∆CV), and the health impacts falling on unknown victims’ health (∆HVu). This latter 
component is generated by the OCs in the CJS. QALYs displaced in other patients (Qdp) are the costs 
falling on the HC and otherwise used to treat general patients (∆CP). Both ∆CV and ∆CP are 
‘converted’ in QALYs using the marginal productivity of the HC sector (kH).  
         𝑄𝑑𝑣 =
∆𝐶𝑉
𝑘𝐻
+ ∆𝐻𝑉𝑢   𝑄𝑑𝑝 =
∆𝐶𝑃
𝑘𝐻
   (7.3) 
To obtain the INwHB associated with the intervention, equity weighting can be applied to DEs and 
OCs as illustrated in Equation 7.1. Resulting INwHB can be computed as shown in Equation 7.4. 
𝐼𝑁𝑤𝐻𝐵 = (∆𝐻𝑂 −
∆𝐶𝑃
𝑘𝐻
) + 𝜔 (∆𝐻𝑉 −
∆𝐶𝑉
𝑘𝐻
− ∆𝐻𝑉𝑢)  (7.4) 
Two operations are required before being able to operationalise the INwHB formula illustrated in 
Equation 7.4. Firstly, in order to compute the amount of QALYs displaced in victims of violent crimes 
and in the general population, the proportions of victims and general population treated by the 
NHS must be estimated. This issue is discussed in in Sub-section 7.2.1.1. Secondly, it is necessary to 
find an appropriate weight to be applied to impacts on the health of victims of violent crimes. This 
is discussed in Sub-section 7.2.1.2. 
7.2.1.1. Health care opportunity costs falling on victims of crime 
As stressed in Sub-section 3.3.3.1, in order not to violate the principle of horizontal equity, equity 
weights must also be taken into account when assessing the OCs. The amount of victims’ QALYs 
displaced must be therefore estimated and weighted accordingly. For this reason, it is necessary to 
determine the proportion of victims in the general population treated by HC services. 
                                                          
 
43 These are given by the sum of: costs to treat offenders (∆CH) additional costs due to the HC services for 
victims (∆CHv) and unknown victims (∆CHvu) (see Chapter 6, Equation 6.1). 
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Data about finished admission episodes (FAEs)44 and accident and emergency (A&E) attendances 
can give an idea of the overall activity of the National Health Service (NHS). A report published by 
the NHS Digital (2012) provided details on Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) data about admissions 
and attendances due to assault in the period from April 2011 to March 2012 in England. These are 
the only data publicly available containing information about admissions due to assaults. It was 
therefore assumed that proportions observed during this specific interval of time can be 
generalised to different years. According to the report, 15.0 million FAEs were recorded in that year, 
and assaults accounted for 38,766 FAEs. Moreover, with regard to the A&E HES, 17.6 million A&E 
attendances were recorded, and there were 185,941 A&E attendances as a result of assault. 
Only data about assault were available. These numbers certainly under-estimate the total FAEs and 
A&E attendances due to generic violent crimes. In fact, according to the Home Office Statistical 
Bulletin (Chaplin, Flately & Smith, 2011), 67% of the crimes with consequences on health 45 
committed in 2010 were assaults, while 33% were other offences with consequences on health. 
Therefore, the 38,766 FAEs and 185,941 A&E attendances due to assaults represent approximately 
67% of the total criminal offences with consequences on health. A crude estimate of the total 
number of FAEs and A&E events due to violent criminal offences can be obtained by multiplying the 
FAEs and A&E events due to assault for a factor of 1.5. Results are summarised in Table 7.1. 
Category No. of events 
% of total 
events 
Finished admission episodes (FAEs) 15,000,000   
  FAEs due to assaults 38,766 0.26% 
  FAEs due to violent criminal offences 57,840 0.39% 
A&E attendances  17,600,000   
  A&E attendances as a result of assault 185,941 1.06% 
  A&E attendances due to violent criminal offences 277,429 1.58% 
Table 7.1 FAEs and A&E attendances due to crime 
There is a higher percentage (1.58%) of A&E attendances due to violent criminal offences compared 
to FAEs (0.39%). Such a discrepancy might be due to the types of injuries. It is probably more likely 
for a victim to end up in A&E rather than being admitted. Assuming that these proportions are 
constant in time, and keeping in mind that this work is mostly illustrative, it can be concluded that 
                                                          
 
44 A finished admission episode is the first period of inpatient care under one consultant within one health 
care provider (NHS Digital, 2012). 
45 According to the report, 12.2% of all crimes committed in 2010 had consequences on health, and 87.8% 
were other offences without (estimated) consequences on health, such as criminal damage, violence without 
injury and theft. It is acknowledged that even these crimes might have actually health consequences on the 
victims. This is a simplifying assumption, due also to the lack of data. 
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on average approximately 1% of the activity of the NHS is devoted to treating victims of criminal 
offences. 
When introducing equity weights, health impacts on direct and unknown victims are weighted 
differently. The same equity weight applied to health outcomes for DEs can be now used also to 
adjust the OCs. In fact, 1% of the OCs of an intervention displacing HC resources are estimated to 
fall on victims of crime. The equity weight must be therefore applied. The remaining part (99%) of 
the OCs falls on generic patients and no equity weight is applied. 
7.2.1.2. Equity weight for impacts on victims’ health 
As mentioned at the end of Sub-section 7.2.1, to implement the equity weighting summarised in 
Equation 7.4 it is necessary to find an appropriate weight (ω) to be applied to impacts on the health 
of victims of violent crimes. 
Such a parameter is not available in the literature. Given the exploratory purpose of this analysis, it 
has been decided to use a hypothetical weight of 2. A threshold analysis will be conducted to 
investigate weight values that would be required to change the recommended decisions. 
Incorporating an equity weight of 2 in the analysis implies that QALYs gained or lost by victims of 
violent crimes are valued twice as important as health impacts falling on other individuals. It must 
be stressed again that in this analysis only consequences falling on victims were valued differently. 
All other health impacts were treated equally. For instance, consequences on offenders treated 
with the intervention were compared to any other health impacts falling on the general population.  
This limitation is further discussed at the end of this section, before introducing the equity impact 
analysis. 
CEA of SIPS from the HC perspective including equity weights 
As explained in Sub-section 7.1.2, the first objective of this analysis is to revise the results of the 
original CEA of SIPS conducted from the HC perspective without equity weighting (i.e. Step 3). The 
second objective, illustrated in the next sub-section, is to revise the cross sectoral evaluation of the 
intervention (i.e. Step 4). 
According to the ‘traditional’ CEA (conducted in Chapter 3), both interventions are associated with 
negative INHBs when compared to CIL. On the contrary, when the additional components (i.e. QALY 
losses avoided by victims and additional HC costs savings) are included in the CEA (Chapter 6), while 
INHBs of BA remain negative, BLC appears to be cost-effective from the HC perspective. 
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Equity weights can be incorporated in the CEA from the HC perspective using the methods 
illustrated in Sub-section 7.2.1. Impacts of BA and BLC are compared to CIL and have been 
disentangled into ‘traditional’ estimates and additional components. The ‘traditional’ estimate is 
the result of the CEA without considering the impacts on victims’ health. Results are presented in 
Table 7.2, where costs are expressed in QALYs using the marginal productivity of the HC sector (kH) 
to convert monetary impacts in QALY variations. Cost savings are expressed as negative OCs and 
INwHBs are obtained as the difference between DEs and OCs.  
Group affected 
'Traditional' estimate Additional component Total 
DE OC DE OC DE OC 
Brief advice (BA) vs CIL 
Offenders -0.010     -0.010   
Victims    0.033  0.033   
Unknown victims     -0.001   -0.001 
General population   0.029   -0.020   0.009 
INwHB -0.039 QALYs 0.054 QALYs 0.015 QALYs 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling (BLC) vs CIL 
Offenders -0.018      -0.018   
Victims    0.043   0.043   
Unknown victims     -0.001   -0.001 
General population   -0.018   -0.026   -0.044 
INwHB 0.000 QALYs 0.070 QALYs 0.070 QALYs 
Table 7.2 CEA of SIPS from HC perspective including equity weights (Step 3 revised) 
Compared to original estimates without equity weighting (reported in Chapter 6, Table 6.7), the 
only difference in the ‘traditional’ analysis is that now OCs take into consideration the impact of 
displacing resources for victims. In fact, even if health impacts on (direct and unknown) victims are 
not included, 1% of the health care OCs still fall on other unidentifiable victims. Results of the 
‘traditional’ CEA are therefore slightly different. INHBs associated with BLC previously estimated 
were negative (-0.001 QALYs). This is because BLC was associated with negative health 
consequences, but also cost savings. Nevertheless, cost savings could not offset the negative impact 
on offenders’ health. On the contrary, in this analysis, INHBs associated with BLC are zero. This is 
because the negative OCs associated with BLC become more valuable due to the higher value 
associated with additional resources available for victims of violence. Cost savings offset the 
negative impact on offenders’ health. 
When the additional component is incorporated in the analysis, DEs on (both unknown and direct) 
victims and 1% of the additional OCs are weighted using ω. Overall INwHBs are higher when 
compared to the original analysis. BA and BLC are now associated with INwHBs of 0.015 QALYs 
(previous estimate: -0.002 QALYs) and 0.070 QALYs (previous estimate: 0.048 QALYs), respectively. 
According to this analysis, BLC is still the overall cost-effective option, being the intervention that 
183 
 
provides the highest INwHBs. However, compared to the results without equity weighting, the main 
difference is that INwHBs associated with BA become positive (even though BA is still dominated 
by BLC). 
In this analysis, a hypothetical weight of 2 was used to value impacts on victims’ health. A threshold 
analysis was conducted in order to investigate the minimum equity weight necessary to make 
INwHBs associated with BA positive. It was found that the tipping point for the equity weight to 
switch the sign of the average INwHBs associated with BA was 1.1. Incremental Net weighted 
Benefits (INwBs), expressed both in natural and monetary units, corresponding to an equity weight 
of 1.1 are reported in Appendix P. 
Incorporating equity weights in the cross-sectoral analysis of SIPS 
In the analysis carried out in Sub-section 7.2.2, the perspective adopted was still the narrow 
viewpoint of the HC system. Cross-sectoral data were only used to estimate health impacts on 
victims. The ultimate goal of the proposed framework is to incorporate equity concerns in a full 
cross-sectoral analysis conducted from an integrated perspective (Step 4 revised). New estimates 
from the analysis conducted in Sub-section 7.2.2 (which now incorporate also equity concerns) can 
be used to inform a cross-sectoral analysis from an integrated perspective that includes DEs and 
OCs falling on both HC and CJ sectors. 
As illustrated in Chapter 6, impacts on health and crime can be aggregated using the social valuation 
(VH) of a health outcome (i.e. a QALY) and the social valuation (VR) of a CJ outcome (i.e. an avoided 
episode of recidivism). Simplifying assumptions such assuming a constant ratio of v over k across 
sectors can be employed to compensate the lack of data for sectors other than HC46. Health and CJ 
benefits can be aggregated to obtain the societal Incremental Net Monetary Benefits (INMBs) as 
shown in Equation 6.2 (see Chapter 6, Sub-section 6.3.1). If equity weights are incorporated in the 
analysis, the same formulation can be used, but using INwHBs instead of INHBs. Resulting 
Incremental Net weighted Monetary Benefits (INwMBs) including equity weights can be therefore 
obtained as illustrated in Equation 7.5. 
𝐼𝑁𝑤𝑀𝐵 = 𝑉𝐻 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑤𝐻𝐵 + 𝑉𝑅 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐵   (7.5) 
                                                          
 
46 Borrowing evidence from the HC sector, being VH ≈ £60,000 (Glover & Henderson, 2010) and kH ≈ £13,000 
(Claxton, Martin, et al., 2015), it can be assumed that all v’s are about 4.6 times bigger than k’s across sectors. 
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Cross-sectoral INwMBs of BA and BLC compared to CIL are reported in Table 7.3.  
Group affected 




DE OC DE OC DE OC 
Brief advice (BA) 
Offenders 
-130 £   5610 £   
25208 £ 
 
(-0.010 QALYs)  (0.51 R)    
Unknown offenders 
    -496 £  
-2280 £     (-0.05 R)  
Victims 
431 £      
1985 £ 
 
(0.033 QALYs)       
Unknown victims  
-9 £      
-44 £ 
 (-0.001 QALYs)     
 
General population 
 112 £      
515 £ 
  (0.009 QALYs)      
INwMB 
199 £ 6106 £ 
29001 £ 
(0.015 QALYs) (0.56 R) 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling (BLC) 
Offenders 
-234 £   7260 £   
32320 £ 
 
(-0.018 QALYs)  (0.66 R)    
Unknown offenders 
    -631 £  
-2903 £     (-0.06 R)  
Victims 
558 £      
2568 £ 
 
(0.043 QALYs)       
Unknown victims  
-12 £      
-56 £ 
 (-0.001 QALYs)     
 
General population 
 -572 £      
-2631 £ 
  (-0.044 QALYs)      
INwMB 
908 £ 7891 £ 
40478 £ 
(0.070 QALYs) (0.72 R) 
Table 7.3 Cross-sectoral INwMBs of BA and BLC compared to CIL (Step 4 revised) 
Results resemble the original cross-sectoral analysis, conducted in Chapter 6. Similarly to the 
findings presented in Sub-section 6.3.2 and summarised in Table 6.11, from an integrated and 
broader perspective BLC appears to be the overall cost-effective treatment option. Nevertheless, 
when equity weights are incorporated in the analysis, the implementation of both BA and BLC 
would not require any compensation across sectors. This is because BA and BLC are on average 
cost-effective from both the HC and CJS perspective. 
Discussion 
Equity-weighting analysis should not be used as an algorithm for making decisions, but as an aid to 
deliberation, used to assist decision-makers and stakeholders in exploring the implications of 
alternative value judgements about equity (Cookson et al., 2017). In this section the focus is on 
victims’ health, but alternative equity considerations could be investigated using the same 
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methods. For example, empirical evidence suggested that some inequalities in health might be 
considered less inequitable than others if they are attributed to individual responsibility. Less 
priority might be assigned to those who are considered to be in some way responsible for their ill 
health (Dolan & Tsuchiya, 2009). Consequently, it might be argued that a lower equity weight could 
be put on offenders’ health, to distinguish them from general population. However, evidence is not 
conclusive. The priority could still be to treat those who have less lifetime health, independently of 
their responsibility (Edlin, Tsuchiya & Dolan, 2012). Moreover, the ethical implications of 
introducing such an adjustment would have to be discussed. 
The equity weighting approach illustrated in this section has the advantage of being relatively easy 
to implement. Nonetheless, the risk is that the evaluation becomes context dependent and 
undermines the comparability of the results across different public health areas. For example, the 
value judgment explored in this section (i.e. the prioritisation victims’ health) might be deemed 
appropriate for this very specific context, but not relevant in many other cases. In fact, in this 
analysis, any other potentially disadvantaged group (e.g. due to age, burden of illness etc.) did 
actually receive a lower weight compared to victims of crime. 
The objective of this work is to develop a framework which is flexible, but context independent in 
its general formulation. For this reason, if equity weighting is incorporated in the evaluation, then 
it would be necessary to introduce a set of weights to be applied to all categories of individuals with 
characteristics that reflect considerations of fairness. Incorporating these ‘universal principles’ in 
the analysis would allow to implement the same methods to different context and compare the 
results across different areas of public health. Nevertheless, the operationalisation of such a 
framework would be much more complex and hindered by data availability. 
Alternatively, an overarching equity principle applicable to all evaluations could be based on the 
potentially inequitable association between SES and health (Love-Koh et al., 2015). The effect of 
incorporating in the economic evaluation of SIPS a value judgment that aims at prioritising benefits 
falling on more disadvantaged population subgroups is explored in the next section.  
186 
 
7.3. Equity impact analysis 
Introduced in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.3.3.2, the equity impact analysis quantifies the distribution 
of costs and effects by equity-relevant variables (Cookson et al., 2017). For example, as illustrated 
in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.3.2.1, the positive correlation between SES and health (in terms of 
QALEs) might be deemed unfair and unjust (Love-Koh et al., 2015, Marmot et al., 2010). An equity 
impact analysis can be therefore carried out to examine the distribution of DEs and OCs broken 
down by SES subgroups, and assess the impact of the intervention on heath equity. 
In the proposed framework, the DCEA (Asaria, Griffin & Cookson, 2016) was chosen as the analytical 
technique to conduct the equity impact analysis. Methods to conduct a DCEA were already 
illustrated in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.3.3.2. The objective of this section is to carry out a DCEA of 
SIPS, and show how to incorporate its results in the cross-sectoral evaluation. The analysis plan of 
the DCEA is described in the next sub-section. 
Analysis plan of the DCEA of SIPS 
This operationalisation of the DCEA reflects the approach employed by Love-Koh et al. (2018) for 
the analysis of NICE public health guidelines. Similarly to their analysis, it is assumed that the DEs 
of the intervention follow the distribution of prevalence of the target population by SES subgroup. 
In other words, in order to assess the distributional impact on offenders’ health, firstly the 
prevalence of offenders with alcohol issues (i.e. the target population) by SES subgroup is 
estimated. Secondly, the treatment effect is simply applied to all potential recipients of the 
intervention. The estimation of the DEs on offenders’ health is explained in detail in Sub-section 
7.3.2. 
In Sub-section 7.3.3, population costs are converted into population health OCs, and their 
distribution by SES is estimated. In Sub-section 7.3.4, the distributional impact of DEs and OCs falling 
on direct and unknown victims is estimated. Due to the lack of data, it is assumed that the 
prevalence of victims of crime by SES is the same as offenders’ prevalence. 
Once estimates of health DEs and population health OCs by SES are available, the distribution of 
population INHBs by SES can be calculated as the DEs net of the OCs. INHBs of SIPS by SES are 
reported at the beginning of Sub-section 7.3.5. Moreover, using the distribution of pre-intervention 
lifetime health available in the literature (Love-Koh et al., 2015), whether net health impacts of the 
intervention affect the unequal distribution of health at baseline can be assessed. Variations in 
inequality indexes and results of the DCEA of SIPS are illustrated in Sub-section 7.3.5. 
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Finally, in Sub-section 7.3.6, results of the DCEA are incorporated in the cross-sectoral analysis of 
SIPS. 
Distributional impact on offenders 
Due to the limited sample size of the SIPS trial and the lack of detailed information about the 
offenders involved in the study, it was not possible to estimate the heterogeneous effects of the 
intervention for different SES subgroups. For this reason, in this analysis it was assumed that 
intervention effects follow the distribution of prevalence of offenders who misuse alcohol. 
Prevalence rates were converted into absolute numbers using population data to obtain the 
number of potential recipients for each SES subgroup (assessed using the income deprivation at 
local authority level). Subgroup impacts were calculated by multiplying intervention DEs for the 
number of potential recipients in each SES subgroup. 
7.3.2.1. Prevalence of offenders with alcohol issues by Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 
Classification based on the Offender Assessment System (OASys) 
The National Offender Management Service usually assigns offenders to one of four ‘tiers’, based 
on a number of factors such as the risk of reoffending and risk of serious harm. As the tier number 
rises (Tier 1 is the lowest, and offenders on community sentences belong to Tiers 2–4), there is an 
increase in risk, the needs of the offender, demands of the sentence and the level of resource 
needed to manage them (Ministry of Justice, 2013)47. Additional information about the prevalence 
of needs and risks among offender groups is provided by the Offender Assessment System (OASys). 
OASys is a system for assessing offenders’ risks and needs in terms of the likelihood of reconviction, 
risk of harm to the public, and other eight criminogenic needs (i.e. offending-related factors), 
including alcohol misuse (Ministry of Justice, 2013)48. 
In 2013, the Ministry of Justice reported that 35% of the offenders with a community or suspended 
sentence order were identified as having an alcohol misuse need, according to the OASys 
classification. Moreover, 16% of offenders under post-release supervision were assessed as having 
issues related to alcohol misuse. However, OASys assessments are not required for all offenders. 
                                                          
 
47 As reported in the Probation Circular 08/2008 (National Offender Management Service, 2008), the four 
tiers represent different levels of intervention: Tier 1 = Punish; Tier 2 = Punish and Help; Tier 3 = Punish and 
Help and Change; Tier 4 = Punish and Help and Change and Control. 
48 The full list includes: accommodation, education, training and employment, relationships, lifestyle and 
associates, drug misuse, alcohol misuse, and thinking and behaviour and attitudes. 
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Therefore, OASys data should not be read as representative of the entire offending population 
(Ministry of Justice, 2013) . These numbers can help to provide a broad idea of the magnitude of 
the prevalence of alcohol misuse among offenders, but reliable estimates of potential recipients 
per SES subgroup could not be calculated. 
Severe and Multiple Disadvantage (SMD) classification 
An alternative option is to use the ‘severe and multiple disadvantage’ (SMD) classification, 
developed by the analysts of the Lankelly Chase Foundation (Bramley et al., 2015). SMD index 
identifies adults involved in the homelessness, substance misuse and CJS in England. To obtain such 
classification, various datasets from offender, substance misuse and homeless services were 
employed, and information was integrated with additional administrative datasets. The population 
was divided into three categories: SMD1, experiencing one disadvantage domain only (i.e. 
‘homelessness only’, ‘offending only’, or ‘substance misuse only’); SMD2, experiencing two out of 
three disadvantage domains (i.e. ‘homelessness & offending’; ‘substance misuse & offending’; 
‘substance misuse & homelessness’); SMD3, experiencing all three disadvantage domains. 
Bramley et al. (2015) reported 58,000 cases of SMD3, with a prevalence rate of 0.15%, calculated 
as percentage of the adult working age (16-64) population of England. The association between 
SMD3 prevalence rates and IMD was also investigated. Figure 7.2 is an adaptation of the original 
picture from the report, and shows that a higher relative prevalence of SMD3 is associated with 
lower IMD quantiles. Approximately one third of the total cases of SDM3 are observed in the 
subgroup with the lowest IMD. 
 
Figure 7.2 Relative prevalence of SMD3, adapted from Bramley et al. (2015) 
Specifically, for SMD2, 164,000 cases were reported, with a prevalence rate of 0.42%. Of these, 

































prevalence rate of this subgroup (0.25%) was not available in the original report and was estimated 
from the number of observations. Assuming that SMD2 (and in particular to the subgroup 
‘substance misuse & offending’) has the same distribution across IMD quantiles as SMD3, resulting 
prevalence (i.e. percentage of the total 16-64 English population) is illustrated in Table 7.4. 
IMD quantile 
SMD2 (substances & offending) 
relative prevalence 
SMD2 (substances & offending) 
prevalence in the 16-64 population 
Q1 – poorest 33.40% 0.08% 
Q2 23.40% 0.06% 
Q3 20.00% 0.05% 
Q4 13.20% 0.03% 
Q5 – richest 10.00% 0.03% 
Total 100.00% 0.25% 
Table 7.4 Prevalence of SMD2 subgroup ‘substance misuse & offending’ 
In the SMD classification, ‘substance misuse’ was defined as “participating in publicly funded 
treatment for dependence on drugs or alcohol” (Bramley et al., 2015). For this reason, on the one 
hand the prevalence rate of 0.25% might overestimate the population that could be treated with 
SIPS. The SMD2 subgroup ‘substance misuse and offending’ includes in fact all types of substance 
misuses, and not only alcohol. SIPS is instead targeted specifically and only to offenders with alcohol 
misuse issues. On the other hand, the administrative data-led approach used for the estimation of 
the SMD categories considers only individuals who are already in touch with relevant services. 
Estimated prevalence rate might be therefore a reasonable estimate of the true prevalence of 
offenders who misuse alcohol. 
Using the prevalence of SMD2 for the adult working age population of England, the number of 
potential recipients of the SIPS could be therefore estimated and compared to the total population 
in 2010 (Office for National Statistics, 2017). Results are reported in Table 7.5. 
IMD Total population Adult working age 16-64 Potential recipients 
Q1 10,541,505 6,824,097 28,892 
Q2 10,663,393 7,102,625 20,241 
Q3 10,560,965 6,886,727 17,300 
Q4 10,483,579 6,748,755 11,418 
Q5 10,395,075 6,555,841 8,650 
Overall 52,644,517 34,118,045 86,502 
Table 7.5 Potential recipients of SIPS by IMD quantile 
190 
 
Prisoners and alcohol misusers are characterised by higher deprivation levels, compared to the 
general population. Therefore, more potential recipients of SIPS can be found in lower IMD 
subgroups. 
7.3.2.2. Impacts on offender population: results 
In the analysis of SIPS from the HC perspective (see Chapter 4, Table 4.13) it was found that the DEs 
falling on offenders were -0.010 QALYs and -0.018 QALYs for BA and BLC, respectively. Impacts on 
offender population (expressed in QALYs) were obtained by multiplying the DEs of the intervention 
for the number of potential recipients. Results are shown in Table 7.6. 
IMD BA vs CIL BLC vs CIL 
Q1 -289 -520 
Q2 -202 -364 
Q3 -173 -311 
Q4 -114 -206 
Q5 -87 -156 
Total -865 QALYs -1557 QALYs 
Table 7.6 Impacts (measured in QALYs) on offender population 
DEs of SIPS fall on the particularly disadvantaged group of individuals on probation with alcohol 
issues. Population negative health impacts of BA and BLC are therefore unequally distributed and 
cause more harm to lower SES subgroups. It must be remembered however that such estimate of 
the distributional impact of intervention’s DEs is a crude estimate that does not take into account 
potential heterogeneous treatment effects. 
Distributional impact on general population 
Health OCs of SIPS falling on general population (including the additional HC costs to treat victims 
of crime) for BA and BLC are on average 0.009 QALYs and -0.044 QALYs, respectively (see Chapter 
6, Table 6.7). These estimates can be multiplied for the number of potential recipients of SIPS 
(86,502, as reported in Table 7.5), to compute the total population health OCs. Resulting population 
health OCs of BA and BLC were estimated to be approximately 738 QALYs and -3,769 QALYs, 
respectively. 
From the total population health OCs of the intervention, the distribution of population health OCs 
by SES can be computed. Love-Koh et al. (2016) explored the socioeconomic distribution of OCs in 
the English NHS, and provided the distribution of the impact on the population bearing the OCs 
according to their SES, measured by IMD quintile group. As illustrated in the first column of Table 
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7.7, individuals in the lower IMD quantiles bear a higher proportion of the health OCs (Love-Koh et 
al., 2016). 
Using the information on the distributional impacts of the OCs of NHS activity, it is possible to map 
where the population health OCs of SIPS fall. The resulting distribution of the OCs of BA and BLC on 
the five IMD population’s subgroups is illustrated in Table 7.7. 
IMD 
Proportion of total OCs 
falling on IMD subgroup* 
Population health OCs 
(QALYs) 
BA BLC 
Q1 26% 192 -980 
Q2 22% 162 -829 
Q3 22% 162 -829 
Q4 16% 118 -603 
Q5  14% 103 -528 
Total 100% 738 -3769 
* Adapted from Love-Koh (2016) 
Table 7.7 Distributional impact of population health OCs of SIPS by IMD quantiles 
OCs associated with BA and BLC are unequally distributed. BA is associated with higher OCs falling 
on lower IMD subgroups. On the contrary, higher cost savings (negative OCs) associated with BLC 
are experienced by individuals with lower IMD levels. For example, 192 QALYs and 103 QALYs are 
displaced from the first and fifth quantile of the BA group, respectively. Individuals with lower SES 
bear higher OCs associated with BA. On the contrary, 980 QALYs and 528 QALYs are gained by the 
first and fifth quantile of the BLC group, respectively. 
Distributional impacts on (direct and unknown) victims 
Reductions in criminal activity generate positive health consequences for the victims due to avoided 
QALY losses. Two last components must be included in the analysis, namely: the DEs on victims of 
crimes committed by offenders treated with SIPS, and the OCs falling on unknown victims.  
Net health impacts on the victims are given by the DEs on victims net of OCs falling on unknown 
victims. Impacts on direct and unknown victims associated with BA were found to be 0.017 QALYs 
(DEs) and -0.0004 QALYs (OCs), respectively. Impacts on direct and unknown victims associated 
with BLC were 0.021 QALYs (DEs) and -0.0005 QALYs (OCs), respectively (see Chapter 6, Table 6.7). 
Therefore, INHBs on (direct and unknown) victims associated with BA and BLC were 0.017 and 0.021 
QALYs, respectively. Given the total number of potential recipients of SIPS (86,502, see Table 7.5), 
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population health effects falling on victims were estimated to be 1,467 QALYs and 1,898 QALYs for 
BA and BLC, respectively. 
Due to the lack of information about the distribution of the effects falling on victims, it was assumed 
that their distribution follows offenders’ prevalence. It might be in fact sensible to hypothesise that 
victims share some characteristics with the offenders (e.g. they share similar SES). It was thus 
assumed that impacts on victims were distributed as reported in Figure 7.2. If the prevalence of 
victims and offenders is similar across IMD subgroups, reductions in criminal activity 
disproportionately benefit individuals with lower SES. The resulting population INHBs falling on 
victims by IMD subgroup is illustrated in Table 7.8. 
IMD BA BLC 
Q1 490 634 
Q2 343 444 
Q3 293 380 
Q4 194 251 
Q5  147 190 
Total 1467 QALYs 1898 QALYs 
Table 7.8 Distributional impacts on victims 
As expected, greater health benefits (associated with reductions in criminal activity) are 
experienced by individuals with lower IMD levels. For example, 490 (637) QALYs are gained by the 
BA (BLC) group with the lowest SES, compared to 147 (190) QALYs gained by the group with the 
highest SES. 
Results of the DCEA of SIPS 
Total population INHBs are given by the DEs on offender population net of the population health 
OCs, plus the INHBs on victims. Total population INHBs by IMD quantile associated with BA and BLC 












Brief advice (BA) 
Q1 -289 192 490 9 
Q2 -202 162 343 -22 
Q3 -173 162 293 -42 
Q4 -114 118 194 -39 
Q5 -87 103 147 -43 
Total -865 QALYs 738 QALYs 1467 QALYs -136 QALYs 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling (BLC) 
Q1 -520 -980 634 1094 
Q2 -364 -829 444 909 
Q3 -311 -829 380 897 
Q4 -206 -603 251 648 
Q5 -156 -528 190 562 
Total -1557 QALYs -3769 QALYs 1898 QALYs 4110 QALYs 
Table 7.9 Population INHBs by SES 
Looking at the DEs falling on offenders, greater negative health impacts falling on lower SES 
subgroups are associated with both BA and BLC. Focusing on the impacts on victims’ health, greater 
benefits are experienced by more disadvantaged subgroups treated with both BA and BLC. The 
main difference between BA and BLC is in the distribution of OCs falling on the general population. 
Due to negative OCs (cost savings), BLC is associated with positive impacts health, especially for low 
IMD subgroups. On the contrary, BA is associated with higher OCs, falling particularly on more 
deprived subgroups. 
Compared to CIL, total population INHBs of BA and BLC are -136 QALYs and 4,110 QALYs, 
respectively. If the focus of the analysis is on cost-effectiveness, it can be therefore concluded that 
on average total INHBs associated with BA are negative, and total INHBs associated with BLC are 
positive. If the focus is on health equity (i.e. health inequalities across SES subgroups), the 
distribution of total health impacts of SIPS can be assessed. The distribution of population INHBs 




Figure 7.3 Incremental population health impact of BA and BLC compared to CIL, by IMD 
Visually, it appears that both BA and BLC reduce health inequalities and are therefore equity-
focused. Greater benefits fall on the most disadvantaged sub-groups, and benefits gradually 
declines for richer subgroups. In particular, BA is associated with (small but) negative impacts falling 
on less disadvantaged subgroups. 
Impact on health equity can be expressed using the Atkinson index of inequality A(ε) (Atkinson, A. 
B., 1970), which is a function of population’s inequality aversion (See Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.3.3.2, 
for further details). The value of the inequality aversion parameter ε was estimated to be on 
average 10.95 for the general public in England. Intuitively, such a value means that a marginal 
improvement of health for the individual in lowest IMD quantile is associated with a weight of 5.6 
when compared to a marginal improvement of health for the individual in the highest IMD 
quantile49 (Robson et al., 2017). 
Both BA and BLC are associated with reductions in A(ε) and therefore to an improvement in health 
equity. The Health Equity Impact Plane can be used to summarise the results of the DCEA, in terms 
of both cost-effectiveness and equity impact. Cost-effectiveness (population INHBs) is represented 
on the vertical axis, and net health equity impact on the horizontal axis (Cookson et al., 2017). The 
sign of net equity impact is reversed (i.e. increases in -A(ε) represent an improvement in health 
                                                          
 
49 This indirect equity weight was obtained taking the partial derivative of the EDEH with respect to health at 
baseline of the individual in the most disadvantaged group divided by the partial derivative of the EDEH with 
respect to health at baseline of the individual in the least disadvantaged group. 
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equality) to resemble the cost-effectiveness plane (Love-Koh et al., 2018). The health equity impact 
plane for BA and BLC is illustrated in Figure 7.4. 
 
Figure 7.4 Health Equity Impact Plane for SIPS 
Average impact associated with BLC falls in the ‘win-win’ quadrant of delivering health gains and 
reducing health inequity insofar as it disproportionately benefits socially disadvantaged groups 
(Cookson et al., 2017). BLC is therefore not only cost-effective, but also provides a greater 
improvement in health equity, compared to BA. BA is associated on average to negative population 
INHBs and a smaller improvement in health equity. 
Regardless of the degree of inequality aversion, BLC is always worthwhile. With regard to BA, a 
sensitivity analysis around the inequality aversion parameter can be performed. Figure 7.5 reports 
the EDEH associated with BA compared to CIL for inequality aversion parameter values ranging from 




Figure 7.5 Sensitivity analysis around the inequality aversion parameter 
The larger the degree of inequality aversion, the more worthwhile BA becomes compared to CIL. 
However, the tipping point where impact on EDEH becomes positive is associated with an inequality 
aversion parameter of approximately 28, which is unlikely to be reasonable. In fact, an indirect 
equity weight of 28 would imply weighting marginal health impacts falling on the most deprived 
individuals’ health 80 times more than health impacts falling on the least deprived individuals. 
7.3.5.1. Alternative DCEA excluding health and HC impacts falling on victims 
Results presented in this section take into account also the impacts on victims of crime. To illustrate 
the importance of considering the full impact of the intervention, the same analysis was performed 
from the ‘traditional’ narrow HC perspective (i.e. without incorporating also health spill-overs on 
victims through the CJS and the associated additional HC costs). 
As reported in Appendix Q, results were drastically different. Both BA and BLC appeared to be 
neither cost-effective nor likely to improve health equity. Conclusions and recommendations from 
the DCEA would thus differ according to the inclusion or exclusion of cross-sectoral health spill-over 
effects. 
Incorporating DCEA results in the cross-sectoral analysis of SIPS 
In the analysis conducted in Sub-section 7.3.5, the perspective adopted was the narrow viewpoint 
of the HC system. The aim of this sub-section is to use the results of the DCEA to inform a cross-
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sectoral analysis conducted from an integrated perspective that incorporates health equity 
concerns (Step 4 revised). 
In the original cross-sectoral analysis conducted in Chapter 6, Section 6.3, total impact on the HC 
sector was summarised using INHB. In the revised cross-sectoral analysis conducted in Sub-section 
7.2.3, equity weights were incorporated and the impact on the HC sector was summarised using 
INwHB instead of INHB. In this analysis, in order to take into account impacts in both total health 
and health distribution, variations in the EDEH were employed to summarise the impact of the 
intervention from the HC perspective. In fact, as explained previously in Chapter 3, Sub-section 
3.3.3, EDEH represents the level of health per person which, if equally distributed, would give the 
same level of social welfare as the original distribution (Asaria, Griffin & Cookson, 2016). 
The original equation to compute the INMBs (see Equation 6.2 in Chapter 6) can be adapted using 
variations in EDEH instead of INHB. The resulting cross-sectoral monetary benefits include therefore 
equity weights associated with health impacts falling on different subgroups, and are called 
INwMBs. It must be stressed that this estimate of the INwMB cannot be compared to the results 
presented in the previous section because those were based on different equity weights and on a 
different method to assess health impact (i.e. equity weighting). 
Recalling the usual assumptions employed in this case study (i.e. constant ratio v/k), resulting 
INwMBs can be obtained as illustrated in Equation 7.6.  
𝐼𝑁𝑤𝑀𝐵 = 𝑉𝐻 ∗ 𝛥𝐸𝐷𝐸 + 𝑉𝑅 ∗ 𝐼𝑁𝑅𝐵   (7.6) 
When the inequality aversion parameter ε is equal to 0, the distribution of health impacts is not 
relevant and results are the same as the cross-sectoral analysis carried out in Chapter 6. This is 
because no weights are associated with health impacts falling on different population subgroups, 
and variations in EDE correspond to the INHBs reported previously in Table 6.11 (i.e. -0.002 QALYs 
for BA and 0.048 QALYs for BLC). Resulting INwMBs are therefore identical to the INMBs calculated 
in Chapter 6. 
As ε increases, higher weights are put on the more disadvantaged subgroup. Assuming ε to be equal 
to 10.95 (Robson et al., 2017), variations in EDEH associated with BA and BLC are -0.001 QALYs and 
0.055 QALYs, respectively. Both values are higher than the INHBs originally calculated. This is 
because both BA and BLC contribute to reduce health inequalities. Cross-sectoral INwMBs (based 
on a DCEA with ε = 10.95) of BA and BLC compared to CIL are reported in Table 7.10. 
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 Health Care Sector Criminal Justice System INwMB 
BA 
-12 £ 6,106 £ 
28,032 £ 
(-0.001 QALYs) (0.56 R) 
BLC 
713 £ 7,891 £ 
39,578 £ 
(0.055 QALYs) (0.72 R) 
Table 7.10 Cross-sectoral INwMBs (based on DCEA) of BA and BLC compared to CIL 
Compared to the original cross-sectoral analysis, INwMB values associated with BA and BLC are 
slightly higher than the INMBs estimated in Chapter 6. This is because INwMBs now reflect the 
beneficial impact of the intervention in reducing health inequities. Nevertheless, in terms of 
decision making, no differences can be observed. BLC is still the overall cost-effective option from 
an integrated perspective and requires no compensation across sectors to be implemented. BA is 
associated with positive (but lower) INwMBs, but to be implemented it would require the CJS to 
compensate the HC sector. 
7.4. Final remarks 
In this chapter, the impacts of two alternative value judgments were assessed. In the first part, 
using an equity weighting analysis, how to put higher value on victims’ health was investigated. In 
the second part, it was assumed that the decision maker aims at prioritising interventions that 
benefit disadvantaged and least healthy groups, and a DCEA was carried out. 
Alternative equity considerations could have been applied. Nevertheless, the main objective of this 
chapter was not to evaluate specifically the SIPS programme, but to show how to operationalise 
the incorporation of health equity concerns in the cross-sectoral evaluation of a public health 
intervention with effects on HC and CJ. 
Within-dimension and within-individual approach to inequalities 
In the proposed framework, the within-dimension approach was followed. As explained in Chapter 
3, Sub-section 3.2.2.1, this approach aggregates outcomes firstly within and secondly across 
dimensions. The focus of this chapter was on the HC dimension. Nevertheless, concern about 
inequalities could be potentially introduced in aggregations within dimensions other than HC. 
Different functional forms representing alternative normative judgements could be used for 
example also when aggregating impacts on CJ, and the same methods could be potentially used to 
incorporate inequality concerns in other dimensions. 
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However, two potential limitations to the extension of this analysis emerge. Firstly, from a 
pragmatic point of view, the incorporation of equity concerns in sectors other than HC would be 
hindered by the lack of data, especially with regard to OCs. The second limitation is related to the 
aggregation approach, that firstly aggregates across individuals (within the dimension) and 
secondly across dimensions. Inequalities are therefore only assessed within each dimension, and 
the potential link between inequalities in multiple and related dimensions would be missed. 
From a theoretical point of view, the adoption of a within-individual approach to aggregation could 
help addressing the latter issue and take into account the whole combination of inequalities across 
dimensions. As illustrated in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.2.2.1, the within-individual approach consists 
of aggregating first within-individuals across all dimensions, and then across individuals (Walker et 
al., 2019). However, such an extension of the framework would require an adaptation of the 
methods that goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Potential cross-temporal extension of the SIPS case study 
In this chapter, the focus was placed on the ‘health equity’ extension of the cross-sectoral analytical 
framework. Nevertheless, the proposed framework can also potentially accommodate the inclusion 
of long-term consequences. However, this would lead to issues related to how to extrapolate 
effects and costs to a more appropriate time horizon, and assess the impacts of hard and soft 
budgets. 
The potential cross-temporal extension of the cross-sectoral economic evaluation of SIPS is 




Chapter 8:  Discussion and conclusions 
8.1. Summary of objectives and results of the previous chapters 
Before discussing contributions, strengths and limitations of this thesis, a brief summary of 
objectives and findings of each chapter is provided here. Sub-section 8.1.1 recaps the theoretical 
part of this thesis; in Sub-section 8.3 results of the case study are summarised. 
Afterwards, Section 8.2 highlights the key contributions of this thesis to the literature. Strengths 
and limitations of the framework are discussed Section 8.3. A discussion on the results of the case 
study is provided in Section 8.4. The same section explores also potential extensions of the analysis, 
and compares the proposed case study with other case studies taken from the literature. In Section 
8.5, recommendations and further research are illustrated. Lastly, Section 8.6 draws the 
conclusions and points out the policy implications of this research. 
Theoretical part 
8.1.1.1. Chapter 2 
In Chapter 2, an overview of the theoretical background for economic evaluation of HC 
interventions was provided to set the scene for the thesis. A taxonomy of the main theoretical 
underpinnings and analytical techniques was developed. Finally, the appropriateness and 
limitations of the different approaches and methods when applied to the evaluation of public 
health interventions were investigated. 
8.1.1.2. Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 covered the development of the proposed analytical framework and described its 
theoretical underpinnings (i.e. the normative approach taken) and the analytical techniques 
employed. 
Case study 
In Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, the SIPS case study was used as a vehicle to illustrate the 
operationalisation of the proposed framework. A summary of objectives and findings of each 




8.1.2.1. Chapter 4 
The cost-effectiveness of SIPS was investigated from the ‘traditional’ HC perspective (i.e. including 
exclusively costs falling on health and social care budget, and effects on trial participants). It was 
found that the highest NBs were associated with CIL, and it was concluded that BA and BLC did not 
appear to be cost-effective compared to CIL. 
8.1.2.2. Chapter 5 
The cost-effectiveness of SIPS was investigated from the CJS perspective, and incremental costs 
falling on the CJS budget were compared to avoided reconvictions, which were used as a measure 
of effectiveness. Results of the CEA showed that from the CJS perspective it was worth investing in 
either BA or BLC when compared to CIL, but the overall cost-effective intervention was BLC. 
8.1.2.3. Chapter 6 
The CEA from the ‘traditional’ HC perspective was expanded to incorporate also spill-over effects 
on (direct and unknown) victims’ health and the additional costs falling on the HC budget to treat 
them. According to this revised CEA conducted from the HC perspective, BLC was found to be the 
cost-effective option. 
A cross-sectoral analysis from a joint health and criminal justice perspective was also conducted. It 
was assumed that decision makers were interested in both health and criminal justice, and impacts 
on both HC and CJ sectors were included. According to this cross-sectoral CEA, both BA and BLC 
were associated with positive INMBs when compared to CIL, and the overall cost-effective option 
was BLC. 
8.1.2.4. Chapter 7 
Two independent analyses were carried out to investigate the impacts of incorporating alternative 
value judgments into the economic evaluation. The first analysis was based on the hypothesis that 
impacts on victims’ health (i.e. variations in health caused by criminal activity) are valued differently 
from generic health variations. To incorporate this value judgment in the evaluation, an equity 
trade-off analysis based on equity weighting was conducted. Resulting INwHBs (i.e. INHBs that 
incorporate equity concerns) were higher when compared to the original INHBs estimates from the 
‘revised’ CEA, and both BA and BLC were found to be on average cost-effective, compared to CIL. 
Nevertheless, from the HC perspective, final results did not change. BLC was still on average the 
overall cost-effective option. Similarly, results of the cross-sectoral analysis showed that BLC was 
also the overall cost-effective treatment option from an integrated and broader perspective. 
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The second analysis was based on the hypothesis that decision makers want to prioritise 
interventions that benefit disadvantaged and least healthy groups. An equity impact analysis based 
on a DCEA was carried out. From the HC perspective, BLC was found to be not only cost-effective, 
but also associated with a greater improvement in unfair health inequalities, compared to both BA 
and CIL. From a broader perspective, cross-sectoral INwMBs (i.e. INMBs that include health equity 
concerns) values associated with BA and BLC were slightly higher than the original cross-sectoral 
INMBs. From an integrated perspective, BLC was the overall cost-effective option. 
8.2. Key contributions to the literature 
Public health interventions are often characterised by costs and outcomes falling on multiple 
sectors, with impacts that might occur far in the future. Furthermore, such interventions frequently 
aim to address health equity issues. The lack of a consistent framework to evaluate their cost-
effectiveness has been emphasised in the literature (Weatherly et al., 2009, Wanless, 2004). The 
call for the development of methods for the economic evaluation of public health interventions is 
particularly strong in the context of alcohol misuse (Barbosa, Godfrey & Parrott, 2010). 
With a particular focus on cross-sectoral aspects, the importance of investigating broader 
perspectives of CEAs and considering outcomes across different sectors has been recently 
highlighted by a panel of experts (Sanders et al., 2016). The panel emphasised that changes in 
health may lead to positive externalities (e.g. reduction in crime). In order for the analysis to reflect 
the full consequences and opportunity costs of an intervention, a valuation of these externalities is 
required. Furthermore, the panel stressed that it is not sufficient to include in the evaluation only 
the total reduction in non-health care costs (e.g. police and CJ costs). Changes in non-health 
outcomes (e.g. feeling safer and experiencing less crime) must also be taken into account. 
Therefore, further development of methods for capturing the value of broader impacts from real-
world health interventions is needed (Neumann et al., 2018). 
The aim of this thesis was to begin to address these gaps in the literature. More precisely, this work 
had two objectives. Firstly, to develop an analytical framework for the evaluation of public health 
interventions. The framework consists of a cross-sectoral analysis, with the potential incorporation 
of health equity and cross-temporal concerns. Secondly, to show how to operationalise the 




8.3. Strengths and limitations of the framework 
In theory, the proposed framework could be used for the economic evaluation of any intervention. 
However, there might be cases where all costs are likely to fall on the health care sector, there are 
no obvious impacts on outcomes other than health, there are no substantial equity issues, and no 
problems with intertemporal concerns arise. In those cases it would be reasonable to proceed with 
a conventional analysis conducted from the narrow health care system perspective. However, 
particularly in the context of public health, it would be difficult to identify such cases. 
For all the other cases, a first step would be to assess whether relevant impacts are expected to fall 
outside the health care sector. As recommended by the 2nd Cost-Effectiveness Panel, analysts 
should attempt to quantify non-health consequences in the impact inventory unless those 
consequences are likely to have a negligible effect on the result of the analysis (Sanders et al., 2016). 
Similarly, the relevance of cross-temporal and equity impacts could be also investigated. Evidence 
on public health interventions that have impacts on inequity has been recently provided (Griffin et 
al., 2019). However, the choice of including or excluding cross-sectoral, equity and cross-temporal 
concerns in an evaluation is likely to always be disputable. 
For this reason, the strength of the proposed framework resides in its flexibility. The framework can 
be easily adapted. In the simplest way it can be just used as a traditional CEA from the health care 
system perspective. Then it is possible to build up the analysis to consider other sectors and 
impacts. It can be used for the evaluation of any public health intervention, and, when deemed 
necessary, it can focus on cross-sectoral aspects, and/or health equity issues, and/or cross-
temporal aspects. Further, assumptions (e.g. choice of dimensions and outcomes, time constraints, 
and characteristics of the budget) and value judgments (e.g. about equity) are explicitly stated and 
can be updated or modified. Impacts of these decisions can be tested by looking at alternative 
choices. 
Not all the information necessary to operationalise the framework are currently available (e.g. 
marginal productivity estimates in sectors other than health care are rare, as further discussed in 
Sub-section 8.5.2). Nevertheless, even in absence of precise evidence, sensitivity analyses 
examining alternative values can be conducted. Moreover, results could be easily updated when 
such estimates become available. Another contribution of the framework is therefore to identify 
the gaps in the evidence that need to be addressed. 
The proposed framework is flexible to alternative approaches for the identification and aggregation 
of outcomes. However, one pragmatic limitation of the framework is that it still requires the 
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specification of dimensions and outcomes to be included in the impact inventory. In fact, the field 
is still far from reaching an agreement on which elements to include in such a summary, how these 
should be determined, and how to value them (Neumann et al., 2018, Sanders et al., 2016). For this 
reason, the inclusion or exclusion of dimensions and outcomes from the evaluation is likely to be 
open to debate. 
For example, as mentioned already in Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.2.1.1, and Chapter 4, Sub-section 
4.4.4.1, in the usual practice, economic evaluations conducted from the HC perspective typically 
include both health care and social care costs (NICE, 2013). Nevertheless, health spill-over effects 
on family members and informal caregivers are very rarely considered in practice (Al-Janabi, Van 
Exel, Brouwer, Trotter, et al., 2016). Recent literature appears in favour of the inclusion of health 
spill-over effects on caregivers in the evaluation (Sanders et al., 2016), and methods for quantifying 
health spill-overs and including them in economic evaluation have already been proposed (Al-
Janabi, van Exel, Brouwer & Coast, 2016, Al-Janabi, Van Exel, Brouwer, Trotter, et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, no final agreement about the appropriateness of including these effects in economic 
evaluations has been reached (Brouwer, 2018, McCabe, 2018). Because of this ongoing debate, the 
inclusion of other cross-sectoral health spill-over effects (e.g. impacts on victims’ health due to spill-
over effects through the CJS) could be disputed. In fact, if health spill-over effects on carers are not 
considered from the HC perspective, the inclusion of other health impacts (e.g. falling on the victims 
of crime) could be deemed difficult to justify.50 
Two more general limitations of the framework must be pointed out. Firstly, the inclusion of spill-
over effects might introduce potential double counting issues (Sanders et al., 2016). Secondly, 
assumptions about decision makers’ budgets might not be realistic. The framework assumes a 
single payer for each sector, while in reality there are likely to be more payers with similar 
objectives, but separate budget constraints (Remme, Martinez-Alvarez & Vassall, 2017). The 
implications of these two potential issues are explored in the next sub-section, using an illustrative 
example in the context of social care. 
  
                                                          
 
50 Moreover, if impacts on victims are incorporated in the analysis, should health impacts of offenders’ 
families be included as well? However, this is not a limitation of the framework itself. These are issues of 
ethics in social decision making. 
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Budgets and decision makers’ objectives: the case of social care 
The SIPS case study was grounded on the assumption of non-overlapping and non-correlated 
outcomes. It was assumed that the intrinsic value of crime was independent from the impact on 
victims’ health. Consequently, the cross-sectoral aggregation of the outcomes could be simply 
additive without resulting in any double counting. The cross-sectoral outcome was thus given by 
the sum of the CJ outcome (re-convictions) and HC outcome (QALYs), when expressed in monetary 
terms. Moreover, HC and CJS budgets were assumed to be separate and independent. The structure 
of budgets and outcomes considered in the SIPS case study is illustrated in Figure 8.1. 
 
Figure 8.1 HC and CJ sectors: budgets and outcomes 
Potential issues might arise when the additivity assumption does not hold (because outcomes are 
overlapping or correlated), or when decision makers are not responsible for only one budget and 
one outcome. As pointed out in Chapter 4, Sub-section 4.4.4.1, this might be the case if the 
framework is applied in the health care and social care context. 
The aim of this sub-section is to describe potential scenarios related to characteristics of budgets 
and outcomes, and highlight practical consequences for the proposed framework of analysis. Using 
the example of an evaluation including the two dimensions of health care and social care, two 
potential structures of outcomes and budgets are explored. 
8.3.1.1. Assumption 1: separate budgets, but overlapping and/or correlated outcomes 
In this first scenario it is assumed that health care and social care are considered as two separate 
dimensions, with two independent budgets. It is also assumed that QALY and Adult Social Care 
Outcomes Toolkit (ASCOT) are the two measures to assess health and social care outcomes, 
respectively. QALYs are in fact widely used in the economic evaluation of health, and ASCOTs are 
frequently used to evaluate social care interventions (Brazier & Tsuchiya, 2015). The structure of 




Figure 8.2 HC and social care sectors: budgets and outcomes (assumption 1) 
In such a situation, health care budget is invested to maximise QALYs and social care budget to 
maximise ASCOTs. The problem would be that QALYs and ASCOTs are not conceptually independent 
(the correlation is highlighted with a double arrow in Figure 8.2), because they capture some of the 
same benefits (Brazier & Tsuchiya, 2015). Therefore, there would be a risk of double-counting and 
the additivity assumption would no longer hold (Walker et al., 2019). 
This sub-section does not aim to provide methods to solve these issues. Rather the aim is to 
highlight these potential problems and point to relevant literature addressing them. Recent 
evidence about the relationship between ASCOT and EQ-5D-3L (Stevens, Brazier & Rowen, 2018) 
might help addressing the double counting issue. Alternatively, a broad generic measure of quality 
of life that focuses on health and social care might be used, such as the E-QALY, which is currently 
under development (Brazier, 2018). 
8.3.1.2. Assumption 2: shared budget, and distinct but overlapping and/or correlated outcomes 
In this second scenario, it is assumed that health care and social care decision makers share the 
same budget. In other words, the same resources are available to fund both health care and social 
care interventions. The structure of health care and social care budgets and outcomes is illustrated 
in Figure 8.3. 
 
Figure 8.3 HC and social care sectors: budgets and outcomes (assumption 2) 
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Health care and social care could be then considered as one sector producing two outcomes, and 
it would be then necessary to have two thresholds (one for QALYs and one for ASCOTs) for the same 
budget51. However, health care and social care could also be considered as two separate sectors 
with two independent decision makers having different remits. In such a situation, it would not be 
realistic to assume the existence of one budget, one outcome and one decision maker for each 
dimension. This is because not only would outcomes (QALYs and ASCOTs) be potentially correlated 
and partially overlapping, but also the existence of a shared budget would make the compensation 
scheme across sectors more difficult to implement. Moreover, because outcomes are not directly 
linked to distinct decision makers’ budgets, it would be more complicated to calculate opportunity 
cost estimates based on the marginal productivities of the sectors. 
8.4. Discussion about the case study 
Methods and results of each step of the analysis were discussed in each chapter. However, in this 
section, some key issues are explored more in detail. In Sub-section 8.4.1, the main limitations of 
case study results are described. In Sub-section 8.4.2, an analysis plan for the potential cross-
temporal extension of the case study is provided. Such an extension is left as potential further 
research. Lastly, in Sub-section 8.4.3, the original contribution of this case study is highlighted by 
comparing it with other case studies taken from the literature. 
Comments on the results of the case study 
8.4.1.1. Potential spurious effect of SIPS on criminal activity 
Results of the case study should be interpreted with caution. When originally assessing the 
effectiveness of SIPS, Newbury-Birch et al. (2014) pointed out that the reduction in criminal 
recidivism was found in the absence of significant differences in drinking consumption between the 
groups. Nevertheless, even in absence of differences in alcohol consumption across interventions, 
increased awareness might have resulted in a change in offending behaviour rather than 
consumption per se, or offending might be linked to particular patterns of drinking rather than 
overall consumption. 
Nevertheless, the main objective of the case study was not to provide a conclusive recommendation 
specifically about the implementation of SIPS. Instead, the case study was used as a vehicle to 
                                                          
 
51 For further details, see Walker et al. (2019). 
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illustrate how to operationalise the theoretical analytical framework (proposed in Chapter 3) in the 
specific context of a public health intervention having impacts on HC and CJ. The importance of 
using a real intervention instead of a fictional example is further discussed in Section 8.5. 
8.4.1.2. Cost-effectiveness of SIPS from the CJS perspective 
The CEA conducted from the CJS perspective was grounded on the assumption that the reduction 
in crime has a value per se52. As explained in Sub-section 5.2.2, the decision maker in the HC sector 
has the objective of maximising health because health has a value per se (Drummond, M. et al., 
2015). Similarly, the aim of the CJS decision maker is to reduce crime because a negative value is 
associated with crime per se. In other words, when a treatment reduces crime rates, the full 
valuation should not only include the total reduction in CJ costs, but also the increase in non-health 
outcomes, such as feeling safer and experiencing less crime (Neumann et al., 2018) 
However, a brief review of the previous literature of CEAs in CJS was conducted (see Chapter 5, 
Sub-section 5.2.1) and it was found that frequently no value was actually assigned to reductions in 
crime per se. Often analyses only compared costs and cost savings falling on CJS. Moreover, even 
assuming that society has a positive WTP to reduce crime per se (Cohen et al., 2004), the WTP value 
used in the case study might actually overestimate the intrinsic value of reducing crime. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, Sub-section 5.4.2.3, it would be necessary to investigate the WTP value of 
reducing crime per se, with the explicit exclusion of consequences on victims’ health. Alternatively, 
for example, a potential outcome measure for CJS activity based on perceived safety could be 
developed, as discussed in Sub-section 8.5.2. 
8.4.1.3. Different recommendations from different perspectives 
In the case study it was shown that conclusions and recommendations differ according to the 
perspective adopted for the evaluation. CEAs provided different results if conducted from: the 
‘traditional’ HC perspective (Chapter 4); the CJS perspective (Chapter 5); a ‘revised’ HC perspective 
which includes spill-over effects via CJS (first part of Chapter 6); an integrated perspective 
considering both HC and CJ impacts (second part of Chapter 6). 
Results of the ‘revised’ CEA from the HC perspective could be further investigated. As suggested in 
Chapter 6, Sub-section 6.2.2, broader impacts on victims’ health, such as mental distress and fear 
                                                          
 
52 As discussed in Chapter 5, it was assumed that reduction in crime is not only associated with cost savings 
and positive health consequences, but has a value per se due to safety perceived and less crime experienced. 
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of crime could be also included in the evaluation (Dolan & Peasgood, 2007). Furthermore, in the 
case study only effects on direct victims’ health were considered. Health consequences on 
individuals not directly involved in the crime, but still experiencing health consequences (i.e. 
indirect victims) could be included as well. Therefore, in the case study, health impacts that were 
associated with each crime might actually underestimate the full impact on victims of crime. If these 
additional components were included in the analysis, health spill-over effects generated in the CJS 
would be higher, and the inter-sectoral marginal productivity of the CJS in generating health would 
be affected. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework would still be valid. 
With regard to the integrated cross-sectoral analysis, results also depend on crucial assumptions, 
concerning for example the marginal productivity (that reflects the opportunity costs) of the CJS. 
To address the lack of estimates in sectors other than HC, the ratio of v over k was assumed to be 
constant across sectors. Such an assumption has been already suggested in the literature (Claxton 
et al., 2019). However, if new empirical evidence is produced then alternative assumptions about 
the allocation of resources across sectors could be made. The value of the ratio v/k could be 
modified and the framework would still be valid. This work highlights the lack of data and need of 
further research, which are further discussed in Section 8.5. 
8.4.1.4. Health inequities and social determinants of health 
A discussion of results and limitations of the proposed solutions to address health equity issues was 
provided in Chapter 7, Sub-sections 7.2.4 and 7.4.1. In brief, compared to equity weighting, DCEA 
based on SES subgroups appears to be the most suitable method to incorporate health equity 
concerns in the proposed framework. The identification of population subgroups based on their 
SES is an overarching equity principle that can be used in different contexts. Furthermore, from a 
pragmatic point of view, data that are necessary to conduct DCEAs are already available.  
However, it must be pointed out that, according to the results of the DCEA of SIPS, the impacts of 
the intervention in reducing unfair health inequalities is very small in absolute terms. Even if 
delivered to all potential users, effects on QALEs of each subgroup are negligible. This might be 
because the intervention focused more on lifestyle choices, and not on broader social and economic 
circumstances, known as the ‘social determinants of health’ (Dahlgren & Whitehead, 1993, 1991). 
In fact, strong evidence linking broader social determinants of health to good and poor health has 
been provided, and, if the main objective of the decision maker is to address health inequalities, 
action is required across all the wider determinants of health (Marmot et al., 2010). 
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According to Marmot et al. (2010), persisting inequalities across key domains such as early child 
development and education, employment and working conditions, housing and neighbourhood 
conditions, standards of living, and, more generally, the freedom to participate equally in the 
benefits of society, provide ample explanation of health inequalities. Therefore, action taken by the 
DHSC and the NHS alone will not reduce health inequalities. By contrast, acting on education and 
sense of community would be probably more effective in order to address alcohol issues. 
Individuals with less education report being in poorer health, they are more likely to smoke, more 
likely to be obese and suffer alcohol harm. Similarly, social networks have been shown to be as 
powerful predictors of mortality as common lifestyle and clinical risks such as excessive alcohol 
consumption (Buck & Gregory, 2013). In fact, one of the key purposes of relocating public health 
into local authorities was precisely to address the wider determinants of health and well-being in a 
setting that was perceived to be more sympathetic to such a structural approach than the NHS had 
been (Marks et al., 2015). 
Potential extension of the case study: cross-temporal analysis 
Public health interventions can be particularly difficult to evaluate because significant effects might 
occur far in the future (WHO, 2015, Weatherly et al., 2009). It might therefore be necessary to 
extend the time horizon for the estimation of costs and effects (Bojke et al., 2017). Two aspects 
then become crucial for the analysis of public health interventions: the extrapolation of costs and 
effects (e.g. beyond the available trial data), and the impacts of budgetary policies and investment 
strategies. 
In the case study, the focus was mainly on the cross-sectoral aspects of the analysis, and on the 
incorporation of health equity concerns. However, the framework can also potentially 
accommodate an intertemporal extension of the evaluation, with the inclusion of long-term 
consequences and the assessment of impacts of alternative budgetary policies. Extrapolation and 
budgetary impact issues are addressed in Sub-sections 8.4.2.1 and 8.4.2.2, respectively. Sub-section 
8.4.2.3 illustrates how to operationalise the cross-temporal extension of the framework. 
8.4.2.1. Extrapolation of SIPS costs and effects 
Even though public health programmes may impact on health over the longer term, long-term 
consequences are frequently neglected due to the difficulties in measuring them (Weatherly et al., 
2009). Data collected often have a follow-up duration which is too short to allow for a robust 
quantification of the likely costs and benefits over the patient’s entire lifetime. To estimate the full 
long-term impacts of a public health intervention, extrapolation techniques based on assumptions 
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regarding the behaviour of the quantities of interest beyond the time horizon supported by the 
clinical evidence might be required. Decision-analytic modelling can be employed to extrapolate 
costs and effects of the programme which are too distant in time to be observed and directly 
measured (Bojke et al., 2017). 
When carrying out economic evaluations of alcohol interventions, the need to assess and model 
long-term consequences is widely recognised. Alcohol treatments have the potential to improve 
alcohol-related mortality and long-term morbidity through a change in drinking behaviour (Hoang 
et al., 2016, Barbosa, Godfrey & Parrott, 2010). In particular, screening and brief alcohol 
interventions (such as SIPS) may produce long-term HC and CJ resource use cost savings. However, 
it is not clear how long the impact of brief interventions can be expected to last, and there is 
considerable uncertainty as to whether such an interventions will be cost saving in the long-term 
(Latimer et al., 2009). 
The use of decision analytic modelling permits examination of longer time frames, preferable to the 
typically short-term economic evaluations of health interventions for alcohol problems conducted 
alongside RCTs. At the expense of introducing additional assumptions, modelling offers several 
advantages, such as extrapolating beyond the data observed in a trial, and linking intermediate 
clinical endpoints to final outcomes (Hoang et al., 2016). Examples of modelling used for the 
extrapolation of health care costs and effects associated with brief alcohol interventions can be 
found in the literature. For example, Barbosa et al. (2010) developed a framework based on a 
Markov model with a lifetime horizon to evaluate brief alcohol treatments taking into account 
longer term health outcomes and costs. Similarly, Tariq et al. (2009) used a state-transition Markov-
type model to estimate impacts on costs and QALYs of a brief alcohol intervention in the long run. 
As the long-term effects of alcohol brief interventions are uncertain, the model took into account 
this uncertainty regarding the long-term persistence of the effect on alcohol consumption. 
Purshouse et al. (2013) and Angus et al. (2014) used the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM) (see 
Chapter 7, Sub-section 7.1.1) to extrapolate also health spill-over effects of a brief alcohol 
intervention through transport (due to road traffic accidents) and CJ (due to assaults). 
However, the perspective of the economic evaluation in all the aforementioned studies was that of 
the health care system. Only health care costs and effects were considered. The need to develop a 
theoretical model to conduct a similar analysis from a broader perspective has been recognised 
(Barbosa, Godfrey & Parrott, 2010). Nevertheless, no long-term alcohol models that extrapolate 
non-health care costs and consequences were found in the literature (Hoang et al., 2016). 
Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate the long-term impact of SIPS from a broader 
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perspective, and develop a model (or adapt the existing SAPM in order to record CJ outcomes) 
where cross-sectoral consequences are also taken into account. The short-term economic 
evaluation of SIPS carried out in this thesis might have underestimated the expected health or non-
health outcomes and overestimated the costs of the intervention. 
8.4.2.2. Impact of budgetary policies on SIPS 
Let us suppose that the extrapolation process has been conducted and lifetime cross-sectoral costs 
and effects of SIPS are available. Long-term (HC and CJ) costs and effects could be then included in 
the evaluation, and the cross-sectoral cost-effectiveness estimate could be updated in the light of 
the new evidence. 
Nevertheless, in the context of public health interventions, a CEA based on the assumption of the 
existence of soft budgets may be unrealistic. This is because standard decision rules in CEA based 
on expected net benefits usually assume the existence of ‘soft’ budgets constraints. In other words, 
as long as the health care decision maker plans to meet the budget at expectation, any deficit will 
be indemnified (McKenna et al., 2010). Consequently, the timing of costs and benefits is only 
relevant for discounting purposes. In reality, decision makers are constrained in their ability to 
commit resources today to obtain long-term benefits. For example, local authorities operate within 
tightly regulated annual budget cycles that fit within a 4- to 5-year planning cycle (Frew, 2016). 
Moreover, policy makers could prioritise short-term impacts, or ignore consequences happening in 
a distant future beyond the electoral cycle (Hoang et al., 2016). 
As illustrated by McKenna et al. (2010), optimisation solutions of the health maximisation problem 
faced by the decision maker (and therefore investment decisions) can change according to the 
existence of soft or rigid budget constraints. For example, if the decision maker cannot run a deficit 
(i.e. is provided with a ‘hard’ budget), substantial opportunity costs could be imposed. This could 
ultimately lead to corner solutions, when no health care is provided due to the risk of exceeding 
the constraint, or restrictive provision of health care and large expected budget surpluses. 
Consequently, it might happen that an intervention which is theoretically cost-effective cannot be 
implemented because of a rigidity of the decision makers’ budget constraints. For this reason, when 





8.4.2.3. Implications for decision making 
The cross-sectoral analysis was based on the decision rule that if INBs are positive, then the 
intervention should be funded53. Nonetheless, such a decision rule would be a true reflection of the 
real decision problem only if the timing of costs and effects was not relevant. In reality, costs and 
effects might not occur all at once and, in the presence of rigidities in budgets, their timing might 
be crucial. More rigid budgetary policies might determine a prioritisation of those investments 
which guarantee short-term effects. 
The cross-sectoral INMB formula shown in Chapter 3, Equation 3.8, can therefore be adapted: 
impacts can be redefined as time series in order to make the cross-temporal aspects explicit and 
assess the effects of budgetary policies. When impacts (in terms of costs and effects) of the 
intervention are defined as a stream of costs and effects in time, two new variables play a role in 
the decision making process: the discount rate and the time horizon. In fact, not only decision 
makers can place a higher discount rate on outcomes realised far in the future, but also completely 
ignore consequences happening after a specified time horizon (e.g. they might not be interested in 
consequences after their political mandate is over). Moreover, costs and effects might accrue with 
different timings, and decision makers might have different preferences about costs and effects. In 
other words, their time horizon and discount rate for costs might be different from the way effects 
are traditionally valued. The revised cross-sectoral INMB formula, including the cross-temporal 
extension, is shown in Equation 8.1. Two time horizons (T1 and T2) and discount rates (r and d) are 
introduced, one for the costs, and one for the effects. 
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Equation 8.1 could be used to explore alternative scenarios for the discount rate and the time 
horizon. The cross-sectoral economic evaluation of SIPS (with the potential incorporation of health 
equity concern) could be then tailored according to decision makers’ constraints and objectives. 
For example, the discount rate might be set to reflect the higher priority associated with short-term 
impacts, and the time horizon set to reflect the electoral cycle. Because the choice of alternative 
timeframes might significantly influence the results (Hoang et al., 2016), this cross-temporal 
                                                          
 
53 It is assumed that compensation schemes across decision makers can be enforced. 
214 
 
analysis could emphasise the potential net benefit that is loss due to political constraints and 
budgets rigidities. Moreover, by also providing a long-term evaluation based on soft budgets, the 
framework can be used to show explicitly the missed investment opportunities (in terms of 
potential INBs not realised) due to budgetary policies. By incorporating long-term impacts, these 
results would help to make the case for investment in public health interventions. 
A comparison with other case studies from the literature 
When developing the analytical framework proposed in this thesis, a list of crucial aspects in the 
economic evaluation of public health interventions emerged, and a checklist was developed. The 
checklist proposed in Table 8.1 includes: the choice of the normative approach and the theoretical 
underpinnings behind the evaluation; the inclusion of cross-sectoral costs and outcomes; the 
identification of opportunity costs; the incorporation of equity concerns; and the assessment of 
cross-temporal issues. This list of topics also reflects the open questions and research priorities in 
the approach to the economic evaluation of public health interventions pointed out by Chalkidou 
et al. (2008) and Edwards et al. (2013), and the set of considerations for researchers conducting 




1. What normative approach (i.e. theoretical underpinning) was used for analysis? 
Cross-sectoral costs and effects 
2. Was the perspective of the economic evaluation clearly defined? 
3. Were the main beneficiaries of the intervention clearly identified? 
4. Were the agencies bearing the costs of implementing the intervention clearly identified? 
5. Was the health attribute separated from other attributes? 
6. Were multiple outcome measures used (e.g. listed in an impact matrix)? 
7. Were all benefits expressed using the same unit (e.g. in monetary terms)? 
Opportunity costs 
8. Were the opportunity costs of implementing the intervention identified? 
9. Were estimates of the marginal productivity within and across the sectors used? 
Equity concerns 
10. Were any equity judgments explicitly stated? 
11. Was the impact of the intervention on health inequity investigated? 
12. Was the impact of the intervention on other inequities investigated? 
Cross-temporal aspects 
13. Were costs and outcomes extrapolated meaningfully over lengthy time horizons? 
14. Was the impact of the choice of time horizon on the cost-effectiveness explored? 
15. Was the impact of budgetary policies on the decision making process analysed? 
Table 8.1 Checklist for the development of the framework 
Compared to the methods proposed in this thesis (and summarised in Chapter 3, Sub section 3.4.1), 
different approaches and analytical techniques could have been adopted to address all these 
aspects. The checklist reported in Table 8.1 can be therefore used when conducting economic 
evaluations of public health interventions. Such an assessment would encourage analysts to be 
transparent in the approach they have taken, and explicit about assumptions and value judgments 
underpinning the economic evaluation. A few examples are provided in the following sub-sections. 
8.4.3.1. Co-financing approach 
The importance of allocating resources efficiently across sectors has been recently highlighted by 
Remme et al. (2017), who developed the so-called ‘co-financing approach’, which is also based on 
the work by Claxton et al. (2007). The authors used Culyer’s (2016) bookshelf metaphor to describe 
how budget redistributions among health and non-health payers can help to achieve a more 
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optimal resource allocation54. An intervention with multi-sectoral benefits might end up being 
under-financed when either one of the other sector has to pay for the whole intervention. By 
contrast, if the cost of intervention is shared between the sectors, the productivity of the 
intervention per unit of expenditure increases, making it better value for money. 
In a previous work, Remme et al. (2014) used the co-financing approach to evaluate a structural 
intervention to reduce HIV vulnerability by keeping adolescent girls in school in Malawi. Impacts of 
the intervention on both health and education sectors were assessed, and the approach to the 
evaluation appears to be very similar to the analysis proposed in this thesis. Nevertheless, looking 
at the main aspects pointed out in the checklist in Table 8.1, a few differences can be highlighted. 
Firstly, in the cross-sectoral analysis, the rule for cost-effectiveness was based on a WTP threshold 
at a cost per disability-adjusted life year (DALY) averted below country’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita. Even though such a threshold is recommended by WHO (Edejer et al., 2003) and 
is commonly used in economic evaluations of HIV interventions, it is not based on an empirical 
assessment of the likely health OCs (Ochalek, Lomas & Claxton, 2018). Similarly, no attempt was 
made to estimate the OCs for the education sector, and the cost-effectiveness threshold was simply 
based on the highest ICER per education outcome found in previous economic evaluations in sub-
Saharan Africa. Secondly, even if Remme et al. (2014) acknowledged the importance of 
investigating disparities in health gains between different groups and mentioned the potential use 
of extended ICERs55, no attempt was made to incorporate equity objectives in the evaluation. 
Thirdly, with regard to the cross-temporal aspects of the analysis, long-term benefits and cost were 
identified, but excluded from the analysis based on the co-financing approach. The authors argued 
that CEA-based approach focuses on immediate intervention outcomes, and did not discuss 
relevant time horizons for the analysis or the presence of potential budgetary constraints. 
8.4.3.2. Sufficient capabilities approach 
Another alternative approach was proposed by Goranitis et al. (2017) in the context of the 
treatment for drug addiction. The authors developed a methodological case study designed to 
explore the impact of: changing the evaluative space within an economic evaluation from health to 
                                                          
 
54 In the bookshelf framework, each book represents an intervention. The height of the book shows its 
effectiveness, and its thickness depends on its total cost. Books are ranked in order of their height, and 
investments are undertaken until the health budget is exhausted (Remme, Martinez-Alvarez & Vassall, 2017, 
Culyer, 2016). 
55 See Chapter 3, Sub-section 3.3.3.2. 
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capability well-being (i.e. using a broader perspective for the analysis); changing the decision-
making rule from health maximisation to the maximisation of sufficient capability (i.e. incorporating 
alternative value judgments in the decision making process). The case study explored a broader 
perspective of analysis both in terms of costing and evaluative space. Broader costing was 
conducted from a government perspective and included health and social care costs, criminal 
justice, housing (e.g. supported accommodations), private consumption (e.g. state benefits). As 
regards the evaluative space, capability instruments were used to measure broader outcomes than 
health alone. The authors investigated also the incorporation of alternative equity concerns by 
introducing a more egalitarian decision making rule, based on sufficiency instead of maximisation. 
The ‘sufficient capability’ approach prioritises individuals below a normatively sufficient level of 
capability and aims to maximise the number of people in society that achieve sufficient capability. 
The analysis showed that different evaluative spaces and decision-making rules have the potential 
to offer opposing treatment recommendations. Nevertheless, final results of the analysis depend 
on some unspecified decision maker’s WTP per additional year of full capability equivalent (or year 
of sufficient capability equivalent, if equity concerns are included) that does not refer to 
opportunity cost. Moreover, because all costs were aggregated and capability was used as the 
unique outcome measure, the results of such analysis might not reflect the actual decision making 
processes in the various sectors and so may not meet the decision makers’ requirements. 
8.4.3.3. Broader costing perspective 
Other examples from the literature of analyses conducted from a ‘societal’ perspective broadly 
consisted of aggregating costs across sectors and comparing them to an incremental unit of effect 
(Drost et al., 2016, Byford et al., 2013) 
For example, to evaluate an intervention for reducing alcohol use and binge drinking, Drost et al. 
(2016) calculated the total incremental costs (falling on HC, education, private consumption, 
housing and CJS) per incremental reduction of one unit of alcohol consumption. Nevertheless, 
because no guidelines are available that provide a reference cost-effectiveness threshold for 
reducing the consumption of alcohol, it was not possible to make recommendations on whether 
the intervention should be implemented. More generally, the issues related to using only one 
threshold instead of considering different budgets with different opportunity costs have been 
discussed in Chapter 2, Sub-section 2.4.3.1. Further, similarly to the sufficient capabilities approach 
previously discussed, a limitation of such an approach is that the analysis risks not meeting decision 
makers’ requirements. In fact, it would be difficult to identify a decision maker that is responsible 
for an aggregated budget across sectors and a unique measure of outcome.  
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8.5. Recommendations and further research 
In this thesis, instead of using a stylised or fictional example, data from an actual intervention were 
used. The objective of this choice was to show what data was available and what further evidence 
may be needed. The development of the case study helped to identify what currently unavailable 
data should be collected for future studies, and what other wider research (e.g. outcomes of 
interest to decision makers and marginal productivities) would be valuable. 
This section provides an overview of the practical suggestions and recommendations for future 
work and for future evaluations in this field. The need of improving the collection of cross-sectoral 
costs and outcomes is described in Sub-section 8.5.1. Sub-section 8.5.2 illustrates potential 
methods to estimate cross-sectoral marginal productivities, which are currently not available. 
Because this thesis focused specifically on HC and CJS sectors, this discussion covers these two 
areas. However, it would be equally important to address the same issues in other public sectors 
(e.g. education, housing, environment, transport) potentially impacted by public health 
interventions. 
The need of collecting cross-sectoral costs and outcomes 
Time and resource constraints often prevent a comprehensive collection of all data required to 
expand the evaluation perspective (Hill et al., 2017). Nevertheless, as pointed out in Chapter 5, Sub-
section 5.8.2, to capture the real world economic consequences of the intervention, a more 
accurate procedure to record CJ outcomes would be beneficial. The CEA conducted from the CJS 
perspective requires reliable data about the types of crimes committed in order to associate unit 
costs accurately. Moreover, the analysis would be more accurate if CJ resource use consumption 
were collected following each offender, as is commonly done for HC resource use. 
The identification and classification of inter-sectoral costs and benefits (ICBs) would offer decision 
makers supporting information on how to optimally allocate scarce resources (Drost et al., 2013). 
Reliable and valid instruments to measure ICBs such as CJ outcomes and resources use are pivotal, 
and lists of resource-use measurement (RUM) instruments in the CJ sector have been recently 
proposed (Mayer et al., 2017, Drost et al., 2013). Because CJ service resource use (e.g. legal 
assistance, police custody, court appearance, police contacts, and use of correction services) is 
particularly important in the field of alcoholism (Mayer et al., 2017), all future trial-based economic 
evaluations of alcohol interventions should consider the routine adoption of RUM instruments to 
measure ICBs falling on CJS (Drost et al., 2013). 
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With regard to cross-sectoral unit costs, the development of cost catalogues including estimates 
for both HC and non-HC (e.g. the cost of an arrest or a prison sentence) costs was recently suggested 
(Neumann et al., 2018). The UK has already developed such catalogues for HC costs. Data on CJS 
unit costs are also available (Dubourg, Hamed & Thorns, 2005, Brand & Price, 2000), but an update 
of such estimates would be advisable (Bhattacharya, 2017). 
The lack of marginal productivity estimates within and across sectors 
The lack of estimates of marginal productivities within and across sectors hampers the 
operationalisation of the framework. Marginal productivities are necessary to assess the 
opportunity costs of the intervention. To overcome the lack of data in sectors other than health 
care, in this analysis it was necessary to make an assumption. Following Claxton et al. (2019), it was 
assumed that the ratio of marginal productivity and consumption value of each outcome was 
constant across sectors, even though different ratios could be potentially used for different sectors. 
Such an assumption would be not necessary if estimates of marginal productivities for all sectors 
(e.g. the CJS) were available. 
In Sub-section 8.5.2.1, considerations about the estimation of the marginal productivity of the CJS 
in preventing crime are presented. Marginal productivities across HC and CJ sectors are discussed 
in Sub-section 8.5.2.2. 
8.5.2.1. Estimate of the marginal productivity of the CJS 
To obtain an estimate of the marginal productivity for the CJS, it would be necessary to assess the 
variations in the CJS budget over time and variations in the outcome(s) chosen to represent the 
effectiveness of the activity of the CJS in preventing crime. 
CJS budget 
In the CEA conducted from the CJS perspective, only costs in response to and as a consequence of 
crime were considered. Nevertheless, a third category of costs was also provided by the Home 
Office (Dubourg, Hamed & Thorns, 2005, Brand & Price, 2000): the costs in anticipation of crime. 
The three categories of costs and their components are summarised Table 8.2. 
In response to crime As a consequence to crime In anticipation of crime 
CJS costs (including police) 
Consumption Security expenditure 
Health Insurance administration 
Table 8.2 CJS cost categories 
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Costs in response to crime were used to estimate the effects of variations in criminal activities in 
terms of CJ resource use. Costs as a consequence of crime were used to estimate spill-over effects 
on other sectors (e.g. property stolen and damaged, lost output, tangible and intangible health 
consequences). If the objective is instead to assess the activity of the CJS in preventing crime, costs 
in anticipation of crime would be the cost category to take into consideration.  
CJS outcomes 
Two potential alternatives are suggested to estimate the effect of CJS activity in reducing crime. 
The first solution is to assess number of crimes and recidivism, using reconvictions as a proxy. This 
was the method proposed in Chapter 5. Alternatively, as discussed in Sub-section 8.4.1.2, it could 
be argued that the ultimate goal of the CJS is to increase safety. Therefore, instead of measuring 
criminal events, a new composite measure based on the sense of safety could be developed to 
measure the effectiveness of CJS activity. 
For example, a year of life adjusted for the perceived sense of safety could be developed. This could 
be called Safety-Adjusted Life Year (SALY). Similarly to a QALY, a SALY could be obtained by 
weighting a year for a safety loss coefficients for each crime experienced, directly or indirectly. 
Safety loss could be related to both the severity of the crime experienced, and the duration of its 
consequences. The value of a SALY would therefore range from 1 (a year when the individual feels 
completely safe for the entire time) to 0 (if the whole year is perceived as completely unsafe by the 
individual). However, such a measure would have potential overlapping dimension with a QALY, 
and might compromise the applicability of the framework (see Section 8.3). Moreover, to be useful 
in terms of decision making, such a measure would need to be accepted by decision makers when 
assessing the effectiveness of a CJ intervention. 
Assessing variations in CJS budget and outcomes 
Once costs in anticipation of crime and appropriate outcome measures are identified, it is necessary 
to assess their variation over time to determine the marginal productivity of the CJS. 
Variations in criminal activity could be estimated by investigating the yearly statistics about criminal 
events (Chaplin, Flately & Smith, 2011). By contrast, estimates of the amount of resources invested 
to prevent crime are only available for the years 2000 (Brand & Price, 2000) and 2003 (Dubourg, 
Hamed & Thorns, 2005). However, to overcome the lack of data, it could be possible to assume that 
variations in expenditures follow the trend of HC expenditures, which are available (Lomas, Martin 





The comparison of variations in CJS expenditures in anticipation of crime and variations in criminal 
activity would provide an estimate of the marginal productivity of the CJS. Such an analysis should 
be then adjusted for potential secular trends in criminal behaviour (i.e. potential reduction of crime 
over time not due to differential expenditure in anticipation of crime). Moreover, estimates should 
be corrected for the endogeneity of spending (i.e. CJS spending is partly determined by the level of 
needs, which are correlated with criminal justice outcomes). 
The adoption of alternative outcome measures for the CJ output would imply alternative solutions 
for the estimation of its marginal productivity. If the framework proposed in this thesis is used, such 
an analysis would provide the investment necessary for the CJS to prevent one reconviction. 
Alternatively, a cost per additional SALY could be estimated. 
8.5.2.2. Estimate of the cross-sectoral marginal productivities 
CJS activity is associated with spill-over effects on health care and consumption. Cross-sectoral 
productivity of the CJS can be then quantified in terms of health (e.g. measured in QALYs) and 
consumption (e.g. property stolen or damaged, lost output). 
An estimate of the marginal productivity of the CJS in generating health was already calculated in 
Chapter 6, Sub-section 6.2.3.3. The inter-sectoral marginal productivity of CJS in producing health 
was estimated to be approximately equal to 870,000 £/QALY. However, this value could be revised 
if better evidence about the health consequences of crime were provided, and more accurate data 
about CJS activity in preventing crime were available. In Sub-section 6.3.3.3, the procedure to 
estimate the marginal productivity of the CJS in protecting individual consumption was also 
illustrated. No estimate was computed, but data are potentially available (Dubourg, Hamed & 
Thorns, 2005). 
With regard to the health care sector, estimates for the marginal productivity of the health care 
system in generating consumption already exist (Claxton, Sculpher, et al., 2015, Roberts, G., 2015). 




8.6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Even though the importance of economic evaluation to support decision making is widely 
acknowledged, there is a limited evidence of it being used in practice in decisions related to public 
health. This may be partly due to economic evidence typically not addressing the priorities of 
multiple stakeholders and not reflecting local authorities’ needs of capturing wider non-health 
outcomes. Further, economic evaluations should better reflect the financial and political context 
and take into consideration decision making criteria that incorporate equity (e.g. minimising unfair 
health inequalities) (Frew & Breheny, 2019). 
The framework proposed in this thesis aims to address these issues. It can inform decision makers 
by offering assessments of the benefits and opportunity costs for those dimensions (other than 
health care) which are considered most important (Walker et al., 2019). Moreover, the analysis can 
accommodate different decision-making criteria (based on alternative value judgments), and 
potentially accommodate political constraints on budgets and timeframes. For these reasons, 
economic evaluations based on the proposed framework can potentially provide better support for 
decision making in local authorities. 
The proposed framework could be potentially employed for the evaluation of all public health 
interventions. However, because the case study illustrated in this thesis considered specifically HC 
and CJ sectors, it would be straightforward to apply the same approach to other public health 
interventions having impacts on the same dimensions. For example, it could be used to evaluate 
programmes for the treatment of drug addiction. Such programmes may have the primary objective 
of enhancing population health, however costs and benefits may fall also on CJS, through less crime 
attributable to drug use (Goranitis et al., 2017, Sculpher et al., 2014). The framework could be also 
be used in the evaluation of interventions for the treatment of opiate addiction (Byford et al., 2013). 
Recent evidence has shown support from local authorities for methods that incorporate multiple 
sector costs and benefits (Frew, 2016). However, a cross-sectoral analysis can only show the 
potential cost-effectiveness of an intervention. To actually implement the intervention, the 
compensation across-sectors would need to be real (Remme, Martinez-Alvarez & Vassall, 2017). In 
reality, such a compensation mechanism currently does not exist. Furthermore, if compensation 
schemes across sectors were created, incentives to prevent gaming of the system would be 
necessary (Remme et al., 2014). This work however contributes to emphasising the importance of 




A. SIPS population characteristics at baseline, adapted from Newbury-Birch et al. (2014) 
  N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) 
Age in years 184 31.6 (10.9) 177 30.8 (10.8) 163 30.5 (11.1) 524 31.0 (10.9) 
EQ-5D 178 0.84 (0.24) 171 0.82 (0.22) 157 0.88 (0.21) 506 0.85 (0.23) 
Baseline AUDIT score 181 15.40 (8.33) 178 16.29 (8.80) 161 16.58 (8.58) 520 16.07 (8.57) 
  N % N % N % N % 
Baseline AUDIT status           
Negative 32 17.7 22 12.4 16 9.9 70 13.5 
Positive 149 82.3 156 87.6 145 90.1 450 86.5 
AUDIT score category           
Lower risk (0–7) 32 17.7 22 12.4 16 9.9 70 13.5 
Increasing risk (8–15) 75 41.4 80 44.9 72 44.7 227 43.7 
Harmful/Possible dependence (16–40) 74 40.9 76 42.7 73 45.3 223 42.9 
Gender           
Male 160/184 87 145/178 81.5 142/163 87.1 447/525 85.1 
Ethnicity           
White 140/184 76.1 138/178 77.5 122/163 74.8 400/525 76.2 
Marital status           
Single 125/184 67.9 125/178 70.2 103/163 63.2 353/525 67.2 
Education after 16 years           
Yes 84/182 46.2 77/178 43.3 74/163 45.4 235/523 44.9 
Possess degree or equivalent           
Yes 25/184 13.6 26/178 14.6 30/161 18.6 81/523 15.5 
Smoke tobacco           
Current smoker 150/184 81.5 139/177 78.5 126/162 77.8 415/523 79.3 
Readiness Ruler           
Never think about drinking less 39 21.3 35 19.7 43 26.5 117 22.4 
Sometimes think about drinking less 37 20.2 37 20.8 34 21 108 20.7 
Decided to drink less 39 21.3 33 18.5 18 11.1 90 17.2 







B. EQ-5D-3L questionnaire 
 
Please place a cross in one box in each group. 
 
1.       Mobility 
 
I have no problems in walking about 
 
I have some problems in walking about 
 
I am confined to bed 
 
2.       Self-care 
 
I have no problems with self-care 
 
I have some problems washing or dressing myself 
 
I am unable to wash or dress myself 
 
3.       Usual activities (e.g. work, study, housework, family or leisure activities) 
 
I have no problems with performing my usual activities 
 
I have some problems with performing my usual activities 
 
I am unable to perform my usual activities 
 
4.       Pain or discomfort 
 
I have no pain or discomfort 
 
I have moderate pain or discomfort 
 
I have extreme pain or discomfort 
 
5.       Anxiety or depression 
 
I am not anxious or depressed 
 
I am moderately anxious or depressed 
 





C. A focus on the multilevel structure of the data 
SIPS study was a cluster trial. As illustrated in Section 3.4.3, the 525 offenders included in the study 
were recruited by 131 offender managers. For this reason, the impact of the clusters must be taken 
into account, otherwise results could be biased. The question to be addressed here is whether could 
be worthwhile to perform the analysis using a multilevel model (Roberts, J. K., 2004). 
For the sake of performing a CEA, there is little difference in simply adjusting the standard errors of 
the parameter estimates taking into account the clusters, or building a multilevel model. However, 
in the perspective of performing a subsequent multiple imputation procedure, there are some 
technical differences if data are multilevel or not. Multilevel modelling can be computationally 
intensive, and in particular performing a multilevel multiple imputation would add a consistent 
computational hurdle (e.g. Stata software does not support this operation) (Quartagno & 
Carpenter, 2018). 
The following table provides a summary of the clusters (i.e. the groups of offenders recruited by 
each OM) allocated to each intervention allocation grouped according to their size. The first part of 
the table refers to the whole population sample, whereas the second group of columns describe 
the size of the clusters including only those offenders who provided information about QALYs. 
 All patients Only if reported QALYs 




(cluster size) CIL BA BLC CIL BA BLC 
1 15 3 20 38 13 9 19 41 
2 8 2 5 15 13 7 7 27 
3 4 7 7 18 6 9 5 20 
4 6 4 5 15 1 0 3 4 
5 9 8 5 22 0 5 1 6 
6 1 3 4 8 0 0 1 1 
7 1 2 1 4 0 1 0 1 
8 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
10 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 
11 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 
12 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
16 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
17 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
18 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
25 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Total 47 35 49 131 35 32 37 104 
 
Considering the whole trial population, a total of 131 clusters were identified. Of these, almost 30% 
include only one offender, and more than half include less than three offenders. 27 clusters do not 
actually provide any information about QALYs, because offenders in that group did not report the 
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outcome of interest. Focusing on the clusters where QALYs are reported (104 clusters and 255 
offenders), almost 40% are composed of only one individual; roughly 25% of the clusters have two 
observations, and 20% have three.  
It is apparent that it would be difficult to draw conclusions about clusters’ impact if the majority of 
clusters have only three or less observations and the mean cluster size is 2.45 (SD 2.04). A summary 
showing the proportions of small size samples is reported in below. 
   All Only if reported QALYs 
Clusters with only 1 observation 29% 39% 
Clusters with 2 or less observations 40% 65% 
Clusters with 3 or less observations 54% 85% 
 
To formally assess the relatedness of clustered data, the Intracluster Correlation Coefficient (ICC) 
can be measured. Values of ICC range from zero (no correlation between the observations within 
clusters) to one (responses within a cluster are identical) (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). A first crude 
estimation of the ICC was undertaken and then the ICC was estimated again using a regression in 
order to take into account other factors that might affect the crude estimation. The first crude 
estimation provided an estimate of 0.13. Given that usually only values smaller than 0.01 are 
considered negligible (Snijders & Bosker, 2012), it seems that observations do have a degree of 
correlation within the cluster. However, it must be taken into account that the positive ICC value is 
not statically significant at 5% level (95% CI goes from 0 to 0.32). Moreover, this was a crude 
estimation of the ICC, and it is likely to be biased by other factors, such as the baseline health score. 
Alternative regression models can be employed to assess the impact of the clusters. Recalling the 
analysis of QALYs in Section 4.3.2, baseline EQ-5D scores must be included in the regression, 
whereas other covariates are negligible. Four alternative regression models are then compared: 
- Model A: OLS regression where standard errors are assumed to be Normally distributed; 
- Model B: OLS regression with robust standard error (called Model 1 in Section 4.3.2, this 
was the model chosen for the analysis); 
- Model C: multilevel regression without robust SE; 
- Model D: multilevel regression with robust SE. 
As illustrated in the table below, when comparing Model A and Model B, coefficients are identical 
(as expected), whereas CIs are broader in Model A. Nevertheless, the difference in CIs is marginal. 
Results from Model C are almost identical to the previous OLS regression models. Multilevel 
regressions provide also the residual ICC. Once controlled for baseline EQ-5D scores in a multilevel 
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regression, the residual estimated ICC is zero. It seems that there is thus no actual impact of 
clusters. 
OLS regression models 
 Model A: OLS without taking into 
account clusters 
Model B: OLS with SE adjusted for 
clusters 
Dependent variable: QALYs Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:       
Brief Advice -0.023 -0.056 0.011 -0.023 -0.060 0.014 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling -0.028 -0.062 0.007 -0.028 -0.056 0.001 
Baseline EQ-5D 0.675 0.610 0.740 0.675 0.594 0.756 
Constant 0.296 0.236 0.356 0.296 0.217 0.375 
Multilevel models 
 Model C: Multilevel model 
Model D: Multilevel model  with SE 
adjusted for clusters 
Dependent variable: QALYs Coefficient 95% CI Coefficient 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:       
Brief Advice -0.023 -0.056 0.010 -0.023 -0.060 0.014 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling -0.028 -0.062 0.007 -0.028 -0.056 0.001 
Baseline EQ-5D 0.675 0.611 0.740 0.675 0.595 0.755 
Constant 0.296 0.237 0.355 0.296 0.218 0.374 
ICC 0   0   
 
Given the structure of the clusters and with the support of these results, it appears that the impact 
of the clusters on QALYs (the main health outcome) is negligible. Moreover, the analysis of SIPS 
from the health care perspective has mainly the aim of illustrating a method of economic evaluation 




D. Assumptions used in analysis of health care resource use data 
For each resource category, the resource use questionnaire was composed by two questions: a first 
generic ‘yes-no’ question about whether or not the resource was used in the previous six months, 
and a second question recording the quantity used56. 
If the individual answered ‘yes’ to the first generic question, then the resource intensity use should 
also have been recorded. Nevertheless, some individuals answered ‘yes’ to generic health care 
resource consumption questions, but did not report a specific value for resource use. Over a total 
of 18,139 resource use values reported, 18,083 were correctly recorded (i.e. a ‘no’ in the first 
question corresponded to a missing or a null resource consumption, or a ‘yes’ corresponded to a 
stated resource use), and an additional 56 were missing. 
To better illustrate this problem, a practical example of the issue is reported in the table below, 
which summarises the calls to the drinkline in the first 6 months. Out of three patients who called 
the drinkline, only one reported the number of contacts. 
ID Intervention 
Have you called the 
drinkline in the past 6 
months? 
Number of  
contacts 
51345 Minimal Yes Missing 
52865 Minimal Yes 14 
50744 Brief Advice Yes Missing 
 
At this initial stage of the analysis, the aim was to enlarge the complete cases data set on the basis 
of alternative assumptions on the missing information about resource use when the generic 
resource use was instead stated. However, it must be stressed that at both month 6 and 12, for 
most of the health resource use data categories there was no need for imputing any consumption 
value (e.g. only 0.6%, 0.5% and 0.2% missing values at 6 months were found). Consequently, the 
assumptions made about the data are unlikely to affect the final results much. 
Two alternative scenarios were explored. 
- The ‘minimum imputation scenario’ was based on the assumption that if the generic 
resource use was stated (i.e. the answer to the question about resource use has been ‘yes’), 
                                                          
 
56 For questionnaires where some questions were answered and others were not, missing were treated as 
negatives where questions before and after had ‘yes’ ticked. 
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a minimum consumption value of one was certain. For this reason, the 56 missing 
observations were replaced with the minimum certain consumption (i.e. 1). 
- The ‘mean imputation scenario’ was based on mean imputation. For those individuals who 
answered ‘yes’ to the resource use question, but did not report the resource use 
consumption, the missing resource use was replaced with the mean consumption of the 
individuals who had a positive resource use in the same group. In cases where the 
observation was unique and it was therefore not feasible to compute the mean of the 
group, the minimum certain consumption (i.e. 1) was imputed. Out of 56 cases, 17 were 
unique observations in their group, and the minimum consumption was imputed. 
Going back to the example illustrated in the previous table, in the ‘minimum imputation scenario’, 
the missing values for individuals with IDs 51345 and 50744 were replaced with 1 (the minimum 
certain value of contacts). In the ‘mean imputation scenario’, the missing value for individual 51345 
was replaced with the mean value of their treatment group (i.e. 14). With regard to the missing 
value for individual 50744, it was not possible to compute the mean value for the BA group, 
therefore the missing value was replaced with 1 when performing the mean imputation. 
The resulting summary of the resources use at month 6 and 12 in the three scenarios (based on 
original data, mean and minimum imputation) is reported at the end of this section. 
Looking at the categories that include at least one imputed value for the resource use, it is clear in 
most cases there are no considerable differences in the three scenarios. The main differences can 
be found in counselling both at six and twelve months, and in drinkline calls, detoxification and the 
overnight residential programme at six months. As regards the calls to the drinkline, these have a 
really marginal impact on the resource use cost; therefore, there is no real difference in using the 
scenario based on mean or minimum imputation. Detoxification instead, has a bigger impact on 
costs, but again the two scenarios are equivalent because the same values are imputed and the 
resulting resource use is the same. This is because in all these cases the observations were unique 
and there was no mean consumption to be calculated for the group. On the contrary, looking at the 
overnight residential programme, resource uses are considerably different between the two 
scenarios. The same applies to counselling, where the resource use consumption was higher at both 
6 and 12 months in the ‘mean imputation’ scenario in all intervention groups. 
The main argument in support of the ‘minimum imputation scenario’ is that the distributions are 
positively skewed and therefore mean imputation might potentially give higher weight to outliers. 
We cannot be certain that people reporting the generic use of the resource without the specific 
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quantity used did actually consume the resource; under the assumption that individuals did actually 
consume the resources, the minimum consumption would be the only certain value we could 
impute. However, as a counter-argument, especially as regards counselling and overnight 
residential programme, it would probably make sense that the resource is used more than once, 
and it might be more realistic to impute the mean value. If with mean imputation there might be a 
risk of overestimating the resource use consumption, with minimum imputation there might be 
instead a risk of underestimating it. Moreover, it must be noticed that there are also individuals 
that answered ‘yes’, but then explicitly reported zero consumption of the resources; these 
individuals were included when calculating the average group consumption of the resources, and 
they might balance the presence of outliers with very high consumption values. 
Having established these premises, and keeping in mind the aforementioned almost negligible role 
of imputed values, the mean imputation scenario was taken as the reference case. All the following 
analyses will be based on the original dataset adjusted for the imputations under the mean case 
scenario. As a final note, it must be stressed that the treatment of missing values is not the primary 





Health care resource use at month 6 
 CIL BA BLC 
 Original Mean Minimum Original Mean Minimum Original Mean Minimum 
Drinkline calls 0.1 (1.2) 119 0.2 (1.7) 1 0.1 (1.2) 1 0 (0) 128 0 (0) 1 0 (0) 1 0 (0) 110 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Counselling 0.1 (0.8) 115 0.2 (0.9) 5 0.1 (0.8) 5 0.5 (2.7) 126 0.7 (2.8) 3 0.5 (2.6) 3 0.3 (2.3) 109 0.3 (2.3) 1 0.3 (2.3) 1 
Day care 0 (0.1) 118 0 (0.3) 2 0 (0.2) 2 0 (0.4) 129 0 (0.4) 0 0 (0.4) 0 0 (0) 110 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Detoxification 0 (0) 118 0 (0.1) 2 0 (0.1) 2 0 (0.5) 127 0.1 (0.7) 2 0 (0.5) 2 0 (0) 109 0 (0) 1 0 (0) 1 
Outpatient treatment for drinking problems 0 (0) 118 0 (0.1) 2 0 (0.1) 2 0 (0) 128 0 (0.1) 1 0 (0.1) 1 0 (0.1) 110 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 0 
Overnight hospital detoxification 0 (0) 120 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 128 0 (0) 1 0 (0) 1 0.1 (1.6) 110 0.1 (1.6) 0 0.1 (1.6) 0 
Overnight after care hostel 0 (0) 120 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 129 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 110 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Overnight alcohol treatment facility 0 (0) 120 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 128 0 (0) 1 0 (0) 1 0 (0) 110 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Overnight residential programme 0 (0) 119 0 (0) 1 0 (0) 1 1.4 (16) 128 2.8 (22.5) 1 1.4 (16) 1 0 (0) 110 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
A&E visits leading to not admitted 0.1 (0.5) 119 0.1 (0.5) 0 0.1 (0.5) 0 0.2 (0.6) 128 0.2 (0.6) 0 0.2 (0.6) 0 0.1 (0.5) 109 0.1 (0.5) 0 0.1 (0.5) 0 
A&E visits leading to admitted 0 (0.2) 119 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.3) 128 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.2) 109 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 
Inpatient nights 0 (0.4) 120 0 (0.4) 0 0 (0.4) 0 0 (0.5) 129 0 (0.5) 0 0 (0.5) 0 0.1 (0.8) 110 0.1 (0.8) 0 0.1 (0.8) 0 
Outpatient visits 0.2 (1) 118 0.3 (1) 2 0.2 (1) 2 0.4 (1.8) 129 0.4 (1.8) 0 0.4 (1.8) 0 0.2 (0.9) 108 0.2 (0.9) 1 0.2 (0.9) 1 
Day case visits 0 (0.1) 120 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 0 0.1 (1.1) 129 0.1 (1.1) 0 0.1 (1.1) 0 0 (0.1) 109 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 0 
Emergency ambulance travels 0.2 (1.8) 120 0.2 (1.8) 0 0.2 (1.8) 0 0 (0.3) 129 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 110 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 0 
Ambulance travels 0 (0) 120 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 130 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 109 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Private travels 0 (0) 120 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0.1) 130 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 0 0.2 (2.8) 109 0.2 (2.8) 0 0.2 (2.8) 0 
GP visits 1.4 (3.3) 119 1.4 (3.3) 1 1.4 (3.3) 1 1.9 (3.2) 125 1.9 (3.2) 1 1.8 (3.2) 1 1.4 (2.3) 107 1.5 (2.3) 1 1.4 (2.3) 1 
Nurse visits 0.2 (0.8) 119 0.2 (0.8) 1 0.2 (0.8) 1 0.5 (1.6) 125 0.5 (1.6) 1 0.5 (1.6) 1 0.2 (1) 107 0.2 (1) 1 0.2 (1) 1 
Social worker visits 0.1 (0.8) 120 0.1 (0.8) 0 0.1 (0.8) 0 0.4 (2.7) 128 0.4 (2.7) 0 0.4 (2.7) 0 0.1 (0.7) 109 0.1 (0.7) 0 0.1 (0.7) 0 
Home Visit: GP 0 (0) 120 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0.1) 128 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.2) 109 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 
Home Visit: Nurse 0 (0) 120 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 128 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 109 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Home Visit: Community psychiatric nurse 0 (0) 120 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0.6) 127 0 (0.6) 1 0 (0.6) 1 0 (0) 109 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Home Visit: Others 0 (0.2) 120 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 128 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0) 109 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Home Visits: Social worker 0 (0.1) 120 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 0 0.3 (2.4) 127 0.3 (2.4) 0 0.3 (2.4) 0 0.1 (0.5) 108 0.1 (0.5) 1 0.1 (0.5) 1 
NHS Direct events 0 (0.2) 119 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 127 0 (0.2) 1 0 (0.2) 1 0 (0.2) 109 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 
NHS walk in events 0 (0.2) 115 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 0.2 (0.8) 124 0.2 (0.9) 2 0.2 (0.8) 2 0 (0.3) 108 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 0 
For the ‘original’ scenario, the table reports: mean (SD) observations 








Health care resource use at month 12 
 CIL BA BLC 
 Original Mean Minimum Original Mean Minimum Original Mean Minimum 
Drinkline calls 0 (0.1) 99 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0) 114 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 99 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Counselling 1 (5.8) 98 1.1 (5.8) 1 1 (5.8) 1 1.4 (11) 114 1.4 (11) 0 1.4 (11) 0 1 (5.2) 97 1.2 (5.3) 2 1 (5.1) 2 
Day care 0 (0) 98 0 (0.1) 1 0 (0.1) 1 0 (0) 114 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0.1 (0.8) 99 0.1 (0.8) 0 0.1 (0.8) 0 
Detoxification 0 (0) 99 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 113 0 (0) 1 0 (0) 1 0 (0.8) 99 0 (0.8) 0 0 (0.8) 0 
Outpatient treatment for drinking problems 0 (0) 98 0 (0.1) 1 0 (0.1) 1 0 (0) 113 0 (0) 1 0 (0) 1 0 (0.8) 99 0 (0.8) 0 0 (0.8) 0 
Overnight hospital detoxification 0.2 (2.8) 100 0.2 (2.8) 0 0.2 (2.8) 0 0 (0) 113 0 (0) 1 0 (0) 1 0 (0) 99 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Overnight after care hostel 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 114 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 99 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Overnight alcohol treatment facility 0 (0) 99 0 (0.1) 1 0 (0.1) 1 0 (0) 114 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 99 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Overnight residential programme 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 114 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 99 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
A&E visits leading to not admitted 0.1 (0.4) 102 0.1 (0.4) 0 0.1 (0.4) 0 0.2 (0.6) 115 0.2 (0.6) 0 0.2 (0.6) 0 0.1 (0.4) 99 0.1 (0.4) 0 0.1 (0.4) 0 
A&E visits leading to admitted 0 (0.2) 102 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.4) 115 0 (0.4) 0 0 (0.4) 0 0 (0.2) 99 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 
Inpatient nights 0.3 (2.8) 102 0.3 (2.8) 0 0.3 (2.8) 0 0.7 (4.5) 115 0.7 (4.5) 0 0.7 (4.5) 0 0.1 (0.7) 99 0.1 (0.7) 0 0.1 (0.7) 0 
Outpatient visits 0.6 (3.6) 101 0.7 (3.7) 1 0.6 (3.6) 1 0.6 (2.2) 114 0.7 (2.2) 1 0.6 (2.2) 1 0.4 (1.6) 99 0.4 (1.6) 0 0.4 (1.6) 0 
Day case visits 0 (0.1) 102 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 115 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 98 0 (0.1) 1 0 (0.1) 1 
Emergency ambulance travels 0 (0.3) 102 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 0 0.4 (4.6) 115 0.4 (4.6) 0 0.4 (4.6) 0 0.1 (0.5) 99 0.1 (0.5) 0 0.1 (0.5) 0 
Ambulance travels 0 (0.1) 102 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.2) 115 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0) 99 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Private travels 0.1 (1.5) 102 0.1 (1.5) 0 0.1 (1.5) 0 0 (0.1) 115 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0.1) 0 0 (0) 99 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
GP visits 1.4 (2.9) 101 1.4 (2.9) 1 1.4 (2.9) 1 2.4 (5.7) 115 2.4 (5.7) 0 2.4 (5.7) 0 1.5 (3.2) 99 1.5 (3.2) 0 1.5 (3.2) 0 
Nurse visits 0.6 (2.2) 101 0.7 (2.2) 1 0.6 (2.2) 1 0.2 (1.1) 115 0.2 (1.1) 0 0.2 (1.1) 0 0.1 (0.6) 99 0.1 (0.6) 0 0.1 (0.6) 0 
Social worker visits 0.2 (1.7) 102 0.2 (1.7) 0 0.2 (1.7) 0 0.2 (1.6) 114 0.3 (1.7) 1 0.2 (1.6) 1 0.7 (7) 99 0.7 (7) 0 0.7 (7) 0 
Home Visit: GP 0 (0) 102 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0.3) 115 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 99 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 0 
Home Visit: Nurse 0 (0.8) 102 0 (0.8) 0 0 (0.8) 0 0 (0.3) 115 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 99 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 0 
Home Visit: Community psychiatric nurse 0 (0.5) 102 0 (0.5) 0 0 (0.5) 0 0.1 (1.2) 115 0.1 (1.2) 0 0.1 (1.2) 0 0 (0) 99 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Home Visit: Others 0 (0) 102 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 115 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 99 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Home Visits: Social worker 0.1 (0.7) 101 0.1 (0.7) 0 0.1 (0.7) 0 0.3 (1.7) 113 0.3 (1.9) 1 0.3 (1.7) 1 0 (0.4) 97 0 (0.4) 0 0 (0.4) 0 
NHS Direct events 0 (0.2) 102 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 115 0 (0.2) 0 0 (0.2) 0 0.1 (0.4) 97 0.1 (0.4) 0 0.1 (0.4) 0 
NHS walk in events 0 (0.3) 102 0 (0.3) 0 0 (0.3) 0 0.1 (1.2) 111 0.1 (1.2) 0 0.1 (1.2) 0 0 (0.3) 98 0 (0.3) 1 0 (0.3) 1 
For the ‘original’ scenario, the table reports: mean (SD) observations 







Total health care resource use after 12 months (complete cases) 
  Original scenario Mean imputation Minimum imputation 
  CIL BA BLC CIL BA BLC CIL BA BLC 
Drinkline calls 0.17 (1.51) 86 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 87 0.17 (1.51) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0.17 (1.51) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Counselling 0.98 (5.82) 83 1.98(12.29) 100 1.54 (6.34) 85 1.15 (5.81) 3 1.98 (12.29) 0 1.78 (6.48) 2 1.01 (5.72) 3 1.98 (12.29) 0 1.54 (6.26) 2 
Day care 0.02 (0.21) 84 0 (0) 100 0.11 (0.88) 87 0.05 (0.32) 2 0 (0) 0 0.11 (0.88) 0 0.04 (0.26) 2 0 (0) 0 0.11 (0.88) 0 
Detoxification 0 (0) 85 0.02 (0.2) 99 0 (0) 86 0.01 (0.1) 1 0.03 (0.22) 1 0.1 (0.96) 1 0.01 (0.1) 1 0.03 (0.22) 1 0.1 (0.96) 1 
Outpatient treatment for drinking 
problems 
0 (0) 84 0.01 (0.1) 100 0.11 (0.86) 87 0.02 (0.15) 2 0.01 (0.1) 0 0.11 (0.86) 0 0.02 (0.15) 2 0.01 (0.1) 0 0.11 (0.86) 0 
Overnight hospital detoxification 0 (0) 87 0 (0) 100 0.19 (1.82) 87 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0.19 (1.82) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0.19 (1.82) 0 
Overnight after care hostel 0 (0) 87 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 87 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Overnight alcohol treatment facility 0 (0) 86 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 87 0.01 (0.1) 1 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0.01 (0.1) 1 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Overnight residential programme 0 (0) 86 0 (0) 100 0 (0) 87 0.01 (0.1) 1 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0.01 (0.1) 1 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
A&E visits leading to not admitted 0.27 (0.72) 88 0.51 (1) 101 0.37 (0.86) 86 0.27 (0.72) 0 0.51 (1) 0 0.37 (0.86) 0 0.27 (0.72) 0 0.51 (1) 0 0.37 (0.86) 0 
A&E visits leading to admitted 0.06 (0.25) 88 0.09 (0.59) 101 0.09 (0.42) 86 0.06 (0.25) 0 0.09 (0.59) 0 0.09 (0.42) 0 0.06 (0.25) 0 0.09 (0.59) 0 0.09 (0.42) 0 
Inpatient nights 0.07 (0.4) 89 0.66 (4.16) 102 0.26 (1.05) 87 0.07 (0.4) 0 0.66 (4.16) 0 0.26 (1.05) 0 0.07 (0.4) 0 0.66 (4.16) 0 0.26 (1.05) 0 
Outpatient visits 0.95 (4.34) 87 1.06 (3.22) 102 0.68 (1.88) 85 1.06 (4.37) 2 1.06 (3.22) 0 0.72 (1.91) 1 0.97 (4.29) 2 1.06 (3.22) 0 0.7 (1.89) 1 
Day case visits 0.03 (0.18) 89 0.15 (1.2) 102 0.03 (0.18) 85 0.03 (0.18) 0 0.15 (1.2) 0 0.04 (0.21) 1 0.03 (0.18) 0 0.15 (1.2) 0 0.04 (0.21) 1 
Emergency ambulance travels 0.38 (2.26) 89 0.08 (0.44) 102 0.18 (0.82) 87 0.38 (2.26) 0 0.08 (0.44) 0 0.18 (0.82) 0 0.38 (2.26) 0 0.08 (0.44) 0 0.18 (0.82) 0 
Ambulance travels 0.02 (0.21) 89 0 (0.09) 102 0 (0) 86 0.02 (0.21) 0 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0) 0 0.02 (0.21) 0 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0) 0 
Private travels 0.17 (1.69) 89 0.02 (0.16) 102 0.34 (3.23) 86 0.17 (1.69) 0 0.02 (0.16) 0 0.34 (3.23) 0 0.17 (1.69) 0 0.02 (0.16) 0 0.34 (3.23) 0 
GP visits 2.67 (4.18) 87 4.44 (8.49) 99 2.97 (4.65) 85 2.77 (4.2) 2 4.43 (8.44) 1 2.97 (4.62) 1 2.73 (4.16) 2 4.41 (8.45) 1 2.95 (4.62) 1 
Nurse visits 0.94 (2.33) 87 0.73 (2.02) 99 0.54 (1.41) 85 1.05 (2.52) 2 0.73 (2.01) 1 0.54 (1.4) 1 1.05 (2.54) 2 0.74 (2.01) 1 0.54 (1.4) 1 
Social worker visits 0.47 (2.35) 89 0.75 (4.21) 100 0.2 (0.94) 86 0.47 (2.35) 0 0.8 (4.22) 1 0.2 (0.94) 0 0.47 (2.35) 0 0.75 (4.18) 1 0.2 (0.94) 0 
Home Visit: GP 0.01 (0.1) 89 0.06 (0.43) 101 0.06 (0.45) 86 0.01 (0.1) 0 0.06 (0.43) 0 0.06 (0.45) 0 0.01 (0.1) 0 0.06 (0.43) 0 0.06 (0.45) 0 
Home Visit: Nurse 0.1 (0.95) 89 0.04 (0.4) 101 0.03 (0.32) 86 0.1 (0.95) 0 0.04 (0.4) 0 0.03 (0.32) 0 0.1 (0.95) 0 0.04 (0.4) 0 0.03 (0.32) 0 
Home Visit: Community psychiatric nurse 0 (0) 89 0.23 (1.47) 100 0.01 (0.1) 86 0 (0) 0 0.25 (1.48) 1 0.01 (0.1) 0 0 (0) 0 0.23 (1.47) 1 0.01 (0.1) 0 
Home Visit: Others 0.03 (0.31) 89 0.02 (0.29) 101 0 (0) 86 0.03 (0.31) 0 0.02 (0.29) 0 0 (0) 0 0.03 (0.31) 0 0.02 (0.29) 0 0 (0) 0 
Home Visits: Social worker 0.15 (0.85) 88 0.84 (3.82) 99 0.2 (0.76) 83 0.15 (0.85) 0 0.93 (3.88) 1 0.23 (0.8) 1 0.15 (0.85) 0 0.85 (3.8) 1 0.21 (0.76) 1 
NHS Direct events 0.11 (0.41) 88 0.11 (0.44) 100 0.1 (0.49) 84 0.11 (0.41) 0 0.11 (0.45) 1 0.1 (0.49) 0 0.11 (0.41) 0 0.11 (0.45) 1 0.1 (0.49) 0 
NHS walk in events 0.12 (0.37) 85 0.38 (1.08) 93 0.15 (0.56) 85 0.12 (0.37) 0 0.42 (1.1) 2 0.16 (0.57) 1 0.12 (0.37) 0 0.4 (1.07) 2 0.16 (0.57) 1 
For the ‘original’ scenario based on assumptions, the table reports: mean (SD) observations 

























Intervention costs               X 
Drinkline calls    X        
Counselling    X        
Day care    X        
Detoxification    X        
Outpatient treatment for drinking problems    X        
Overnight hospital detoxification     X       
Overnight after care hostel     X       
Overnight alcohol treatment facility     X       
Overnight residential programme     X       
A&E visits leading to not admitted   X         
A&E visits leading to admitted   X         
Inpatient nights   X         
Outpatient visits   X         
Day case visits   X         
Emergency ambulance travels        X    
Ambulance travels        X    
Private travels         X   
GP visits X          
Nurse visits X          
Social worker visits      X      
Home Visit: GP X          
Home Visit: Nurse X          
Home Visit: Community psychiatric nurse       X     
Home Visit: Others       X     
Home Visits: Social worker      X      
NHS Direct events   X         








F. CEA results based on SURs without adjusting for baseline costs 
ICERs and INMBs 
 BA vs CIL BLC vs CIL 
ICER (£/QALY) -39492 -9966 
INMB, k = £13,000 per QALY (£) -987 -449 
INMB, k = £20,000 per QALY (£) -1119 -586 

















G. Parametric CEACs 
Parametric CEACs without adjusting for baseline health care costs 
 





H. Multiple imputation 
Proportions of missing data for all health care related variables included in the analysis 
Description 
Baseline 6 months 12 months 
Missing values, % Missing values, % Missing values, % 
Total CIL BA BLC Total CIL BA BLC Total CIL BA BLC 
Age in years 0 0 1 0                 
Gender 0 0 0 0            
Ethnicity 0 0 0 0            
Marital Status 0 0 0 0            
Education after 16 years 0 1 0 0            
Possess degree or equivalent 0 0 0 1            
Smoke tobacco 0 0 1 1            
Location reference (cluster) 0 0 0 0            
Intervention allocation 0 0 0 0            
Baseline and outcome variables for health-related quality of life 
EQ-5D index score 4 3 4 4 34 37 29 36 41 45 37 40 
Total QALYs over 1 year*           51 55 49 50 
Other baseline and outcome variables 
AUDIT score 1 2 0 1 33 36 29 34 41 45 38 40 
Readiness to change 0 1 0 1 33 37 28 35 42 45 37 42 
APQ score     31 35 26 33 40 44 35 39 
Outcome variables for costs 
Drinkline calls     32 35 28 33 41 46 36 39 
Counselling     32 35 28 33 41 46 36 39 
Day care     32 35 28 33 41 46 36 39 
Detoxification     32 35 28 33 41 46 36 39 
Outpatient treatment for drinking 
problems 
    32 35 28 33 41 46 36 39 
Overnight hospital detoxification     32 35 28 33 40 46 36 39 
Overnight after care hostel     32 35 28 33 40 46 36 39 
Overnight alcohol treatment facility     32 35 28 33 40 46 36 39 
Overnight residential programme     32 35 28 33 40 46 36 39 
A&E visits leading to not admitted     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 39 
A&E visits leading to admitted     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 39 
Inpatient nights     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 39 
Outpatient visits     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 39 
Day case visits     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 39 
Emergency ambulance travels     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 39 
Ambulance travels     32 35 27 33 40 45 35 39 
Private travels     32 35 27 33 40 45 35 39 
GP visits     33 35 29 34 40 45 35 39 
Nurse visits     33 35 29 34 40 45 35 39 
Social worker visits     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 39 
Home Visit: GP     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 39 
Home Visit: Nurse     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 39 
Home Visit: Community psychiatric nurse     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 39 
Home Visit: Others     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 39 
Home Visits: Social worker     32 35 29 33 41 45 36 40 
NHS Direct events     32 35 28 33 40 45 35 40 
NHS walk in events     34 38 29 34 41 45 38 39 
Intervention costs         0 0 0 0 
Total costs over 1 year*         
    
52 56 49 50 
* Total QALYs and total costs over 1 year refer to the sum of QALYs and costs over the individuals with complete data for 





Associations of health outcomes missingness with baseline variables and observed outcomes 
 
  EQ-5D month 6 EQ-5D month 12 EQ-5D month 12 
  Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI 
Baseline EQ-5D 0.339 -0.659 1.337 0.843 -0.123 1.808 0.985 -0.644 2.613 
Age 0.025 0.002 0.048 0.039 0.017 0.062 0.044 0.008 0.079 
Gender   
           
Male -0.417 -1.013 0.180 -0.501 -1.069 0.068 -0.039 -0.884 0.807 
Ethnicity   
           
Black -0.006 -0.591 0.580 -0.385 -0.941 0.171 -0.651 -1.469 0.167 
Asian -0.029 -1.305 1.247 -0.980 -2.196 0.236 -2.462 -4.314 -0.611 
Mixed 0.017 -1.131 1.164 -0.815 -1.907 0.277 -2.018 -3.505 -0.531 
Other -0.002 -1.855 1.852 -0.033 -1.925 1.860 -1.179 -3.713 1.354 
Marital Status   
           
Living with partner 0.202 -0.368 0.772 -0.112 -0.656 0.433 -0.014 -0.884 0.857 
Married -0.709 -1.560 0.142 0.151 -0.751 1.054 1.314 -1.034 3.662 
Separated 0.038 -0.865 0.942 -0.509 -1.348 0.329 -0.720 -1.950 0.510 
Divorced 1.401 -0.139 2.941 0.001 -1.089 1.090 -1.014 -2.353 0.325 
Widowed 0.000 
   0.000    0.000   
Education after 16 years   
           
Yes -0.111 -0.571 0.348 -0.161 -0.604 0.281 -0.014 -0.712 0.684 
Possess degree or equivalent   
           
Yes 0.261 -0.365 0.888 0.550 -0.060 1.160 0.559 -0.396 1.514 
Smoke tobacco   
           
Ex-smoker 0.509 -0.258 1.276 0.182 -0.533 0.897 0.110 -1.013 1.233 
Never smoked 0.582 -0.085 1.248 0.219 -0.398 0.835 0.191 -0.716 1.098 
Baseline AUDIT score -0.026 -0.051 0.000 -0.016 -0.041 0.009 0.010 -0.039 0.060 
Baseline RCR   
           
Sometimes think about drink.. 0.392 -0.214 0.999 0.198 -0.383 0.779 -0.620 -1.544 0.305 
I have decided to drink less 0.331 -0.302 0.964 0.292 -0.317 0.900 -0.121 -1.139 0.897 
Already trying to cut down 0.393 -0.137 0.922 0.657 0.144 1.171 0.156 -0.737 1.048 
Month 6 EQ-5D   
        -1.203 -3.096 0.691 
Month 6 AUDIT score   
        -0.046 -0.103 0.011 
Month 6 APQ score   
        -0.016 -0.108 0.076 
Month 6 RCR   
           
Sometimes think about drink..   
        0.888 -0.121 1.896 
I have decided to drink less   
        0.581 -0.387 1.549 
Already trying to cut down   
        0.948 0.056 1.839 




Associations of health care costs missingness with baseline variables 
 
 
Hospital and AED Visits and home visits Treatment for drinking problems 
  Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI 
Baseline EQ-5D 0.689 -0.287 1.665 0.689 -0.287 1.665 0.653 -0.324 1.630 
Age 0.041 0.019 0.064 0.041 0.019 0.064 0.043 0.020 0.066 
Gender   
          
Male -0.588 -1.169 -0.007 -0.588 -1.169 -0.007 -0.605 -1.185 -0.025 
Ethnicity   
          
Black -0.399 -0.960 0.161 -0.399 -0.960 0.161 -0.377 -0.937 0.184 
Asian -1.036 -2.254 0.181 -1.036 -2.254 0.181 -1.016 -2.235 0.202 
Mixed -0.909 -2.006 0.188 -0.909 -2.006 0.188 -0.873 -1.968 0.223 
Other -0.093 -1.989 1.803 -0.093 -1.989 1.803 -0.065 -1.959 1.828 
Marital Status   
          
Living with partner -0.131 -0.680 0.419 -0.131 -0.680 0.419 -0.110 -0.659 0.438 
Married 0.076 -0.834 0.987 0.076 -0.834 0.987 0.081 -0.830 0.991 
Separated -0.621 -1.465 0.223 -0.621 -1.465 0.223 -0.606 -1.450 0.238 
Divorced -0.118 -1.216 0.980 -0.118 -1.216 0.980 -0.127 -1.225 0.970 
Widowed 0.000 
   0.000   0.000   
Education after 16 
years 
            
Yes -0.141 -0.587 0.305 -0.141 -0.587 0.305 -0.124 -0.570 0.321 
Possess degree or 
equivalent 
            
Yes 0.565 -0.054 1.183 0.565 -0.054 1.183 0.490 -0.123 1.104 
Smoke tobacco   
          
Ex-smoker 0.124 -0.595 0.843 0.124 -0.595 0.843 0.149 -0.569 0.867 
Never smoked 0.253 -0.372 0.879 0.253 -0.372 0.879 0.284 -0.341 0.910 
Baseline AUDIT 
score 
-0.017 -0.042 0.009 -0.017 -0.042 0.009 -0.015 -0.041 0.010 
Baseline RCR   
          
Sometimes think 
about drink.. 
0.222 -0.361 0.805 0.222 -0.361 0.805 0.171 -0.411 0.753 
I have decided to 
drink less 
0.392 -0.221 1.005 0.392 -0.221 1.005 0.380 -0.233 0.993 
Already trying to 
cut down 
0.729 0.212 1.246 0.729 0.212 1.246 0.691 0.175 1.207 





Associations of health outcomes and health care costs missingness with baseline variables 
and observed outcomes 
 
 
 Hospital and AED Visits and home visits Treatment for drinking problems EQ-5D month 12 
 
Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI 
Baseline EQ-5D 0.226 -1.378 1.831 0.226 -1.378 1.831 0.084 -1.522 1.689 4.391 -1.600 10.382 
Age 0.056 0.021 0.090 0.056 0.021 0.090 0.059 0.025 0.094 0.026 -0.119 0.172 
Gender                 
Male -0.475 -1.330 0.379 -0.475 -1.330 0.379 -0.511 -1.359 0.337 1.502 -1.087 4.090 
Ethnicity                 
Black -0.510 -1.313 0.293 -0.510 -1.313 0.293 -0.454 -1.253 0.346 0.135 -4.191 4.460 
Asian -1.958 -3.557 -0.359 -1.958 -3.557 -0.359 -1.906 -3.511 -0.302 0.000   
Mixed -1.682 -3.007 -0.356 -1.682 -3.007 -0.356 -1.585 -2.911 -0.260 0.000   
Other -0.872 -3.313 1.569 -0.872 -3.313 1.569 -0.815 -3.248 1.618 0.000   
Marital Status                 
Living with partner -0.428 -1.211 0.356 -0.428 -1.211 0.356 -0.375 -1.154 0.404 0.094 -3.212 3.401 
Married 1.015 -0.802 2.833 1.015 -0.802 2.833 1.020 -0.786 2.826 0.000   
Separated -1.047 -2.190 0.097 -1.047 -2.190 0.097 -1.021 -2.163 0.122 0.000   
Divorced -1.289 -2.592 0.015 -1.289 -2.592 0.015 -1.285 -2.588 0.017 0.000   
Widowed 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
Education after 16 years                 
Yes -0.154 -0.802 0.494 -0.154 -0.802 0.494 -0.113 -0.757 0.531 -0.136 -2.814 2.542 
Possess degree or 
equivalent                 
Yes 0.555 -0.335 1.445 0.555 -0.335 1.445 0.395 -0.469 1.260 2.874 -3.433 9.180 
Smoke tobacco                 
Ex-smoker -0.158 -1.150 0.834 -0.158 -1.150 0.834 -0.111 -1.100 0.878 0.000   
Never smoked -0.030 -0.875 0.815 -0.030 -0.875 0.815 0.026 -0.817 0.868 -0.780 -4.086 2.526 
Baseline AUDIT score -0.003 -0.042 0.037 -0.003 -0.042 0.037 -0.001 -0.040 0.039 -0.040 -0.200 0.120 
Baseline RCR                 
Sometimes think about 
drink.. -0.206 -1.023 0.611 -0.206 -1.023 0.611 -0.305 -1.117 0.506 1.956 -2.234 6.145 
I have decided to drink 
less 0.549 -0.395 1.493 0.549 -0.395 1.493 0.539 -0.403 1.481 0.736 -2.163 3.634 
Already trying to cut 
down 0.651 -0.123 1.426 0.651 -0.123 1.426 0.575 -0.193 1.343 0.000   
Costs at 6 months                 
Hospital and AED 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 
Visits and home visits 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.008 -0.014 -0.001 
Treatment for drinking 
problems -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.026 -0.003 0.055 
Costs at 12 months                 
Hospital and AED             0.000 -0.002 0.002 
Visits and home visits             0.006 0.000 0.011 
Treatment for drinking 
problems             0.000 -0.002 0.002 
Constant -0.087 -2.270 2.097 -0.087 -2.270 2.097 -0.075 -2.259 2.109 -0.802 -9.259 7.654 
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Post-imputation diagnostics for hospital and AED costs at 6 months 
 





Post-imputation diagnostics for visits and home visits costs at 6 months 
 





Post-imputation diagnostics for treatment for drinking problems costs at 12 months 
 





Post-imputation diagnostics for EQ-5D scores at 6 months 
 





Results of the alternative CEA based on SUR without baseline costs adjustment 
 
 QALYs Costs 
  Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:         
BA -0.031 -0.061 -0.002 427.905 -122.943 978.754 
BLC -0.025 -0.055 0.005 -154.452 -653.863 344.958 
Baseline EQ-5D 0.584 0.518 0.650    
Constant 0.376 0.315 0.437 912.858 553.939 1271.777 
 
 
Compared to CIL ICER 
INMB 
(for k=13,000) 
BA Dominated -837 £ 








I. Examples of CEAs conducted in the CJS sector 
Authors Description Measure of effectiveness Results Potential issues 
(Griffith et al., 
1999) 
Examination of the cost-
effectiveness of corrections-
based treatment for drug 
abuse 
3-year re-incarceration 
Approximately $500 was needed to reduce 
the re-incarceration rate by 1% for low-risk 
parolees who completed treatment, 
compared to $165 for high risk parolees 
Only relative cost-effectiveness was determined 
(i.e. the option with the lowest ICER) 
(McCollister, 
French, Inciardi, 
et al., 2003) 
CEA of Delaware’s CREST 
Outreach Center, a work 
release therapeutic community 
(TC) and aftercare program for 
criminal offenders 
Number of days re-
incarcerated during an 18-
month, post-release follow-up 
period 
CREST program reduced incarceration for 
criminal offenders at an average cost of $65 
per day. By adding an aftercare component to 
the CREST work release program, a day of 
incarceration is avoided at an average cost of 
$19 per day 
Not clear if cost savings from avoided 
incarcerations were included in the cost 
estimation. 
Decision criteria employed was to compare ICER 
to the average daily cost of incarceration (i.e. if 






CEA of the Amity in-prison TC 
and Vista aftercare programs 
for criminal offenders in 
California 
Number of days incarcerated 
over the one-year follow-up 
period 
For the average offender, treatment reduced 
recidivism at a cost of $80 per incarceration 
day 
ICER considers only incremental treatment cost 
and incremental days incarcerated during 
follow-up. Decision criteria are vague and do not 
compare benefits (recidivism and cost savings) 
and opportunity costs 
(McCollister et 
al., 2004) 
Extension of previous CEA of 
the Amity in-prison TC and 
Vista aftercare programs for 
criminal offenders in southern 
California 
Number of days re-
incarcerated over a 5-year 
follow-up 
Estimated ICER of $65 
ICER is compared to the average daily cost of 
incarceration in California ($72) to determine 
cost-effectiveness 
(Daley et al., 
2004) 
Cost-effectiveness of four 
levels of substance abuse 
treatment programs for a 
sample of 831 offenders 
Reductions in the likelihood of 
re-arrest within six months, 
one year and 18 months post-
release. Recidivism includes 
re-arrest only 
The benefits (from the perspective of the 
Connecticut Department of Correction, and 
measured in terms of the costs of avoided re-
incarcerations) were from 1.8 to 5.7 times the 
cost of implementing the programs 
Results are presented as a comparison between 
costs and cost savings. Opportunity costs are not 
assessed. Cost savings are not included in the 
costs of the intervention and are used instead as 
a measure of benefit (instead of the natural 
units of offending). 
There is a value of reducing crime itself, and 
then there might be potential cost savings that 







(Shanahan et al., 
2004) 
CEA of an Australian adult drug 
court (ADC) program as an 
alternative to jail for criminal 
offenders addicted to illicit 
drugs 
Time to the first offense and 
offending frequency per unit 
time 
ADC was as cost-effective as were 
conventional sanctions in delaying the time to 
the first offense, and more cost-effective in 
reducing the frequency of offending for those 
outcome measures selected 
Estimated ICERs were not compared to any 
benchmark. It is not clear how conclusions about 
cost-effectiveness are drawn 
(Mansdotter et 
al., 2007) 
CEA of a multi-component 
alcohol prevention programme 
targeting licenced premises in 
Stockholm 
Savings due to prevented 
violence, and the health gains 
in terms of QALYs 
The base case cost-saving ratio was 1:39. 
236 gained QALYs for society as a whole. 
Cost-effective from the HC perspective 
Analysis of crime is only based on the 
comparison of intervention costs and cost 
savings. 
Cost-effectiveness from HC perspective does not 




CEA and cost-offset analysis of 
the dangerous severe 
personality disorder (DSPD) 
programme 
Serious reoffending  
In the CEA, the intervention programme was 
not cost-effective for all values a decision 
maker may be willing to pay for preventing a 
serious offence. 
In the cost-offset analysis, expected costs of 
the programme were greater than the 
monetary value of the expected benefits 
 
(Muser et al., 
2015) 
CEA for the Paliperidone 
palmitate Research In 
Demonstrating Effectiveness 
(PRIDE) trial 
Number of CJS events, number 
of incarceration events, 
number of incarcerations with 
a duration 42 days, and 
number of patients with at 
least one incarceration event 
ICERs ranged from $17,391 per CJS event 
avoided to $77,731 per patient that avoided 
any incarceration for the paliperidone 
palmitate group compared with the oral 
antipsychotic group. 
ICER per CJS event avoided was $24,409 for a 
15 month period, which is consistent with 
what a community might be willing to pay 
Community’s willingness to pay to prevent 
incarceration used as a benchmark for cost-
effectiveness. To inform decision an estimate of 










J. The Peterborough Social Impact Bond 
According to Fox and Albertson (2011), the first pilot model based on SIB in the English and Welsh 
CJS was the prisoner resettlement project at Her Majesty’s Prison Peterborough (Fox & Albertson, 
2011). In 2010, 17 private investors (through Social Finance) committed £5 million to the 
Peterborough SIB to fund a series of rehabilitative interventions. The Ministry of Justice and the Big 
Lottery Fund agreed to pay an outcome payment of up to £8 million based on the performance over 
8 years of three cohorts of 1,000 offenders each (Social Finance, 2017). The British Broadcasting 
Corporation suggested that a comparable rate of return on investment in a conventional bond-
market was 7.5% per year57 (BBC, 2010). This return on investment was agreed to be paid in the 
event of a reduction in the frequency of reconviction events of at least 10% in each of the cohorts, 
and/or a reduction of 7.5% in the combination of those cohorts that do not achieve the 10% 
reduction (Disley et al., 2015). 
Reductions in reconviction frequency (calculated using data held on the Police National Computer, 
PNC) in the SIB cohort were compared to the number of reconviction events for a comparison group 
drawn from individuals released from other similar prisons who have similar characteristics  (Cave 
et al., 2012). The frequency of reconviction events was selected as the outcome metric, rather than 
a binary measure of whether offenders were reconvicted or not. This had the objective of 
incentivising the service to continue to work with cohort members even if they were reconvicted 
(Disley et al., 2015). 
In 2015, the programme was terminated ahead of schedule for unspecified reasons, with only two 
cohorts of 1000 short-sentenced male prisoners for a period of up to 12 months post-release. The 
results for the first cohort showed a 8.4% reduction in the frequency of reconviction events (Jolliffe 
& Hedderman, 2014). The reduction in reoffending for the second cohort was 9.7%. While both 
reductions were below the 10% target required to trigger an outcome payment for the single 
cohort, the weighted average of the two cohorts was above the minimum threshold of 7.5% and 
sufficient to trigger an outcome payment (Anders & Dorsett, 2017). As a result, investors in the 
Peterborough Social Impact Bond were repaid in full and received a single payment representing 
their initial capital plus an amount represented by a return of just over 3% per annum for the period 
of investment (Social Finance, 2017).  
                                                          
 
57 In fact: 5m + 5m*0.075*8y = 8m 
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K. Regression outcomes for PNC data 
Poisson regression models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:         
  
Brief Advice -0.3554 [-0.7269, 0.016] -0.4151 [-0.7662, -0.064] -0.3208 [-0.6935, 0.0518] 
Brief Lifestyle 
Counselling 
-0.3044 [-0.7149, 0.106] -0.2683 [-0.7543, 0.2176] -0.2789 [-0.6915, 0.1335] 
Number of cautions 
prior to screening 
0.1765 [0.1367, 0.2163]     0.1686 [0.1253, 0.212] 
Number of times in last 
6 months been arrested 
or cautioned (at 
baseline) 
    0.1064 [0.0451, 0.1677] 0.0233 [-0.0331, 0.0798] 
Constant -0.2711 [-0.5649, 0.0226] 0.2280 [-0.0214, 0.4776] -0.2855 [-0.5864, 0.0154] 
AIC 1744   1965   1722 
 
BIC 1761   1982   1743 
 
Zero inflated negative binomial regression models 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:           
Brief Advice -0.3682 [-0.7242, -0.0123] -0.3431 [-0.7268, 0.0405] -0.3021 [-0.6566, 0.0523] 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling -0.4807 [-0.8504, -0.111] -0.1642 [-0.5478, 0.2193] -0.4553 [-0.8219, -0.0886] 
Number of cautions prior 
to screening 
0.1612 [0.1077, 0.2148]     0.1557 [0.105, 0.2065] 
Number of times in last 6 
months been arrested or 
cautioned (at baseline) 
    0.1280 [0.0224, 0.2336] 0.0257 [-0.0546, 0.1061] 
Constant 0.0509 [-0.3478, 0.4497] 0.3541 [-0.0107, 0.719] 0.0619 [-0.3052, 0.4292] 
Inflate         
  
Number of cautions prior 
to screening 
-0.2782 [-0.581, 0.0245]     -0.1110 [-0.2926, 0.0705] 
Number of times in last 6 
months been arrested or 
cautioned (at baseline) 
    -1.4571 [-2.836, -0.0781] -1.0541 [-2.0653, -0.043] 
Constant -0.6533 [-1.8018, 0.4952] -0.5484 [-1.3749, 0.278] -0.1153 [-0.9364, 0.7057] 
Alpha [overdispersion] 1.2444 [0.7062, 2.1928] 1.7369 [1.1921, 2.5307] 1.1305 [0.7084, 1.8039] 
AIC 1401   1415   1368  
BIC 1431   1444   1406  
zinb vs. zip Pr>=chibar2 =  0.0000 Pr>=chibar2 =  0.0000 Pr>=chibar2 =  0.0000 
zinb vs. nb Pr>z = 0.1580 Pr>z = 0.0622 Pr>z = 0.0362 
 
 
L. Criminal events (original, mean and minimum imputation scenarios) 
Criminal events at 6 months 
 CIL BA BLC 
 Original Mean Min Original Mean Min Original Mean Min 
Violent offences                   
Violence 0.08 (0.58) 115 0.11 (0.63) 2 0.1 (0.59) 2 0.11 (0.52) 128 0.13 (0.54) 2 0.13 (0.53) 2 0.16 (0.74) 107 0.2 (0.79) 2 0.18 (0.74) 2 
Assault 0.09 (0.42) 114 0.13 (0.47) 3 0.11 (0.43) 3 0.03 (0.17) 127 0.05 (0.22) 3 0.05 (0.22) 3 0.23 (1.22) 107 0.29 (1.29) 2 0.24 (1.21) 2 
Wounding 0.01 (0.13) 115 0.03 (0.18) 2 0.03 (0.18) 2 0.06 (0.62) 129 0.09 (0.7) 1 0.06 (0.62) 1 0.1 (0.78) 107 0.15 (0.85) 2 0.11 (0.79) 2 
Sexual offences 0 (0) 118 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 129 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 106 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Criminal offences              
Theft (non-vehicles) 0.11 (0.93) 117 0.14 (0.96) 1 0.12 (0.93) 1 0.06 (0.51) 127 0.12 (0.7) 2 0.07 (0.52) 2 0.23 (1.98) 105 0.31 (2.12) 1 0.24 (1.97) 1 
Vehicles theft 0 (0.09) 117 0.01 (0.12) 1 0.01 (0.12) 1 0 (0) 129 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0.09) 106 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0.09) 0 
Burglary 0 (0) 118 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0.09 (0.89) 129 0.09 (0.89) 0 0.09 (0.89) 0 0 (0) 106 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Criminal damage 0 (0.09) 118 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0.09) 0 0.09 (0.88) 129 0.09 (0.88) 0 0.09 (0.88) 0 0.06 (0.5) 106 0.06 (0.5) 0 0.06 (0.5) 0 
Robbery 0 (0) 118 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0.04 (0.27) 128 0.05 (0.3) 1 0.05 (0.28) 1 0 (0.09) 106 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0.09) 0 
Shop lifting 0 (0.09) 118 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0) 129 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 106 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Drug offences 0.01 (0.12) 118 0.01 (0.12) 0 0.01 (0.12) 0 0 (0) 129 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 106 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Driving offences 0.03 (0.22) 118 0.03 (0.22) 0 0.03 (0.22) 0 0.02 (0.15) 129 0.02 (0.15) 0 0.02 (0.15) 0 0 (0.09) 106 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0.09) 0 










Criminal events at 12 months 
 CIL BA BLC 
 Original Mean Min Original Mean Min Original Mean Min 
Violent offences                   
Violence 0.19 (0.77) 100 0.22 (0.8) 2 0.2 (0.77) 2 0.16 (0.73) 113 0.2 (0.78) 2 0.18 (0.73) 2 0.14 (0.71) 99 0.14 (0.71) 0 0.14 (0.71) 0 
Assault 0.15 (0.71) 100 0.18 (0.76) 2 0.16 (0.71) 2 0.21 (1.88) 113 0.29 (1.96) 2 0.22 (1.87) 2 0.09 (0.38) 99 0.09 (0.38) 0 0.09 (0.38) 0 
Wounding 0.06 (0.34) 100 0.08 (0.39) 2 0.07 (0.36) 2 0.17 (1.88) 113 0.52 (3.2) 2 0.19 (1.86) 2 0.05 (0.33) 99 0.05 (0.33) 0 0.05 (0.33) 0 
Sexual offences 0 (0.09) 101 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0) 112 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 95 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Criminal offences              
Theft (non-vehicles) 0.03 (0.22) 100 0.04 (0.26) 1 0.03 (0.24) 1 0 (0.09) 112 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0.09) 0 0.05 (0.27) 93 0.07 (0.31) 2 0.07 (0.3) 2 
Vehicles theft 0.01 (0.1) 100 0.01 (0.14) 1 0.01 (0.14) 1 0 (0) 112 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0.01 (0.1) 95 0.01 (0.1) 0 0.01 (0.1) 0 
Burglary 0.03 (0.3) 100 0.05 (0.42) 1 0.03 (0.31) 1 0.02 (0.21) 112 0.02 (0.21) 0 0.02 (0.21) 0 0 (0) 95 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Criminal damage 0.03 (0.3) 100 0.05 (0.42) 1 0.03 (0.31) 1 0.03 (0.23) 111 0.04 (0.26) 1 0.04 (0.24) 1 0.05 (0.22) 95 0.05 (0.22) 0 0.05 (0.22) 0 
Robbery 0.01 (0.1) 100 0.01 (0.14) 1 0.01 (0.14) 1 0.01 (0.18) 112 0.01 (0.18) 0 0.01 (0.18) 0 0 (0) 93 0.02 (0.14) 2 0.02 (0.14) 2 
Shop lifting 0 (0) 101 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 112 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 95 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 
Drug offences 0 (0.09) 101 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0) 112 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 0.01 (0.1) 95 0.01 (0.1) 0 0.01 (0.1) 0 
Driving offences 0 (0.09) 101 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0.09) 112 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0.09) 0 0 (0) 95 0 (0) 0 0 (0) 0 









Graph of the criminal events at 6 months (under mean imputation scenario) 
 
 





M. NB and ZINB regression models for self-reported data 
 
 Negative binomial Zero inflated negative binomial 
 Coeff. 95% CI Coeff. 95% CI 
Intervention allocation:         
Brief Advice 0.2136 [-0.7718, 1.1991] 0.4005 [-0.4408, 1.242] 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling 0.3006 [-0.9002, 1.5015] 0.4265 [-0.436, 1.2891] 
Number of times in last 6 months been 
arrested or cautioned (at baseline) 
0.0264 [-0.1775, 0.2305] -0.1134 [-0.3194, 0.0926] 
Constant 0.1288 [-0.5599, 0.8176] 0.6984 [-0.0461, 1.443] 
Inflate   
    
Number of times in last 6 months been 
arrested or cautioned (at baseline)   
-0.8716 [-1.7517, 0.0084] 
Constant   
0.2512 [-0.7599, 1.2623] 
Alpha 8.2288 [5.6319, 12.0232] 4.0983 [2.0821, 8.0669] 
AIC 649.4357  645.7260  
BIC 667.3532  670.8105  
zinb vs. zip    Pr>=chibar2 =  0.0000 





N. Proportion of individuals self-reporting at least one crime after the 
intervention 
In the figure below, the first (blue) and second (red) bars are based on self-reported data at six and 
twelve months, respectively; the third (green) bar is based on the complete cases. 
 
From the figure, it appears that individuals treated with CIL tend to self-report a higher number of 
crimes both after six and twelve months. Complete cases (i.e. obtained by aggregating six- and 
twelve-month data, if both are non-missing) show the same pattern. Higher values in the complete 
case scenario are due to a reduction of the sample: 360 individuals reported information at six 
months, 316 at twelve months, but only 278 complete cases were available. 
To estimate the appropriate odds ratios it was necessary to adjust the estimates for baseline 
differences. A logistic regression was performed using as the dependent variable the proportion of 
individuals self-reporting at least one crime in year following the intervention (complete cases 
only). For reasons of consistency, baseline adjustment was also based on self-reported data. 
Potential imbalances were adjusted using the proportions of individuals who reported that they 
were arrested or cautioned in the previous six months (presented in the first column of Table 5.3). 
Compared to CIL, resulting odds ratios associated with individuals treated with BA and BLC were 
0.5815 (95% CI: 0.2711, 1.2469) and 0.7138 (95% CI: 0.3257, 1.5643), respectively. Being allocated 
to BA or BLC is therefore associated with a (non-statistically significant) reduction in the risk of being 
committing another crime least once within one year after the intervention.  
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O. CEA of SIPS from the CJS perspective: further analyses 
Exploring the interaction between k and cost components of SIPS 
As explained in Section 5.9, the higher k, the greater INMBs associated with BA and BLC. This is 
because higher k means that the effectiveness (i.e. convictions avoided) of the programme is valued 
more in monetary terms. Nonetheless, when assessing the impact of alternative values of k, special 
caution must be taken if interpreting the results in natural terms, and not in monetary terms. 
When comparing BLC and BA to CIL, for construction, conclusions are always consistent if using 
INMB or INRB. In fact, looking at the INB measured in reconviction events (INRB), BLC and BA 
provide higher benefits than CIL because they are not much more expensive and are associated 
with greater reductions in crime (more reconvictions avoided). Nevertheless, higher k means that 
CJS is less efficient in avoiding reconviction episodes. In other words, the CJS has a lower marginal 
productivity and must invest more resources in preventing one criminal episode. For this reason, 
the higher k, the lower reductions in convictions can be obtained via cost savings. 
The trend of the INRB (increase in k, decrease in INRB) is therefore actually the opposite with 
respect to the INMB trend (increase in k, increase in INMB). For illustrative purposes, trends of INRB 
and INMB resulting from a univariate analysis are shown in Graphs A and B. 
  
The opposite trends of INMB and INRB are explained by the fact that cost savings are higher than 
the incremental intervention costs. This situation is described in Equation 5.10. 
R * CR > Cint     (5.10) 
In such a scenario, for growing values of k, the intervention is associated with higher INMBs, but 
also to fewer reconvictions avoided. In fact, the costs saving component of the OCs (that can be 
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expressed in further reconvictions averted) is greater than the costs of the intervention (i.e. the 
reductions in reconviction that cannot be obtained due to the resources spent to cover intervention 
costs). 
The discrepancy in the trends of INRB and INMB disapperars when cost savings are lower than 
incremental intervention costs. In fact, if the condition in Equation 5.11 is fulfilled, for growing 
values of k the intervention is again associated with higher INMBs. Nevertheless, the intervention 
is associated also to more reconvictions averted, because the OCs (i.e. potential reductions in 
reconvictions that cannot be obtained due to the intervention costs) become smaller when 
compared to the DEs (reductions in reconvictions) of the intervention. 
R * CR < Cint     (5.11) 
In the specific case of SIPS, Equation 5.11 is fullfilled if, for example, it is assumed that reconviction 
costs CR are zero. Such a situation is illustrated in Graph C. The negative impact on unknow 





Scenario analysis: alternative intervention costs associated with BLC 
BA and BLC are the two more intense interventions, and cost £ 2.2 and £ 13.2, respectively. The 
minimal intervention, CIL, costs only £ 0.2. Intervention costs are very low compared to costs 
associated with criminal events, and differences in the costs of implementing alternative 
treatments are very small. Nevertheless, as discussed in Sub-section 5.8.1, intervention costs might 
have been actually underestimated. For this reason, alternative scenarios were explored, where 
intervention costs associated with BLC ranged from £ 0 (i.e. cost saving) to £ 2000 (i.e. more than 
100 times more costly than what was estimated). 
Graphs D and E show the INMBs associated with the variation in BLC costs. Even when the cost of 
implementing BLC is much higher (e.g. £ 2000), INMBs are always positive when compared to CIL. 
Nevertheless, ceteris paribus, £ 1700 represents the tipping point after which it would be better on 
average to choose BA rather than BLC. 
  
However, these are the results of a univariate sensitivity analysis and do not consider the 
uncertainty of other estimates. As illustrated in the figure below, if the uncertainty around the 
effectiveness of BLC is included, for k = 11,000 £/R, BLC should cost approximately £ 8,000 to be 




Scenario analysis: alternative costs in response to crime 
As pointed out in Sub-section 5.8.3, estimates of the costs in response to crime (i.e. CJS costs 
associated with each re-conviction episode) might be deemed inaccurate. These costs play an 
important role. If costs in response to crime were higher, INMBs associated with BA and BLC would 
increase because preventing one additional crime would help saving more resources. On the 
contrary, lower costs of recidivism would imply that cost savings are lower, and cost of the 
intervention would matter more. 
However, in this specific case, being the costs of the intervention particularly low, INMBs of BA and 
BLC compared to CIL are likely to be positive even if costs in response to crime were lower. In fact, 
as shown in the figure below, for k = 11,000 £/R, BLC provides higher INMBs than CIL even if costs 




P. Equity weighting: threshold analysis 
Results of the CEA from the HC perspective with a weight for victims’ health = 1.1 
Incremental Net weighted Health Benefit (INwHB) 
Group affected 
'Traditional' estimate Additional component Total 
DE OC DE OC DE OC 
Brief advice (BA) 
Offenders -0.010     -0.010   
Victims    0.018  0.018   
Unknown victims     0.000   0.000 
General population   0.029   -0.020   0.009 
INwHB -0.039 QALYs 0.039 QALYs 0.000 QALYs 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling (BLC) 
Offenders -0.018      -0.018   
Victims    0.024   0.024   
Unknown victims     -0.001   -0.001 
General population   -0.017   -0.026   -0.044 
INwHB -0.001 QALYs 0.050 QALYs 0.050 QALYs 
 
Incremental Net weighted Monetary Benefit (INwMB) 
Group affected 
'Traditional' estimate Additional component Total 
DE OC DE OC DE OC 
Brief advice (BA) 
Offenders -130       -130   
Victims    237  237   
Unknown victims     -5   -5 
General population   374   -263   111 
INwMB -504 £ 505 £ 1 £ 
Brief Lifestyle Counselling (BLC) 
Offenders -234       -234   
Victims    307   307   
Unknown victims     -7   -7 
General population   -227   -340   -567 





Q. Distributional analysis of the ‘traditional’ CEA 
The following graphs illustrate the results of the DCEA without considering the effects on victims’ 
health due to avoided crimes and the related additional cost savings. 
 
 
Estimates associated with both BA and BLC fall into the ‘lose-lose’ quadrant of the health equity 
impact plane, being neither cost-effective nor likely to improve health equity insofar as they 
disproportionately benefit well-off groups. BA is the intervention that provides the greatest overall 
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